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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Objectives 
The concept of dynamic capabilities is an influential strategic management framework 
for understanding how competitive advantage evolves in situations of rapid and 
unpredictable change and how this advantage sustains over time (Teece et al., 1994, 
Grant, 1996, Kogut and Zander, 1997, Teece et al., 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, 
Pisano, 2000, Zollo and Winter, 2002). This perspective focuses on the processes and 
structures by which managers “integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997). 
Despite the recognized significance of dynamic capabilities, the perspective has not gone 
unchallenged. It has been criticized as conceptually vague and tautological and that it 
lacks empirical grounding (Mosakowski and McKelvey, 1997, Williamson, 1999, Priem 
and Butler, 2001). Moreover, D’Aveni questioned the existence of sustained competitive 
advantage in dynamic markets (1994). 
The tautology surrounding the concept of dynamic capabilities may be caused by the fact 
that it is frozen within theoretical firm- level derivations instead of a more operational and 
empirical grounding. The ambiguity created by this can be seen in the various definitions 
of dynamic capabilities in literature. (See, for example, Teece (1997), Eisenhardt (2000), 
or Zollo (2002)). Most of them use highly aggregated definitions like “the learned and 
stable pattern of collective activity through which the organization systematically 
generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness” (Zollo 
and Winter, 2002). These definitions are academically true and valid but still on a high 
level of abstraction. This tautology and vagueness have made it difficult to derive 
concrete implications for real management practice. 
We have recently witnessed some interesting attempts to break up this tautology. One of 
these attempts was Eisenhardt and Martin’s re-conceptualization of dynamic capabilities 
(2000). They identified dynamic capabilities as “specific organizational and strategic 
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processes (e.g. product development, strategic decision making, alliancing) by which 
managers alter their resource base”. In their view, dynamic capabilities consist of 
“identifiable and specific routines that often have been the subject of extensive empirical 
research in their own right outside the resource-based view of the firm” (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000).  
The results of such attempts are a first step, confirming that the concept of dynamic 
capabilities can be linked to concrete business operations in a way that is more realistic, 
empirically valid and non-tautological. A more empirical-based approach to dynamic 
capabilities seems to be necessary, one that links dynamic aspects of organizations to real 
business operations, but stays within a broader configuration of business strategies and 
firm- level contexts. 
Using an empirical-based approach to dynamic capabilities requires a fundamentally 
different understanding of what dynamic capabilities are, away from abstract definitions 
like ‘routines-to-learn-routines’ towards specific processes and structures that can be 
described and observed in real business operations. But within the traditional strategic 
management context, the idea of using specific processes like product development as 
level of analysis for the research of dynamic capabilities could hardly find a taker, due to 
the now acknowledged dominance of the resource-based view of the firm (Priem and 
Butler, 2001). 
However, these persistent research problems on dynamic capabilities suggest that we still 
do not have a sufficient understanding of the nature and evolution of dynamic capabilities 
and, as a consequence, we can hardly derive implications for management practice. 
Therefore, a more empirical-based understanding of dynamic capabilities and of the 
pattern they exhibit in specific processes (like product development) is desirable. This 
work aims to achieve such an understanding by investigating a dynamic capability 
perspective to product development following Eisenhardt and Martin’s proposition that 
dynamic capabilities exhibit common features that are associated with effective processes 
across firms (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
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1.2 Research Question 
My claim is to reduce tautology and vagueness from the concept of dynamic capabilities. 
I contend that we can reduce tautology and vagueness if a dynamic capability perspective 
to product development provides valuable contributions for product development 
operation. 
Thus, I derive my research question 
“Does the concept of dynamic capabilities provide valuable contributions for 
   product development operation?” 
1.3 Expected Results 
Explaining how and why some firms are more successful than others in developing new 
products has been a central and enduring quest of researchers in management and other 
disciplines. This topic was the subject of various case studies in which product 
development success stories were known to have been used. The case studies investigated 
how and why this success story had occurred, entertaining several rival explanations such 
as coherent product-market positioning, superior project organization, or charismatic 
team leaders, among others. 
A dynamic capability perspective to product development presents a different approach. 
Most research on product development either employs highly aggregated concepts like 
product-market positioning or focuses on low level tasks and practices. A dynamic 
capability perspective to product development, by contrast, is an intermediate- level 
concept that combines product development operation into cohesive wholes, yet offers a 
fine-grained, differentiated perspective. Such a perspective is inherently dynamic. 
Because product development capability unfolds over time, this perspective captures 
linkages among activities that are often lost in static models and cross-sectional analyses. 
A dynamic capability perspective to product development encourages thinking in story 
lines rather than events. For this reason, the approach is unusually helpful in addressing 
problems of implementation of strategic intentions (Hamel, 1989). Managers can 
articulate the required steps in product development tasks and projects as well as 
improvements.  
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Finally, product development represents the intimate connection between diverse 
perspectives and the futility of analyzing them in isolation. It is extraordinary difficult to 
derive management implications based on one single variable without first taking account 
of the others. 
As for research on dynamic capabilities, a dynamic capability perspective to product 
development provides a disaggregated model of dynamic capabilities, but does so in 
ways that make the operationalization of dynamic capabilities more tractable and explicit. 
Put another way, if the concept of dynamic capabilities answer the ‘what to do’ question, 
product development operation provides a fine-grained answer of the ‘how to do it’ 
question.  
1.4 Research Methodology 
It is clear from my research that sustained product development success is a function of 
an organization’s overall product development capability. I reviewed the existing 
literature as a guide of research in order to identify pattern of product development 
capability. After reviewing the more ‘static’ pattern, I investigated dynamic aspects of 
product development capability. In this sense, I apply a dynamic capability perspective to 
product development according to the conceptualizations o f Teece (1997) and Eisenhardt 
(2000). I identified open and vague links and cause-effect patterns between dynamic 
aspects (like learning processes and path dependencies) and product development tasks. 
From this standpoint, where literature is vague and poor in content, I continued with 
exploratory case study research.  
My research strategy follows the procedure proposed by Stuart et al. (2002). The research 


















Figure 1 – The Five Stage Research Process (Stuart et al., 2002) 
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Chapter 1 explains the problem and defines the research question. Chapter 2 starts with 
theory development of the capability to develop new products successfully or what I have 
termed ‘product development capability’. It develops the theoretical foundation of a 
dynamic capability perspective to product development that is to be validated and 
extended in the following data gathering and analysis phase. Conducting stage 3, I report 
two exploratory case studies in two different settings: the first in automotive industry at 
the German automobile manufacturer Audi and, the second, in telecommunications 
industry at the enterprise network (EN) division of Siemens ICN. The Audi cases were 
studied in the course of my observations of project work at the Audi Product 
Management Department (1999-2003). The data of the Siemens cases follow my 
observation of a restructuring initiative at Siemens ICN-EN in order to address the 
problem of fast changing environments (2000-2002). Stage 4 analyses case study 
evidence and derives propositions and links out of the cases. The stages 2-4 are described 
in more detail in Figure 3 and they are compatible to the framework for case study 





























Figure 2 – Applying Case Study Research Methodology (Yin 1994) 
The core of empirical work examines the relationship between elements of dynamic 
capabilities and product development operation. This methodological approach is rooted 
in the work of many others that studied dynamic capabilities within the product 
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development context; see, for example, Leonard-Barton (1992), Henderson and Cockburn 
(1994), Iansiti and Clark (1994), Tabrizi and Eisenhardt (1995).  
1.5 Contribution to Theory and Practice 
To academia, this research intends to make contributions for both dynamic capabilities 
research and product development research.  
Firstly, the work attempts to reduce tautology and vagueness from the concept of 
dynamic capabilities. Much of dynamic capability literature is locked into highly 
aggregated concepts with the firm as the level of analysis. The perspective developed 
here sketch potential elements for operationalization of dynamic capabilities as ‘common 
features’ (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) of working- level practices. Linking working-
level practices with dynamic aspects of product development capability will reduce the 
tautology and vagueness of the concept. 
Secondly, research on dynamic capabilities is criticized because it lacks empirical 
grounding (Mosakowski and McKelvey, 1997, Williamson, 1999, Priem and Butler, 
2001). By reporting several product development case studies of two different firms in 
different industries, this work contributes to fill this gap. 
Thirdly, by exploring a dynamic perspective to product development, I provide some new 
insights into the question “Why are some firms more ‘capable’ than others in developing 
new products?” These issues are central for various research streams in academic 
management literature. 
Fourthly, research on product development profits from this research in the way that such 
a ‘dynamic’ perspective calls into question traditional ‘market-based’ approaches to 
product development where planning and doing proceed sequentially. In dynamic 
environments, a more ‘learning-based’ approach might be more adequate where probing 
and learning proceeds iteratively.  
The use of this work for management practice is twofold. First, it can help managers to 
see product development projects as elements of a broader firm-level context. Such a 
view is not focused solely on individual projects but also on market positions and 
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competence bases that themselves are objects for evolution through effective product 
trajectories.  
Second, it provides implications for managers to institutionalize and manage dynamic 
routines like learning and reconfiguration. These processes have hardly been in the focus 
of traditional product development literature but, as we will see in the case studies, they 
can and should be managed in order to create and sustain new product success. 
1.6 General Outline 
1. Introduction
5. Conclusions
2.1 Pattern of Product Development Capability
2.2 Market-based Pattern of Product Development Capability
2.3 Resource-based Pattern of Product Development Capability
2.4 Evolutionary Pattern of Product Development Capability
2.5 Dynamic Pattern of Product Development Capability
2.6 New Content for Product Development
3.1 Empirical Design
3.2 The Audi Case Study
3.3 The Siemens ICE Case Study
3.4 Static vs. Dynamic Routines
3. Empirical Evidence from Audi and Siemens
2. A Dynamic Capability Perspective to Product 
Development
4. Analyzing Case Study Evidence
4.1 Pattern of Product Development Capability 
4.2 Elements of Product Development as Dynamic Capability 
4.3 New Content for Product Development Research
4.4 Implications for Future Research
 
Figure 3 – Structure of Work 
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The remainder of this study follows the methodology and is structured as depicted in 
Figure 3. Theoretical work starts in Chapter 2 with a literature review about pattern of 
product development capability. At least three different patterns of product development 
capability have been found to be important: market-based, resource-based and 
evolutionary pattern. The analysis is followed by a dynamic pattern of product 
development capability based on the concept of dynamic capabilities. In a third step, 
some basic elements of a dynamic capability perspective to product development are 
determined that are a basis for the following empirical work.  
The transition to empirical work is performed in Chapter 3 and describes two exploratory 
case studies at Audi and Siemens ICN-EN. Chapter 4 analyzes and discusses the case 
studies in order to identify pattern of product development capability that are then 
discussed and compared with theoretical derivations of Chapter 2. Chapter 4 finishes with 
implications for future research. Chapter 5 concludes the results and insights out of the 
case studies. 
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2 A Dynamic Capability Perspective to Product 
Development 
This chapter develops the theoretical foundation of a dynamic capability perspective to 
product development. It comprises six sections, one introductory in nature, four on the 
routines and structures that build the pattern of product development capability and one 
concluding the results. Section 2.1 introduces product development capability as the 
driver of sustained new product success as it is seen by strategic management and product 
development literature and probes the relevant aspects of it to clarify the rough areas of 
interest. Sections 2.2 to 2.5 discuss patterns of product development capability; each from 
a different perspective (market-based, resource-based, evolutionary, dynamic). Section 
2.6 turns attention to product development operation and concludes the results as ‘New 
Content for Product Development’. 
2.1 Product Development Capability 
Successful new products and services are critical for many organizations, since product 
development is one important way that firms can implement strategic intentions into real 
business operations (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). There is, accordingly, a large and 
growing literature on product development at the level of both specific projects (e.g. 
Cooper, 1996) and the firm as a whole (e.g. Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Researchers 
have identified various characteristics that relate to new product success, such as market-
orientation (Day, 1990) or innovative product features (van de Veen, 1986) among 
others. 
Some of the earliest work of product development that emphasized the importance of 
market issues over purely technical ones was written by Myers and Marquis (1969). They 
studied 567 successful products in over 100 firms and 5 industries. They concluded that 
market pull, i.e. identifying and understanding customer needs, was substantially more 
important to new product success than technology push. In addition, they identified cross-
functional integration as the key factor for product development success. 
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Subsequent research sharpened the emergent emphases on product advantages, market 
attractiveness, and product development organization. Particularly important were several 
studies of Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1979, 1987). The 1979 study, called NewProd, 
examined 102 successful and 93 failed products within 103 industrial firms in Canada. 
The 1987 study investigated 203 products in 125 manufacturing firms, including 123 
successes and 80 failures. Cooper and Kleinschmidt observed that the most important 
determinant of new product success was product advantage. The intrinsic value of the 
product, including unique customer benefits, high quality, attractive cost, and innovative 
features, was the critical success factor. Such products were seen as superior to 
competing products. Project organization was also found to be important. Particularly 
important was pre-development planning. This included a well-defined target market, 
product specifications, clear product concept, and extensive preliminary market and 
technical assessments. Finally, market conditions also affected new product success. 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987)  found that products that entered large and growing 
markets were more likely to be successful. However, they also noted that market 
characteristics were less important than were product advantage and internal 
organizational factors such as pre-development planning and a clear product concept. 
More recently, Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1995) conducted another study of product 
development efforts by 161 business units in the chemical industry. The authors 
replicated some of their earlier findings. Most notably, this time they highlighted that 
product development organization was most strongly associated with new product 
success. They recommended a “high quality product development process” as a major 
determinant of new product success. Contrary to their earlier studies, the authors found in 
this study that market competitiveness had no relationship with new product success. 
Other studies focused not on sole projects or products but on sequences of products. 
Arthur D. Little (1991), for example, noted that many organizations still have difficulty 
with sustained product development success, or managing a number of product 
development efforts over time. Sustained new product success has been found 
particularly difficult for organizations with long histories of stable operations. 
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However, these results suggest that product development literature remains ambiguous in 
what characteristics and activities make product development successful. Is it either the 
product-market positioning, the way product development is organized or innovative 
product features or other things that are the source of new product success? In a way, all 
of the mentioned topics are important. They altogether build a kind of pattern of product 
development capability. This pattern needs further investigation. To do so, I first review 
the existing literature as a guide for research and, based on this review, I explore concrete 
routines and structures that form the cumulative patterns of product development 
capability. 
2.1.1 Product Development and Competitive Advantage 
Product development success can be defined as the achievement of something desired, 
planned or attempted. Firms that enjoy successful products also enjoy the positive 
economic consequences. I start with identifying the relevant attributes that determine 
product development success. To do so, we ask how product development affects the 
firm’s competitive position. From such a standpoint, we can argue that product 
development is successful when it produces positive strategic consequences or, in other 
words, when it creates and sustains competitive advantages. 
In a popular work of product development, Clark and Wheelwright concluded that 
product development can create competitive advantage in at least three areas: market 
position, resource utilization, and organizational renewal (Clark and Wheelwright, 1993). 
All three areas are studied within traditional product development literature. However, 
their theoretical foundations are more dedicated to strategic management literature, where 
one can find constructs and theoretical concepts that explain sources of competitive 
advantage from different viewpoints. Using strategic parlance, we can argue that product 
development can create competitive advantage of at least three different types: market-
based advantages, resource-based advantages, or evolutionary advantages. 
Market-based Advantages 
A firm’s market position consists of the products or services it provides, the market 
segments it sells to, and the degree to which it is isolated from direct competition (Porter, 
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1980). In general, the best positions involve supplying distinctive products to price- 
insensitive buyers, whereas poor positions involve being one of many firms supplying 
marginally distinctive products to well- informed, price-sensitive buyers. 
Market-based advantages can be gained by foresight, superior product-market 
positioning, or just by luck (Barney, 1986b). In such a sense, product development is 
successful when it builds or improves valuable market positions. 
Resource-based Advantages 
Resources include patents, trademarks, specialized physical assets, and the firm’s 
relationship with suppliers and distribution channels as well as a firm’s reputation with its 
employees, suppliers, and customers. Resources that constitute advantages are specialized 
to the firm, are built up slowly over time through the accumulated exercise of superior 
capabilities, or are obtained through being an insightful first mover (Lieberman and  
Montgomery, 1988), or just by luck. For example, during the 80s, Japanese car 
manufacturers possessed an advantage that was embodied in superior product quality. 
In this sense, product development is successful when it builds or improves valuable 
resources or capabilities for the firm. 
Evolutionary Advantages 
A firm’s way of learning and reconfiguration can be a source of advantage if capabilities 
are based on the firm’s history of learning-by-doing and if it is rooted in the coordinated 
behavior of many people. By contrast, capabilities that are based on generally understood 
scientific principles, on training that can be purchased by competitors, or which can be 
analyzed and replicated by others are not sources of sustained competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991). 
Evolutionary advantages are usually organizational, rather than the improvement of 
individual skills. They involve the adept coordination and collaboration of specialists and 
are built through the interplay of investments, operation, and learning (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). Unlike physical assets, evolutionary advantages enhance capabilities by 
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their use. Capabilities that are not continually used and approved will atrophy (Abell, 
1999). 
Evolving technologies and customer requirements can make existing capabilities obsolete 
or sometimes require new ones. Therefore, product development is successful when it 
contributes to renewal of capabilities over time (Dougherty, 1992). 
2.1.2 Capabilities vs. Competences 
In the last section, I identified three different types of competitive advantage that product 
development creates: market-based, resource-based, and evolutionary advantages. I 
introduced the term “capability” as a construct to describe resource-based and 
evolutionary advantages created by product development. Before I continue to explore 
the sustainability of these advantages, the parlance of this work is to be defined. 
We argue that new product success that is not built up by luck is rooted in fundamental 
product development capability (Stalk et al., 1992). The capability under examination is 
defined at a relatively broad level as the capability to develop new products (Moorman 
and Slotegraaf, 1999). More specifically, it can be defined as the ‘ability’ of the 
management to use and integrate existing organizational competences to create and 
sustain new product success. 
In contrast to my definition here, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) use the term ‘competence’ 
or “core competence” with a different understanding. In this work, I differentiate between 
the terms competences and capabilities. The term ‘competence’ is used to describe more 
technological competences and the term ‘capability’ is used for broader organizational 
capabilities. 
In this logic, various competences build the overall product development capability. 
These competences can be combined in various ways, for example, through joint ventures 
or other forms of alliances with partners, licensing agreements, franchising relationships 
and long-term contracts, the combinations of which result in networks. This can happen 
in parallel, as when an electronic firm combines its research competences with that of a 
mechanical product firm to develop electromechanical products together. Or it can 
happen sequentially, as when the design competence of one firm is combined with the 
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engineering competence of another. However they are combined, altogether these 
competences build the overall product development capability of a firm (Hagedoorn and 
Narula, 1996, Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1998, Steensma and Corley, 2000). 
2.1.3 Characteristics of Product Development Capability 
Most organizations can develop a successful new product occasionally. The critical 
question is “What sustains this success, keeping competitors from imitating or replicating 
it?” For example, Peters (1992) described the introduction of a successful new product by 
a 120-year-old machinery manufacturer but wondered if the organization could replicate 
that success. Hage (1988) argued that long-stable organizations are especially challenged 
by changes in technology and global competition. 
For a firm’s product development capability, in order to provide sustained new product 
success, and thus, by implication, be a source of superior financial performance, three 
characteristics must be met. Product development capability must be valuable, rare, and 
imperfectly imitable (Barney, 1991). 
First, product development capability must be valuable; it must enable the firm to 
develop products in ways that lead to high sales, low costs, high margins, or in other 
ways add financial value for the firm. Because financial value is an economic concept, 
product development capability, to generate such value, must have positive economic 
consequences.  
Second, product development capability must be rare; it must have attributes and 
characteristics that are not common to the product development capability of a large 
number of other firms. 
Finally, product development capability must be imperfectly imitable; firms without such 
product development capability cannot engage in activities that will change their product 
development capability to include the required characteristics, and if they try to imitate 
this product development capability, they will be at some disadvantage (experience, 
reputation etc.) compared to the firm they try to imitate. 
 A Dynamic Capability Perspective to Product Development 22 
These three requirements result from work on sustained competitive advantage by 
strategic management researchers (Porter, 1980, Barney, 1991). The first requirement that 
a firm’s product development capability must enable it to develop products in ways that 
add economic value to the firm, is clearly a prerequisite for generating economic 
performance. If a firm’s product development capability enables it to develop products in 
ways that are inconsistent with a firm’s competitive position, then that capability cannot 
be a source of sustained competitive advantage.  
The requirement that valuable product development capability must be rare to generate 
sustained competitive advantage reflects Porter’s industrial analysis framework (Porter, 
1980). If many firms have a similar product development capability that allows them to 
develop products and compete in approximately the same way, none will possess a 
capability-based competitive advantage, and above-normal economic performance cannot 
be expected.  
Finally, even if the above conditions are met, it is still necessary for a firm’s product 
development capability to be imperfectly imitable to generate sustained new product 
success. Perfectly imitable capabilities, even if they are valuable, and even if they are 
currently rare, are subject to imitation that dissipates any new product success they may 
provide. The capability-driven new product success of one firm creates an incentive for 
other firms to modify their product development capability in order to duplicate that 
success. If the capability is perfectly imitable, it cannot give any one firm a sustained new 
product success and financial performance. Thus, for example, if ‘best practices’ are, in 
fact, easily transferable, as it is suggested by numerous consulting firms, then these ‘best 
practices’ cannot be a source of sustained new product success, and their existence cannot 
be an explanation of such a success. 
This leads to an interesting preliminary result: when product development capability 
creates and sustains new product success, then ‘best practices’ in a narrow sense cannot 
be the source of sustained new product success. If ‘best practices’ are instead part of an 
unfolding sequence of activities that altogether form the overall product development 
capability, then they can be the source of sustained competitive advantage. 
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Product Development Capability and Financial Performance 
A firm that has a valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable product development capability 
enjoys sustained new product success. Such a firm will enjoy the positive economic 
consequences of its product development capability. Relatively few other firms will be 
able to obtain these same benefits, and those firms that currently do not enjoy them 
cannot engage in activities that will make it possible to achieve them. However, the 
overall financial performance of a firm with such advantages can decrease if a firm fails 
to manage other strategically relevant capabilities and resources. While a firm with a 
valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable product development capability can obtain 
superior financial performance, other capabilities and resources of the firm like, for 
example, marketing capabilities and, not to forget, luck, can also lead to such 
performance. 
That analysis does not imply that most firms currently enjoying capability-based 
advantages always enjoy these advantages because a valuable capability today, in 
different economic and competitive contexts, can become a rigidity tomorrow (Leonard-
Barton, 1992a). Moreover, because other capabilities and resources can also generate 
sustained above-normal performance, it is possible that several firms in an industry can 
all obtain sustained superior financial performance based on different capabilities. 
Therefore, superior financial performance can only restrictively be an indicator for 
product development capability. 
The preliminary result of this section is that firms’ sustained new product success is 
rooted in product development capability if this success is founded in fundamental 
product development capability that is valuable, rare, and not easy to imitate. But we are 
still on a highly aggregated level where one can hardly derive management implications. 
In order to get a more cogent understanding of what such a pattern of product 
development capability looks like, I review the existing literature as a guide for research.  
2.1.4 Different Perspectives to Product Development Capability 
To understand patterns of product development capability, researchers have borrowed 
many concepts, techniques, and theories from other disciplines, ranging from social 
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theory to evolutionary biology. These concepts include industry-level, firm- level, and 
business unit-level observations. This variation has created a theoretical pluralism that 
has uncovered various ways to explain patterns of product development capability. 
However, the diversity of theories and concepts borrowed from different disciplines often 
encourages compartmentalization of perspectives that do not enrich each other and 
produce isolated lines of research (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). As van de Ven and Poole 
recognized: “It is the interplay between different perspectives that helps one gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of organizational life, because any one theoretical 
perspective invariably offers only a partial account of a complex phenomenon.” (van de 
Ven and Poole, 1995). Yet when different perspectives are compared with each other, 
they provide a powerful focus for a more cogent understanding of product development 
capability. 
Three Perspectives to Explore Pattern of Product Development Capability 
To identify pattern of product development capability, I describe the different viewpoints 
to the topic. Some authors started from an industrial viewpoint where they identified 
product development as an instrument to achieve superior market positions (Ansoff, 
1965, Andrews, 1971, Porter, 1980, Porter, 1986, Mintzberg, 1988). The notion of 
‘competitive and generative strategy’ resulted from this stream. Others started from the 
firm level and investigated superior resources and their utilization as sources of 
competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984, Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, Barney, 1991, 
Peteraf, 1993). Many concepts and tools, like the notion of core competences, derived 
from this research stream. A third stream, initiated by economists, concluded that the 
prime drivers of technological and organizational progress are mechanisms of variation, 
selection, and retention (Schumpeter, 1934, Nelson and Winter, 1982, Utterback, 1994, 
Tushman and Anderson, 1997). The emphasis on ‘innovation’ resulted from this research 
stream. Successful product development, in this sense, helps to develop the firm’s market 
position and competence base over time.  
By inductively examining the substance and argumentation paths of each viewpoint, I 
found that they could be utilized as three complementary perspectives to explore patterns 
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of product development capability. Each of these three streams has a rich and long-
standing intellectual tradition although various research fields use different terminologies. 
I refer to them as market-based, resource-based and evolutionary pattern of product 
development capability. 









Figure 4 – Three Different Perspectives to Product Development Capability 
Figure 4 illustrates that these three perspectives provide fundamentally different accounts 
to explore patterns of product development capability. From a resource-based 
perspective, product development capability involves the development process and 
internal organizational aspects (‘inside-out’). A market-based perspective determines 
product development capability from outside- in. Together, these two perspectives 
determine how product development is assigned and completed, how products match 
customer requirements, and how new technologies are introduced. 
At any given time, each organization’s product development capability has a mix of 
resource-based and market-based characteristics (‘white arrow’). An evolutionary 
perspective, the succession of the ‘white arrows’, shows the organization’s product 
development capability as it moves through time. This evolution is affected by prevailing 
resource and market characteristics and will unfold in different ways depending on 
generic aspects of resources and market position.  
This section describes these three perspectives in their pure ideal-type forms. Various 
studies of product development combine elements of these ideal types to explain 
observed pattern of product development capability in specific areas and contexts. Table 
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1 outlines the three perspectives in terms of key idea, relevant theories, representative 
studies, and role of product development. 
I shaped my review around these perspectives because each involves a pattern of 
cumulative citations evolving from some representative studies. The market-based 
perspective builds mainly on studies of Porter and Mintzberg with their notion of 
“generative and competitive strategies”; the resource-based perspective on studies of 
Wernerfelt, Prahalad and Hamel, Barney, and Peteraf with their notion of “firm-specific 
resources and competences”; and the evolutionary perspective on Schumpeter, Nelson, 
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Table 1 – Three Fundamental Perspectives to Product Development 
Further, although there are overlaps in focus and analysis across these areas, research 
within each area centers on particular aspects of product development capability. The 
market-based perspective focuses on the product in its market context, whereas the 
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resource-based perspective focuses on internal firm-specific characteristics, and the 
evolutionary perspective concerns the emergence of technologies and market contexts. 
Moreover, the research within each area is theoretically and methodically 
complementary. The market-based perspective is primarily a ‘static’ perspective and 
helps to broadly define ‘outside- in’ aspects of product development capability. The 
resource-based perspective complements these ‘outside- in’ aspects by accomplishing 
‘static’, ‘inside-out’ aspects of product development. The evolutionary perspective adds a 
‘dynamic’ consideration of how product development capability is influenced by 
technological and industrial evolutions over time. 
Working out the relationships between such seemingly divergent perspectives provides 
opportunities to develop new theory that has stronger and broader explanatory power than 
the initial perspectives. Some integration is thus desirable, but it must preserve the 
distinctiveness of alternative theories. I contend that such integration is possible if 
different perspectives are viewed as providing alternative pictures of the same 
phenomenon without nullifying each other. This can be achieved by identifying the 
viewpoints from which each dimension applies and the circumstances when these 
elements are interrelated in the context of product development. This approach preserves 
the authenticity of distinct theories, and at the same time advances theory building 
because it highlights circumstances when interplays among theories may provide stronger 
and broader explanatory power of successful product development. 
Overall, based on this review, these three perspectives capture best the cumulative pattern 
of product development capability. In the subsequent sections, I outline briefly each 
perspective, including their key concepts, underlying theory, critical findings, methods, 
strengths and weaknesses. However, as noted, although all areas are coherent bodies of 
work, they also complement and somewhat overlap one another. 
2.2 Market-based Pattern of Product Development 
Capability 
The ambiguous role of product development was one of the most popular issues 
addressed by management researchers. Given impetus especially by Porter (1980), 
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product advantage and product-market positioning came into the scope of management 
and management research during the 1980s and is still popular (Markides, 1999). 
Probably the best known model attempts to display the current product line from a 
growth rate and market share perspective (see Figure 5). This matrix, proposed by the 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG), categorizes products into one of four quadrants. The 
















Figure 5 – Product-Portfolio Matrix – Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 
While the BCG matrix looks at product development only from a financial viewpoint 
(cash-flow and investment), the reasons why, for example, a product is a ‘star’ are not 
displayed. 
The reasons why products become, for example, a ‘star’ has two aspects: the product 
must both match its basic mission and it must at the same time compete with other 
products (Porter, 1986). This dual character of the relationship between the product and 
its environment has its analog in two different aspects of product development success. 
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Analysis of the first is normally done by looking at changing market conditions over 
time. Analysis of the second, by contrast, typically focuses on the differences across 
products at a given time. In literature, this dualism is usually termed the generative and 
competitive aspect of strategy (Porter, 1986). 
The key to evaluating both aspects is an understanding of why the product in its market, 
as it currently stands, exists at all and how it assumed its current pattern. Once the analyst 
obtains a good grasp of the basic economic foundation that supports and defines the 
product in its market, it is possible to study the consequences of environmental changes. 
The problem was posed most clearly by Porter (1986), with his generative model of 
strategy. Porter posted that there are two basic types of product advantage a product can 
provide in the marketplace: low costs or differentiation (Porter, 1986). These combine 
with the ‘scope’ of a firm’s operation (the range of market segments targeted) to produce 
three generic strategies for achieving above-average product success in the market place: 
(1) cost leadership, (2) differentiation and (3) focus, as shown in Figure 6. 
Competitive Advantage






















Figure 6 – Porter’s Generic Strategies (Porter, 1986) 
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Mintzberg (1988) extended the conceptualization by Porter and argued that an 
organization can differentiate its products in six basic  ways: along price, image, support, 
quality, design, and no differentiation. These 6 basic ways are briefly described in Table 
2.  
Product Differentiation Description 
Price Differentiation The most basic way to differentiate a product (or service) is to 
charge a lower price for it. Price differentiation may be used with a 
product undifferentiated in any other way – in effect, a standard 
design. The organization absorbs lost margin, or makes it up through 
higher volumes of sales. 
Image Differentiation Organizations are sometimes used to create differentiation where it 
does not otherwise exist – an image is created for the product (or the 
company). Image has an emotional dimension independent from the 
physical attributes of the product. 
Support Differentiation More substantial, yet still having no effect on the product itself, is to 
differentiate on the basis of something that goes alongside the 
product, some basis of support. An example is 24h-delivery service. 
Quality Differentiation Quality differentiation has to do with product features that make it 
better. Examples are greater reliability, greater long-term durability, 
and/or superior performance. 
Design Differentiation Design differentiation means offering something truly different that 
breaks away from the ‘dominant design’ to provide unique features. 
No Differentiation No differentiation is a strategy. Copying successful products can be 
a strategy if there is enough room in the market. 
Table 2 – Strategies of Differentiation (Mintzberg, 1988) 
According to Mintzberg, the second dimension to distinguish product-market positions is 
by the scope of the product and services offered, in effect the extent of the markets in 
which they are sold. Mintzberg proposed four market strategies: unsegmentation, 
segmentation, niche, and customizing that are described in Table 3. 
Along with these models, there now exist clear guidelines as to how product development 
decisions can be better reflected within corporate decisions.  
 
 
 A Dynamic Capability Perspective to Product Development 31 
Market Strategy Description 
Unsegmentation Strategy “One size fits all”. Examples are Ford T model, salt, sugar etc. 
Segmentation Strategy The possibilities for segmentation are limitless, as are the possible 
degrees. A distinction can be made between simple segmentation 
(cars: sedan or station wagon) to fine segmentation strategy 
(individual colors etc.). Also some organizations seek to be 
comprehensive in their product line, to serve all segments, others to 
be selective, targeting only certain segments. 
Niche Strategy Niche strategies focus on a single segment. Porsche’s niche is 
sports cars. 
In a sense, all strategies are in some sense niche, characterized as 
much by what they exclude as by what they include. 
Customizing Strategy  Customization is the limiting case of segmentation. Each customer 
constitutes a unique segment. Architecturally designed houses and 
buildings are examples. 
Table 3 – Strategies of Scope (Mintzberg, 1988) 
2.2.1 Market-Based Routines in Product Development Operation 
The market-based perspective had its impact in product development operations. It 
emphasized that products should be planned and designed thoroughly before they are 
implemented physically. 
Separating the ‘Planning’ from the ‘Doing’ 
This philosophy leads to a separation of ‘planning’ and ‘execution’ or ‘concept 
development’ and ‘product implementation’. Figure 7 shows this simple product 











Figure 7 –Separation of ‘Planning’ and ‘Execution’ in Product Development Operation 
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Product development starts with a product idea and ends with the product release. The 
process consists of two phases: concept development (planning) and product 
implementation (execution) separated by a ‘concept freeze’ milestone. 
Product development works as follows: concept development, aimed at the creation of a 
distinctive product concept, is optimized for the investigation of market opportunities, 
competitive moves, technical options, and production requirements. Once the product 
attributes are agreed, a product team defines the product concept that is then ‘frozen’ and 
transferred to the product implementation phase. While in the concept development phase 
effectiveness dominates the tasks (‘developing the right product’), product 
implementation activities are optimized to realize a product efficiently (‘developing the 
product right’).  
In such an approach the ‘frozen’ product concept is the pivotal topic in the development 
process. It is the link pin between management policy and product development 
operation. As such, the product concept critically determines product development 
success. 
The term product concept has been so widely used for different purposes that it has 
several defined meanings. For the purposes of this work, a product concept is a set of 
goals and objectives that, taken together, define the scope of the product development 
effort and its approach to create a successful product. 
A product concept addresses four important questions (Clark and Wheelwright, 1993): 
1. What products will be offered (i.e. breadth and the depth of the product line)? 
2. Who will be the targeted customers (i.e. market segments)? 
3. How will the product reach those customers (distribution channel)? 
4. Why will customers prefer our product to those of competitors (distinctive attributes 
and value)? 
Devising adequate answers to these questions is neither simple nor straightforward. It 
requires a reasonable store of situation-based knowledge and more than the usual degree 
of insight. In particular, each product concept is unique. For example, one cellular phone 
manufacturer might rely on new and innovative features as primary development goal 
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while another might place primary low costs as highest objective. Neither strategy is 
‘wrong’ or ‘right’ in any absolute sense; both may be right or wrong for the firms in 
question. Concept development must, then, rest on a type of situational logic that does 
not focus on ‘one best way’ but which can be tailored to the market situation as it is 
faced. 
Concluding Market-based Pattern  
Together, the market-based perspective recognizes the importance of pre-development 
planning and product-market positioning before the product is realized and it considers 
the effects of competition. This perspective evolved mainly from strategic management 
studies and developed strategies for effective product-market positioning that is 
generative and competitive in diverse market contexts. In this case, product development 
capability is seen as having the right product and market strategy. This perspective also 
highlights the role of the competitive context for effective product development. 
The market-based perspective emphasizes that product development needs an attractive 
product for an attractive market (Dougherty, 1990). Simply put, if a product is well 
planned and designed, the product development effort will create a superior product-
market position and, thus, will be a success.  
However, the stream suffers from several shortcomings. This stream may help to think 
about products and market positions, but it totally neglects internal organizational 
characteristics that allow for, for example, a ‘cost differentiation’ strategy. It does not 
answer the question if the organization is ‘capable’ to realize such a strategy. These 
inside-out aspects of product development capability are the scope of the following 
resource-based perspective. 
2.3 Resource-based Pattern of Product Development 
Capability 
The resource-based perspective focuses on intra-organizational characteristics that lead to 
new product success (Verona, 1999, Bharadwaj, 2000). The most influential theory of 
this perspective is the resource-based view of the firm, which describes how competitive 
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advantage within firms is achieved and how this advantage might be sustained over time 
(Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). The resource-based view 
focuses on internal organization of firms, and so complements the market-based view 
within the structure as determinants of competitive advantage (Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994, Porter, 1996, Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
In particular, the  resource-based view of the firm assumes that firms can be 
conceptualized as bundles of resources, that those resources are heterogeneously 
distributed across firms, and that resource differences persist over time (Wernerfelt 1984; 
Amit and  Schoemaker 1993). Based on this assumption, the different approaches of the 
resource-based view of the firm explain the development of competitive advantage that 
leads in the long term to ‘above-normal rents’. The basic argument of the resource-based 
view is that competitive advantage is the result of unique resources (Wernerfelt, 1984, 
Barney, 1991, Peteraf, 1993) and distinctive capabilities (Selznick, 1957) of the firm. 
Resources in this context include “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm 
attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to 
conceive of and implement strategies that improve efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney 
1991). 
According to Barney (1991), competitive advantage only evolves if resources are 
valuable (contribute to firm’s effectiveness or efficiency) and rare (not widely held). 
When these resources are simultaneously imperfectly imitable (they cannot easily be 
replicated by competitors) and not substitutable (other resources cannot fulfill the same 
function) – the so-called VRIN attributes – those resources fulfill the necessary attributes 
for sustained competitive advantage.  
If these resources are applied in the  ‘right’ combination and ‘adequate’ coordination then 
competitive advantage evolves (Kogut and Zander, 1997). This is where the 
conceptualization of ‘capabilities’ develops the argument further. Amit and Shoemaker 
define capabilities as “a firm’s capacity to deploy resources” (Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993). Grant provides a more concrete conceptualization: “capabilities involve complex 
patterns of coordination between people and people and other resources. Perfecting such 
coordination requires learning through repetition” (Grant, 1991). 
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Experience-based learning through frequent repetition of similar activities builds the 
basis for the evolution of organizational routines, where the organizational knowledge to 
solve context-specific problems is inherently codified. In other words, all standardized 
procedures or patterns of decision-making and problem-solving are based on routines and 
thus these routines are basic components of any organizational capability and therefore 
they can be interpreted as the essence of competitive advantage (Montgomery, 1995).  
Figure 8 presents the different levels of aggregation and analysis of the resource-based 








Figure 8 – Resource-Based View of the Firm - Levels of Aggregation 
Resource-based view recognizes the importance of resources and their utilization in 
explaining product development capability. But it also considers the value of 
collaboration and alliances. Embedded in the resource-based view of the firm is the 
assumption, that product development capability is inherently a function of resources and 
competences (Dougherty and Hardy, 1996, Moorman and Slotegraf, 1999). 
But still the constructs of resources and capabilities are very vague referred to their 
application in product development operation. If we focus on product development, it 
becomes clearer what types of resources or competences are required for product 
development. 
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2.3.1 Product Development and Competences 
Products reflect the competences captured by organizations that create them (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990). This comprises competences of the underlying technical foundations, 
specific engineering fields, managerial processes, users, distribution channels, markets 
etc. If one compares automobiles of different manufacturers, one can see different 
competences in design, ergonomics, manufacturing etc. As such, product development 
capability is linked to the underlying competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Because 
these competences comprise many different elements, for product development there is a 
need to distinguish between competences of at least two different types: function-specific 
competences or what can be termed “component competences” and context-specific 
competences or what can be termed “architectural competences” (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1994).  
Part of the competences required for conceptualizing a new product is captured in 
product components or sub-systems. These are self-contained, functional disciplines 
independent of the product architecture, such as brake system or radio receiver in 
automobiles. Developing a product means drawing upon many components. For example, 
competences needed for a complex product, like a cellular phone, range from integrated 
circuit design to antenna design and testing technologies. Creating these competences is a 
critical challenge for organizations. Successful product development is built on functional 
excellence, and no company can compete without strong foundations in functional 
competences. Strength at the component level is not enough, however. The diverse 
functional competences must be integrated with each other and with their product 
architecture to produce a product that functions consistently in diverse application 
contexts (Clark, 1985, Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). In a cellular phone, for example, the 
integrated circuits must work with circuit boards, and the whole must function reliably 
even in situations of movement or in humid environment. This is where architectural 
competence comes in. 
In distinctive products, diverse component competences combine to a coherent whole, 
consistent to its product strategy (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). The competence needed to 
perform these integrative tasks is not usually captured by component competences. Part 
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of the competences needed to perform product development is made up of integrative or 
architectural competences, which describes the interactions between components and 
their application context (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). 
Therefore, product development capability from a resource-based perspec tive requires at 
least two different types of competences: function-specific competences and architectural 
competences. 
To assess the existence of these competences it is useful to ask two questions. Firstly, has 
the organization demonstrated that it possesses the function-specific competences and 
problem-solving abilities required by the product concept? A product concept, as such, 
does not and cannot specify in detail each action that must be carried out. Its purpose is to 
provide structure to the general issue of the business’ goals and approaches to coping 
with its environment. It is up to members and departments of the organization to carry out 
the tasks defined by product concept. A concept that requires tasks to be accomplished 
which fall outside the available competence base might probably fail. 
And secondly, has the organization demonstrated the degree of integrative and 
architectural competence necessary to carry out the product concept? The key tasks 
required of a product concept not only require specialized function-specific competences, 
but often make considerable demands on the organization’s ability to integrate disparate 
activities (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). A manufacturer of standard cars may find, for 
example, that its primary difficulty in entering the luxury segment is a lack of system 
attributes like smoothness and gentleness of drive although they used only top quality 
components. Firms that want to expand their product portfolio to new markets with new 
products may find that the integrative competence, rather than function-specific 
competences, becomes the weak link in the concept posture. 
We can derive that, from a resource-based perspective, effective product development is 
only possible if the right resources or competences are available. Developing new 
products often requires the integration of complementary resources. These resources can 
be distinguished between as internal and external to the firm.  
 A Dynamic Capability Perspective to Product Development 38 
It is not unusual for a company to lack some of the complementary resources required to 
transform the product concept into a commercial product. The company can develop such 
resources internally, at the expense of lead time. Alternatively, the company might gain 
access to important complementary resources by entering into strategic alliances or other 
forms of collaboration. These collaborations are especially valuable when the resources 
gained through such an alliance are difficult to replicate or to substitute by competitors. 
2.3.2 Resource-Based Routines in Product Development 
Operation 
During the eighties and nineties, some organizations ‘overlapped’ concept development 
and product implementation (Schilling and Hill, 1998). Overlapping phases means that 
these organizations started product implementation be fore the final concept specification 
was agreed (see Figure 9). The key idea is that product implementation can start with a 
rough product concept that can be further detailed. Such organizations shortened 
development lead time dramatically compared to competitors that used the traditional 













Figure 9 – Overlapping ‘Planning’ and ‘Execution’ 
Moreover, this efficiency leap allowed firms to expand their product portfolios within the 
same available resources. For example, in 1985, Audi offered only two product lines, 
Audi 80 and Audi 100 with two derivatives Audi Coupe and Audi 200. Today, they offer 
5 product lines A2, A3, A4, A6, A8 with various derivatives.  
Starting implementation during concept development made the management of product 
development more challenging. While a clear separation of concept development and 
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implementation made it easier to focus either on effectiveness or efficiency, an 
overlapping of phases made it necessary to manage both at the same time. Concept 
development, therefore, was not the ‘playing in the sand’ anymore; late concept changes 
had a significant impact on development cost and project lead time. With ‘overlapping’, 
firms gained some advantages over their competitors. They could increase the number 
and frequency of products launched into the marketplace and were faster in the market 
than their competitors (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998). 
In the resource-based perspective to product development, sustained new product success 
or ‘sustainable competitive advantage gained via the product’ are taken for granted as an 
outcome of effective and efficient product development organization. This view of 
product development is rooted in the traditional economic view of organizations as 
operating systems (e.g. Wild, 1995). Using simple system terminology, product 
development may be seen to comprise inputs, processes, and outputs. This simple system 
structure represents product development with product ideas as input and product releases 
as output. In the words of Clark and Wheelwright: “The aim of any product or process 
development project is to take an idea from concept to reality by converging to a specific 
product that can meet a market need in an economical, manufacturable form.” (Clark and 
Wheelwright, 1993). 
The Product Development Funnel 
This view of product development was conceptualised by Wheelwright and Clark using 
the “funnel” metaphor (1992). Product development starts with a broad range of ideas as 
input and gradually refines to a product concept and selects from among them, creating 
some formal development projects that can be pushed to rapid product implementation 
and market introduction. This notion of a converging funnel is illustrated in Figure 10 
and helps to explain the product development process. The funnel metaphor structures the 
generation and screening of alternative product development options, combining a subset 
of these into product concepts, which are then implemented into commercial products. A 
variety of different product and process ideas enter the funnel for investigation, but only 
few of them will become a real commercial product or service. In the words of Clark and 
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Wheelwright “The funnel creates the architecture for the set of development activities 





Figure 10 – The Development Funnel (Clark and Wheelwright, 1993) 
Managing the development funnel entails some challenges. The first is to build variation 
of product ideas since organizations must expand their knowledge base and access to 
information to increase product ideas. The second is the selection of product ideas; that 
means to screen and focus resources on the most attractive opportunities. The third 
challenge is to balance variation and selection of product ideas. It seems best to combine 
various idea-generating mechanisms with a monitoring and control process.  
A framework to manage product development was proposed by Cooper (Cooper, 1990) 
with the concept of ‘stage-gate systems’ that gained a lot of attention in management 
practice. 
Stage-Gate Systems 
The concept of stage-gate systems aims to monitor and control the firm’s product and 
project progress (Cooper, 1990). A stage-gate system is a systematic process for moving 
a development project through the various stages from idea to launch. Cooper proposed 
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the following structure with five stages and five gates, exhibited in Figure 11. Stage 1-2 



























Figure 11 – A Funneling Approach, with 5 Overlapping Stages and Gates (Cooper, 1994) 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt supported their stage-gate concept by a benchmarking study 
examining new product efforts of 161 business units (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995). 
The authors identified three critical success factors to be the drivers of new product 
success: A high quality process, a clear and well-communicated new product strategy, 
and adequate resource allocation for the development effort. The three success factors in 
detail were  
1. A high quality process: This process includes those steps and activities in a product 
development project from idea to launch. Particularly important was the concept 
development phase. This included developing a well-defined target market, product 
specifications, clear product concept, and extensive preliminary market and technical 
assessments. Other process factors were also important, including cross- functional 
skills and their synergies with existing competences.  
2. A clear and well-communicated new product strategy. Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
found that products with clear goals and objectives were more likely to be successful. 
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3. Adequate resource allocation for new products. Senior management support was 
found to be especially important for devoting the necessary resources to achieve the 
project’s goals. 
A high quality product development process was found to be the strongest common 
denominator among successful products – more powerful than having a new product 
strategy or even having the right resources in place – although the three critical success 
factors were intimately connected, and the symbiotic effect of all three acting together 
yielded the most positive results. 
Concluding Resource-Based Pattern 
For product development, the resource-based perspective has several implications. New 
product success depends on the consistency between the intended product concept and 
the firm’s available resources and competences. Therefore, developing a product means 
not only to think about products and markets. It also requires thinking about available 
resources and competences that determine feasibility of the intended product concept. 
In addition, this perspective emphasizes that product development capability is reflected 
in product development organization, i.e. structure and process. Simply put, if product 
development is professionally organized and carried out, product development is 
successful.  
The resource-based perspective recognizes the importance of resources and their 
utilization and coordination in explaining new product success. However, a resource-
based perspective suffers from some shortcomings. This view may help to think about 
internal characteristics of product development capability, but it loses sight of product 
and market and cannot adequately explain how and why certain firms enjoy competitive 
advantages in situations of rapid and unpredictable change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000).  
In contrast to the market-based perspective, this perspective has more depth and is more 
specific about product development process and organization. 
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However, both market-based and resource-based perspectives scarcely consider the 
dynamic aspects of changing markets and technologies. This is the topic of the following 
evolutionary perspective to product development capability. 
2.4 Evolutionary Pattern of Product Development Capability 
A fast growing number of management researchers suggest the need for developing 
conceptual frameworks that would allow an explanation of the dynamic aspects of firm 
behavior over time. Evolutionary theory may be useful for this purpose. This perspective 
is emerging in economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982), organization theory (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984) and strategic management literature (Burgelman and Rosenbloom, 1997). 
Evolutionary theory recognizes the importance of history, irreversibility, invariance, and 
inertia in explaining organizational behavior as a sociological system. Clark (1985) found 
that the study of product development contains many elements that seem compatible with 
the variation-selection-retention structure of evolutionary theory.  
In evolutionary theory, a general term used to explain the behavioral pattern of firms is 
‘routine’. Routines can be interpreted as the basic elements of processes and play the role 
that genes play in biological evolutionary theory. They are a persistent feature of the 
organism and determine its possible behavior (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
An evolutionary  perspective focuses on mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention 
for explaining dynamic behavior over time. This is reflected in the three different types of 
routines proposed by Nelson and Winter (1982): search routines, investment routines, and 
operating routines in order to explain dynamic firm behavior. Teece et al. (1994)  
proposed a distinction between static and dynamic routines. 
Two characteristics of routines are important to note. Firstly, the distinction in different 
types is subtle and continuous and not clear and sharp and secondly, different types of 
routines exhibit simultaneous, interacting aspects of the evolutionary process (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). 
Embedded in the evolutionary perspective is a view of product development as a social 
learning process. In this view, effective product development is inherently a function of 
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building and reconfiguring of competences (Teece et al., 1997). Such reconfigurations are 
the source of opportunities, which are discovered, selected, and retained through product 
development. Performing product development is expected to have feedback effects on 
the overall product development capability (Burgelman and Rosenbloom, 1997). 
Two key ideas for product development capability underlying the evolutionary 
perspective are useful to note. First, successful firms develop distinctive product 
development capability in the course of their product development efforts and the 
direction of development cannot be determined at the outset (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
The second idea is that “unlearning” is an important aspect of product development 
capability (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). 
2.4.1 Technology as Driver of Evolutionary Processes 
In the following, I focus on technology as a driver of evolutionary processes. In a narrow 
sense, this scope is incomplete because market shifts and changes of customer 
preferences can also drive evolutionary processes. But for the purposes of this work, and 
not to lose the main focus of product development, I concentrate on technology as the 
driver of evolutionary processes.  
When technology, in its broadest sense, is embodied in technological competences, 
technical progress puts the organization in a state of incessant reconfiguration. Its 
structure and processes must continuously adapt to innovatio ns in products, technologies, 
modes of organization, and to evolving competitiveness of markets (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997, Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999). Competences that embody new 
technologies must continually be created, while outdated competences must be released. 
Effective product development can, therefore, be interpreted as a Schumpeterian process 
of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942, Neff and Shanklin, 1997) that results in an 
ongoing renewal of competences and often entails distressing competence losses, even of 
core competences (Leonard-Barton, 1992a, Lynskey, 1999).  
Product development should define an effective response to threats and opportunities in 
markets and technologies by matching the approach of the project and product to the 
firm’s evolving environmental context (Teece, 1998). These threats and opportunities in 
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markets and technologies are opportunities for innovation and, therefore, innovation 
should be seen as an integral part of product development (Tyre and Orlikowski, 1993, 
Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994, Bower and Christensen, 1995). 
Product development in such a sense is not an isolated event where managers can 
conceptualize the product along their available resources and market positions. Product 
development happens in an environmental context, which influences all levels of 
managerial and organizational routines embedded in product development activities 
(D'Aveni, 1999, Teece, 2000). Therefore, new product success is strongly driven by the 
requirements of the environmental context. 
Categorization of Environments 
In literature, characteristics and categorization of environmental contexts can be found in 
different research streams. In strategic management literature, environments are 
categorized according to their dynamism; environments are described as “high-velocity” 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988) or “hyper-competitive” (D'Aveni, 1994) and according 
to new developments in complexity theory as “rugged fitness landscapes” (Beinhocker, 
1999).  
However, not all environments with above-the-average change rate can be termed 
dynamic. Environments that change often but in a predictable way and environments with 
a limited number of strategically relevant variables (e.g. government regulated markets) 
can hardly be classified as dynamic environments. In literature, two characteristics are 
often used to describe dynamic environments: frequency and intensity of technological 
change. 
Frequency of technological change is one characteristic of dynamic environments. The 
more technological innovations occur in one industry, the more dynamic are 
environments. Some studies use R&D expenditures, e.g. (Medcaf, 1999), or patent 
citations, e.g. (Deng et al., 1999), as metrics that indicate the frequency of innovation. 
Intensity of technological change is another characteristic of dynamic environments. The 
more radical innovations occur in one industry, the more dynamic are environments. 
Some studies use cyclical models of technology (Anderson and Tushman, 1990), and/or 
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trajectory models of technology (Christensen, 1997) that explain intensity of 
technological change. 
Such dynamics have accentuated the importance of speed and variety in product 
development especially in turbulent industries like telecommunications. But changes in 
competition, customer demand, and technology also have dramatic  effects on older, more 
mature industries in which product innovation has always been an important part of 
competition. In the automobile industry, for example, life cycles have shortened and 
product variety has increased. In addition, competition has placed increased pressure on 
new innovative product features as well as reliability and cost (Tyre and Orlikowski, 
1993). 
2.4.2 Incremental vs. Breakthrough Projects 
Concurrent to the intensity of technological change, organizations can develop products 
in different ways. Their projects can follow a breakthrough path, resulting in products 
that satisfy customer needs by embodying a fundamentally different technological base 
(Stringer, 2000). Such was the case in the development of the Sony transistor radio, 
which offered the customer a large increase in functionality at a much lower price. 
Projects can also follow an incremental path (Johnson, 1988). This approach leverages 
existing technologies and resources, increasing their match with market requirements. 
This was the case when Sony introduced the Walkman in the early 1980s. The product 
achieved a much smaller size than usual cassette players without changing its technology 
base. Not only can both breakthrough and incremental paths tackle technological 
challenges but both types may coexist even within the same context (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990, Utterback, 1994, Sharma, 1999). Such is the case in some platform projects 
that are incremental by definition but can possess some breakthrough characteristics. The 
same firm might even choose different approaches for different aspects of a single new 
product. Day and Schoemaker (2000) found that many manufacturers often decide to 
introduce new technologies in some subsystems, and focus on more incremental change.  
These different degrees of change have different implications for product development 
(Rice et al., 1998, Kaplan, 1999). Radical technological change can be associated with 
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breakthrough projects and incremental technological change with incremental projects 













Figure 12 –Types of Projects  
Framed in the way of Figure 12, incremental and breakthrough projects are extreme 
points along both dimensions. Breakthrough projects might establish a new dominant 
design, which means new product/process components linked together in a new 
product/process architecture. Incremental projects extend the established design, which is 
exhibited in improvements of individual product and process components, but the product 
and process architecture remain the same. 
In this logic, one can characterize the context of development projects along their degree 
of change. A breakthrough project renders obsolete the competences required to master 
the technology that it replaces. For example, the skills of mechanical type writers were 
rendered irrelevant by the development of electronic type writers and integrated circuits, 
respectively. 
An incremental project builds on competences embodied in the technology that it 
replaces. For example, the Audi Cabriolet built on the technology platform of the Audi 
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A4. Incremental projects introduce new technical competences, with enhanced product 
performance while building on an existing technical order rather than making it obsolete. 
2.4.3 Evolutionary Routines in Product Development Operation 
Work by Abernathy and Utterback (1978) showed that radical technological change does 
not emerge fully developed at the outset of product development. Technological 
evolution is usually characterized by periods of uncertainty followed by the acceptance of 
a dominant design that opens the period of incremental change. 
This pervasive phenomenon that occurs across industries and that is critical to 
understanding when and why breakthrough or incremental projects occur is the dynamic 
of product, service, and process innovation, dominant designs, and substitution events 
which together make up technology cycles (Utterback, 1994, Tushman and Anderson, 
1997). 
In any industry, there is a pattern of competition that describes the development of 
products over time (Tushman and Anderson, 1997). Technology cycles begin with a 
proliferation of innovation in products or services as the new product or service gains 
acceptance. At some point, a design emerged that became the standard preferred by 
customers. Once this occurred, the basis of competition shifted to price and features, not 
basic product or service design. The emergence of this dominant design transforms 
competition in the market (Utterback, 1994). Once it is clear that a dominant design has 
emerged, the basis of competition shifts to process innovation, driving down costs, and 
adding features. Instead of competing through product or service innovation, successful 
strategies now emphasize compatibility with the standard and productivity improvement. 
This competition continues until there is a major new product, service, or process 
substitution and the technology cycle kicks off again. As firms change their strategies, 
they must also realign their product development efforts to accomplish the new strategic 
objectives. This often requires breakthrough projects. 
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The Interaction between Technology and Product Development 
The concept of technology cycles and dominant design provides the answer of when and 
how incremental and breakthrough projects occur. Over a period of time, successful firms 
learn what works well and incorporate this into their operations. This is what 
organizational learning is about; using feedback from the market to continually refine 
products to get better and better at accomplishing its product trajectories. Such an attempt 
requires a kind of concurrency between product development projects and technology 
cycles. Further, since this concurrency is never perfect, achieving concurrency is an 
ongoing process requiring first a breakthrough project in order to create product/service 
innovation, and then to harvest the trajectory by incremental projects through continuous 
improvement (Orlikowski, 1992, Tushman et al., 1992, Tushman, 1996, Romanelli and 











Figure 13 – Concurrency between Project Trajectories and Technology Cycles 
Concluding Evolutionary Pattern 
Overall, the evolutionary perspective envisions that product development capability 
creates product trajectories that evolve concurrent to technological evolutions. Firms 
learn through breakthrough project and utilize their competences through one or more 
incremental projects. In other words, from an evolutionary perspective, effective product 
development creates effective product trajectories concurrent to environmental 
evolutions. 
The evolutionary perspective recognizes the importance of technological opportunities in 
explaining effective product development (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Product 
development shouldn’t be approached as a sole event; it is more a series of projects that 
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mutually adapts technology and organization in order to stay ahead of competition. 
Simply put, if firms are able to find and follow fruitful technology trajectories they enjoy 
long-term new product success.  
Firms engaging in innovation may find a path dead ahead. New technological 
opportunities may be attractive to create new product trajectories. If this opportunity is 
extremely attractive, firms can shift the allocation of resources away from traditional 
pursuits. 
In contrast to the market-based and resource-based perspective, this stream is more 
specific about technology cycles and their organizational impact. Product development in 
this sense is not an isolated event; it is part of an unfolding sequence of technological 
solutions that altogether create streams of product development projects. 
However, this stream suffers from some shortcomings. This perspective may help to 
think about the importance of technological progress but its scope are industry- level 
aspects. So it has more breadth but less depth than product-market aspects and resource 
utilization aspects of new product success. In addition, some of the constructs are very 
theoretical and therefore challenging for management practice. For example, how does 
management detect technological opportunities or how can organizations be responsive to 
technological change? Although this lack of clarity may reflect the complexity of the 
subject, it also impairs the usefulness of this perspective. 
2.5 Dynamic Pattern of Product Development Capability 
All three presented perspectives (market-based, resource-based, evolutionary) provide 
different accounts to product development capability. The market-based perspective 
emphasizes the significance of product-market positioning while the resource-based 
perspective outlines the importance of product development process and organization. 
The evolutionary perspective puts the focus on technological opportunities in order to 
create technological progress and related product trajectories. 
However, no one perspective can capture all different facets of product development 
capability. Some authors criticized each of these perspectives. For example, Barney 
(1991) criticized market-based perspective as “only half the story of understanding 
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sources of competitive advantage”. Priem and Butler (2001) criticized a resource-based 
view in four broad categories: (1) that a resource-based view is tautological, (2) that the 
argument fails to acknowledge that many different resource configurations could generate 
the same value for firms and, therefore, would not be sources of competitive advantage, 
(3) that the role of product markets is underdeveloped in the argument, and (4) that the 
theory developed has limited prescriptive implications (Barney, 2001). Miller and 
Shamsie (1995) found that it is meaningless to attempt to define resources independent of 
the tasks they are to serve and the environment within which they must function. 
Eisenhardt noted that a resource-based view cannot adequately explain how and why 
certain firms are more effective in situations of rapid and unpredictable change than 
others (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). D’Aveni found that sustained competitive 
advantage is unlikely in dynamic markets (D'Aveni, 1994). Gould criticized evolutionary 
theory and more general the application of concepts from biological evolutions to 
processes of social and cultural evolutions and termed it the “fallacy of unwarranted 
analogy” (Gould, 1987). 
Taking into account these admonitions, an integration of concepts and theories that 
utilizes each perspective’s strengths and avoids weaknesses would be a possibility to 
overcome this criticism. Especially complementing (the more ‘static’) market-based and 
resource-based perspective with evolutionary reasoning promises new insights for 
product development research. Evolutionary reasoning in identifying and explaining 
technological and organizational evolutions can provide further insights and 
understanding especially of dynamic phenomena.  
Integrating perspectives may be useful for integrating extant literature on management 
and technology (Burgelman and Rosenbloom, 1997) or as Winter pointed out “It is 
addressing the dynamics of resource exploitation that one finds the strongest 
complementarities between the resource-based view and evolutionary economics…” 
(Winter, 1995).  
In 1997, such an ‘integrated’ theory was presented by Teece, Pisano and Shuen with the 
concept of ‘Dynamic Capabilities’ (Teece et al., 1997). The concept of dynamic 
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capabilities can be interpreted as a ‘hybrid’ of a resource-based view and evolutionary 
theory.  
2.5.1 The Concept of Dynamic Capabilities 
The concept of dynamic capabilities has its roots in the notion of core competences 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) and related learning mechanisms. As an ‘integrated’ 
strategic management concept, it was first presented in 1997 by Teece, Pisano and Shuen 
(1997) and later reconceptualized by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000). Both 
conceptualizations are briefly presented within this section.  
The concept of dynamic capabilities is an influential framework in strategic management 
literature for understanding how competitive advantage is achieved and how that 
advantage might be sustained over time (Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). 
This perspective integrates the internal organization of firms and the dynamic interaction 
between firms and their environmental context (Henderson and Cockburn 1994; Teece et 
al. 1997).  
In 1997, Teece, Pisano and Shuen proposed a dynamic capabilities framework, which 
“analyzes the sources and methods of wealth creation and capture by private enterprise 
firms operating in environments of rapid technological change” (Teece et al., 1997). 
According to Teece et al. (1997), dynamic capabilities can be defined as a “subset of 
competences, which allow the firm to create new products and processes, and respond to 
changing market circumstances”. This definition makes clear that product development 
capability can be interpreted as a dynamic capability in the sense of the concept of 
dynamic capabilities.  
Following Teece and colleagues, the evaluation of dynamic capabilities is only possible 
through a differentiated analysis of (i) the firm-specific resource position, (ii) the 
historical path, and (iii) the processes of a firm (see Figure 14).  




















Figure 14 – The Concept of Dynamic Capabilities according to Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997 
According to ‘positions’, Teece et al. (1997) noticed “The strategic posture of the firm is 
determined not only by its learning processes and by the coherence of its internal and 
external processes and incentives, but also by its specific assets. (…). These include its 
difficult-to-trade knowledge assets and assets complementary to them, as well as its 
reputational and relational assets.” For the assessment of the firm-specific resource 
position, a definition by Barney (Barney, 1991) or a framework proposed by Wernerfelt 
(Wernerfelt, 1984) can help to evaluate existent resource positions. 
According to the evolutionary path and firm history, Teece et al. (1997) noticed, “the 
notion of path dependencies recognizes that “history matters”. Bygones are rarely 
bygones, despite the predictions of rational actor theory. Thus a firm’s previous 
investments and its repertoire of routines (its “history”) constrain its future behavior”. 
Consequently, apart from other factors, the evolutionary path of the firm constrains 
product development capability and, therefore, new product success.  
The managerial and organizational processes1 represent the organization’s knowledge 
and its competences (Teece et al., 1997). This goes largely with Nelson and Winter’s 
                                                
1 For a complete conceptualization of managerial and organizational processes see Garvin (1998) 
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evolutionary view on organizations (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Both approaches focus on 
the evolution and renewal of organizational capabilities over time. They evolved from 
different motivations and from different levels of perspective, but lead to similar results 
and insights. This can explicitly be seen in a process definition of Teece (1997): “By 
managerial and organizational processes, we refer to the way things are done in the firm, 
or what might be referred to as its routines”. Teece and colleagues characterized 
processes with the term “routines”, which builds the focus of interest of Nelson and 
Winter’s evolutionary level of analysis (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
These three classes of factors ‘positions’, ‘processes’, and ‘paths’ help determine a firm’s 
dynamic capabilities. Therefore, dynamic capabilities are embedded in organizational 
processes and are shaped by the assets the firm possesses (internal and market) and by the 
evolutionary path it has adopted (Teece et al., 1997). I will follow and apply the approach 
of Teece and colleagues in the case studies in Chapter 4.  
In 2000, Eisenhardt and Martin re-conceptualized dynamic capabilities from “tautological 
routines to learn routines that have been criticized as being tautological, endlessly 
recursive, and non-operational” towards “identifiable and specific routines that have been 
the subject of extensive empirical research in their own right outside the resource-based 
view of the firm” (2000). Moreover, they observed that dynamic capabilities “exhibit 
common features that are associated with effective processes across firms. (..) In popular 
parlance, there is best practice” (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Table 4 presents the 
contrasting concepts of dynamic capabilities of Teece et al. and Eisenhardt et al. 
Overall, Eisenhardt and Martin claimed that dynamic capabilities are specific processes 
like product development. Moreover, these capabilities are supposed to exhibit common 
features that are associated with effective processes across firms, which is commonly 
termed as “best practice”. They provided examples like cross- functional teams or 
customer feedback for such commonalities. However, the re-conceptualization of 
dynamic capabilities of Eisenhardt and Martin comes close to our aim to study the pattern 
of product development capability on an operation- level instead of firm- level. To do so, 
we need to study the routines and structures of product development from a dynamic 
capability perspective.  
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 Traditional view of dynamic 
capabilities 
Reconceptualization of dynamic 
capabilities 
Definition Routines to learn routines Specific organizational and strategic 
processes (e.g. product 
development) 
Pattern Detailed analytic routines Depending on market dynamism, 
ranging from detailed, analytic 
routines to simple, experiential ones 
Competitive 
Advantage 
Sustained competitive advantage 
from VRIN attributes 
Competitive advantage from 
valuable, somewhat rare, equifinal, 
substitutable, and fungible dynamic 
capabilities 
Table 4 – Contrasting Conception of Dynamic Capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) 
2.5.2 Organizational and Managerial Processes 
Following the dynamic capabilities perspective of Teece (1997) and Eisenhardt (2000)  
the processes that create product development capability can be distinguished into three 
different types: routines of integration (e.g. Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000), learning (e.g. 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1994), and reconfiguration (e.g. Katzy et al., 2003). 
Routines of integration continuously integrate all executed activities in organizations. 
Recently, these processes were very much in the scope of various initiatives, e.g. process 
reengineering (Hammer, 1990, Hammer and Champy, 1994, Hammer and Stanton, 1999) 
or cross- functional teams (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, Wheelwright and Clark, 1992, 
Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, Lutz, 1994) among others. Identification and adoption of 
new knowledge is commonly dedicated to learning routines. Changes in organizational 
structure and processes are usually referred to as reconfiguration routines. Both static and 
dynamic routines show interacting aspects, their separation is not clear and sharp (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982, Ghemawat and Costa, 1993). Because of increasing turbulences in 
technology and markets in the last years, the routines of learning and reconfiguration 
especially have recently been in the scope of literature in strategic management and 
change, e.g. (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, Henderson and Clark, 1990, Tushman, 1996, 
Burgelman and Rosenbloom, 1997, Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999, Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000, Teece et al., 1997). 
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The idea that routines might lead to dynamic capabilities seems to contradict well-known 
theories that routines cause organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
However, this ambiguity requires a distinction between routines of different ‘orders’ 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). Lewin (1951) argued that any operation at any point in time 
is order zero, change of that operation is order 1, change of change is level 2 etc. To 
distinguish these types of routines, I term order ‘0’ routines ‘static routines’ and order ‘1 
or more’ routines ‘dynamic routines’. With such nomenclature, we can note that routines 
of integration are static routines (order zero) and routines of learning and reconfiguration 
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Figure 15 – Pattern of Product Development Capability from a Dynamic Capability Perspective  
This complementary classification of routines allows conceptualizing product 
development capability in accordance with the concept of dynamic capabilities. Figure 15 
shows the pattern of product development capability from a dynamic capability 
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perspective. Pattern of product development capability can be conceptualized by 
distinguishing between static and dynamic routines. While static routines are the 
sequences of activities that build the overall product de velopment process (operating 
routines), dynamic routines are mechanisms of learning and reconfiguration (search and 
investment routines).  
The knowledge generated by product development may be thought of as organizational 
routines and standard operating procedures (Nelson and Winter, 1982). These are patterns 
of interactions which represent successful solutions to particular problems and which are 
resident in group behaviour, through certain sub-routines may be individual behaviour 
(Teece et al., 1994).  
Routines can be of several kinds. In this process model of product development 
capability, product development is presented as a set of static and dynamic routines. 
Static routines embody the capacity to replicate certain previously performed tasks. Such 
routines are never entirely static, because with repetition routines can be continuously 
improved. The presence of learning curves often indicates the operation of static routines 
(Teece et al., 1994, King and Tucci, 2002). 
Product Development Capability and Routines of Integration 
Integration embraces the effective and efficient coordination and integration of activities 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, Aoki, 1990, Iansiti and Clark, 1994). Work by Clark and 
Fujimoto on product development in the automobile industry illustrates such ‘static 
routines’ and the role of coordination, communication, and integration in developing new 
products (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Their study reveals a significant level of variation 
in how different firms perform the various activities required to develop a product from 
concept to market. These differences in product development capability seem to have a 
significant impact on such performance variables as development cost and time, and 
quality and seemed to have persisted for a long time.  
The fact that the dominant structure in most organizations is functional and that most 
tasks needed in a development project are defined and conducted in functions, adds the 
challenge of cross- functional integration. From engineering one needs design, tests, and 
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prototypes; from marketing, product positioning, customer analysis, and launch plans; 
from manufacturing, processes, cost estimates, pilot production and ramp-up. Integration 
and coordination within and between these functions were very much in the scope of 
recent product development literature, e.g. Takeuchi (1986), Clark and Fujimoto (1991)  
or Wheelwright and Clark (1992). 
In the 1990s most organizations adopted cross- functional team structures. However, as 
organizations experimented with such teams, they discovered that success with cross-
functional teams required more than simply putting together a team. The problem lied in 
making such teams work effectively.  
In automobiles, Clark and Fujimoto’s findings suggest that the best firms in the auto 
industry have cut traditional new car development cycle times significantly. In the 
process, they have delivered better products and, in many cases, more than doubled the 
productivity of critical engineering resources. These firms seem to have developed a 
much more effective way to organize and lead cross- functional teams than their rivals 
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).  
The reasons lie in structures and dedicated project leadership. Four levels of teams are 
commonly described in product development literature: functional teams, where work is 
completed in the function and coordinated by functional managers; lightweight teams, 
where a coordinator works through liaison representatives but has little influence over the 
work; heavyweight teams, where a strong leader exerts direct, integrating influence 
across all functions; and autonomous teams, where a heavyweight team is removed from 
the function, dedicated to a single project, and co-located. 
Because of the wide range of situations in which firms operate, it is not surprising that 
different organizations employ different project and team structures and there is not one 
best way for project organization.  
While integration is important, learning and reconfiguration are at least as important as 
integration but often neglected in product development literature. From a dynamic 
capability perspective, these dynamic routines are a crucial part of product development 
capability and, therefore, they have to be studied more thoroughly. 
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Product Development Capability and Routines of Learning 
Learning starts with the identification of ‘productive opportunities’. These opportunities 
can be new technologies with potential for product innovation as well as new market 
potentials for existing products. The recognition of new opportunities depends heavily on 
the applied search routines of the firm, which can be interpreted as in operational 
processes codified search behavior (Mc Grath et al., 1995, Winter, 2000). This search 
behavior catalyses the generation of new internal and external competences, and can be 
termed as “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, Zahra, 1999). 
The constructs ‘search routines’ and ‘learning’ can be more accurately described in terms 
of learning mechanisms that have been identified principally in various streams of 
management and social literature (Leonard-Barton, 1992b, Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
For example, repeated practice builds experience as an important learning mechanism. 
The codification of that experience into technology and formal procedures makes that 
experience easier to apply and accelerate the building of routines (Zander and Kogut, 
1995, Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
Experimentation also plays a critical role as a learning mechanism. Experimentation 
involves the systematic searching for and testing of new competences and there are 
obvious parallels to systematic problem solving. But unlike problem solving, 
experimentation is usually motivated by opportunity and expanding knowledge, not by 
current difficulties. Experimentation takes two main forms: ongoing programs and one-
of-a-kind demonstration projects (Garwin, 1994).  
Ongoing programs usually involve a continuing series of small experiments, designed to 
produce incremental gains of knowledge. They are the mainstay of most continuous 
improvement programs and are especially founded in the quality movement (Juran and 
Gyrna, 1988). Audi, for example, experiments continuously with diverse raw materials 
and new technologies to increase quality and provide better product functionality. In 
production, Audi regularly examines new techniques and improved technologies to raise 
productivity and reduce costs. 
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Demonstration projects are usually larger and more complex than ongoing experiments. 
They involve holistic, system-wide changes, introduced at a single site, and are often 
undertaken with the goal of developing new organizational competences. Because these 
projects represent a sharp break from the past, they are usually designed from scratch. For 
example, in 1991, the Audi ‘Avus’ , the first aluminum-bodied prototype of Audi, was a 
pioneering demonstration project initiated to introduce the idea of reducing weight and 
increase performance of high-performance cars by using aluminum instead of steel as the 
body material. 
In sum, from a dynamic capability perspective, learning is a basic mechanism of product 
development capability and especially critical in turbulent markets where technology 
bases and customer preferences are shifting. However, learning is affected by the 
historical path a firm evolved through the past.  
Product Development Capability and Path Dependencies 
The firm’s current ability to ‘learn’ is restricted by the existing products and 
competences. An example for such ‘path dependencies’ can be observed at the Italian 
sports car manufacturer Lamborghini, which was bought by Audi in 1998. Because Audi 
has an in-depth expert knowledge with aluminum car bodies, Audi replicated its 
aluminum competence for Lamborghini by sending Audi people to the manufacturing 
plant of Lamborghini and by training Lamborghini people at the Aluminum Competence 
Center in Neckarsulm. Lamborghini combined its existing competence in building high 
performance sports cars with the aluminum competence of Audi and applied this new 
competence base to the design of a brand new aluminum-bodied sports car, called 
‘Gallardo’ which was launched in 2003 and which is remarkably light-weighted. 
This example shows that the development of a lightweight Lamborghini sports car was 
only possible because of the combination of Audi’s aluminum competence and 
Lamborghini’s sports car competence. In many cases, some of the management 
recognized opportunities couldn’t be exploited because the necessary competences are 
not available internally and externally. In that case, new competences have to be built or 
existing competences have to be enhanced through internal learning by research efforts, 
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reorganization initiatives etc. or external learning through acquisitions, strategic alliances, 
joint ventures or new people etc. (Kogut and Zander, 1997).  
Therefore, ‘learning’ depends on the historical path of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982, 
Teece et al., 1997). Exemplarily, I describe an important phenomenon of this 
evolutionary problem in building new competences from a resource-based perspective: 
“Coherence (…) is a measure of relatedness” (Teece et al., 1994). This phenomenon can 
be analyzed on the level of organizations and product trajectories. Following the theory 
of coherence, which is an integration of an evolutionary and resource-based view, an 
organization has only a very restricted “learning domain” for successful innovations and 
for the building of new competences. This “learning domain” is determined by the 
deployed technologies and well-known markets. Figure 16 reflects this argument 
graphically. 













Figure 16 – “Learning Domain” - Dependence on Existing Competences  
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Teece and colleagues described this phenomenon with the following words: “The local 
nature of enterprise learning significantly restricts what firms can do. Their future 
activities are highly dependant on what they have done in the past (…). Opportunities for 
successful new product development will be ‘close in’ to previous activities and will thus 
be transaction and product specific (…). If many aspects of a firm’s learning environment 
change simultaneously, the ability to ascertain cause-effect relationships is confounded 
because cognitive structures will not be formed and rates of learning diminish as a 
result.” (Teece et al., 1994).  
In other words, the ability to build new competences is restricted by the existing 
competence base and market position or, referred to this work, product development 
capability is influenced by the current existing competence base and market position. 
Core competences in this sense can become easily core-rigidities and impede learning 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992a).  
Figure 17 shows graphically the argumentation that project P3 is only possible 
with market position M2 and competence base C2 and both were developed by 
project P2 etc. Therefore, a firm is restricted in what product concept it can 
develop or not. 
P1 P2 P3
M0C0 M1C1 M2C2 M3C3
 
Figure 17 – Product Development and Path Dependency  
Product Development Capability and Routines of Reconfiguration 
Teece (1996) found that firm boundaries (the level of integration) and formal and 
informal organizational structure must be recognized as major determinants of the rate 
and direction of innovation. Today’s textbooks describe organizational structures as 
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either organic and thus appropriately structured for innovation and  change (Burns and 
Stalker, 1966, Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, Rindova and Kotha, 2001), or machine- like, 
and thus appropriately structured for environmental stability (Mintzberg, 1979, 
Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985). 
In such a sense, product development organization should be either ‘adaptive and 
flexible’ or ‘productive and efficient’. Simply said, product development should be 
structured either for flexibility or efficiency. However, what if the conditions require both 
flexib ility and efficiency? Neither of these simplistic views for organizing comes close to 
adequately describing the subtleties required to develop a product successfully. 
Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1997) study of multiple product development processes is an 
illustration. The authors found that firms with highly structured processes such as 
extensive gating procedures developed new products quickly, but that those products 
often were not well adapted to market conditions. But firms without some simple rules 
were equally ineffective. Developers at these firms had difficulty developing products on 
time to hit market windows and consistently reinvented technological solutions.  
From this standpoint, I agree with Schoonhoven and Jelinek’s (1990) argumentation that 
modern firms need both flexibility and efficiency. This imposes a dynamic balance on 
product development to be simultaneously clearly structured for efficiency while 
adapting to organizational modifications required by changes in their technological and 
market conditions. For product development, this has to be done time after time, product 
after product, depending on the environmental context. The old formula of flexibility vs. 
efficiency does not work because product development must simultaneously be both 
flexible and efficient to be successful, and thus organizations must be organized 
simultaneously for both flexibility and efficiency.  
This argumentation shows that one way through which organizations reconfigure 
themselves to adapt to technological and environmental change is by reorganizing their 
formal structures, rather than by so-called organic structures (Burns and Stalker, 1966, 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), in which responsibilities are continuously ambiguous.  
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For product development, companies should adapt their structure to the type of project 
(incremental vs. breakthrough) they are faced with (Schoonhoven and Jelinek, 1990). 
They shift from one existing clear structure designed for a specific kind of project to 
another clear structure. Again, Figure 17 shows these reconfigurations on a project-by-
project basis. 
This reconfiguration on a project-by-project basis is neither simple nor easy to manage. It 
requires a reasonable store of architectural knowledge of the product that is going to be 
developed and more than the usual degree of insight (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996, 
Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001). For example, Henderson and Clark (1990) studied the 
problems of established firms in the photolithographic industry with reconfiguring for 
architectural innovations. These are innovations where new product architectures are 
required but the technological foundation remains the same.  
Neither organizational structure is ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ in any absolute sense; each may be 
right or wrong for the firms in question (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997, Madhok and 
Osegowitsch, 2000). Reconfiguration must, then, rest on a type of situational logic that 
does not focus on ‘one best way’ but which can be tailored to the project context as it is 
faced. 
As these derivations show, dynamic routines, i.e. learning and reconfiguration, are at 
least as important as static routines (integration) as basic components of product 
development capability. They are path dependant and restricted by the current resource 
and market position. Within the following section, I want to identify the nature of such 
routines in product development operation. 
2.5.3 Processes of Product Development Operation 
In contrast to the previous perspectives, the dynamic capability perspective highlighted 
the importance of different type of processes to explore the pattern of product 
development capability. We know how firms learn on a project-by-project basis but it 
still remains fuzzy as to how static and dynamic routines are exhibited and interrelated in 
product development operation. I therefore change towards a project- level perspective to 
study product development activities and their interaction with dynamic routines 
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mentioned above. I ask how organizations learn and reconfigure within product 
development projects because this question is important to structure observations of the 
following case studies. 
Research on product development has contributed a much deeper understanding of 
processes, structures, and tools underlying product development success. Practitioners 
and academics have written about the product development imperatives of speed, 
productivity, and quality. This research has also investigated the approaches needed to 
meet these challenges, such as integrated problem-solving and concurrent engineering, 
the impact of project teams, and the role of project leadership (Maidique and Zirger, 
1985, Roberts, 1988, Ancona and Caldwell, 1990, . 
Traditionally, companies adopt a kind of linear approach to product development that 
assumes the required information on market needs and technical options is available at 
the outset of a project, and thereafter remains stable throughout its duration, (e.g. Cooper, 
1990). Product development is therefore characterized by several activities separated by 




























Figure 18 – Linear Approach to Product Development 
The initial stage establishes the concept design; implementation begins with design-build-
test cycles for each product component, and ends with testing the performance of the 
overall product design against the requirements determined during the concept 
development phase. Several models have been proposed in the literature describing the 
optimal sequence of activities in the process. In addition, many studies have investigated 
mechanisms which allow projects to avoid making late design changes, through 
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anticipating critical decisions and gathering additional knowledge during the early stages, 
e.g. see Houser and Clausing (1988), Bacon, Beckman et al. (1994), Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt (1994) or Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1995). 
Such an approach correlates with a market-based pattern of product development 
capability where planning (concept development) is clearly separated from doing 
(product implementation). Learning is not necessary because the targeted product is well-
known and the environment is supposed to be stable. When the environment is more 
turbulent and the outcome is more uncertain, a more iterative approach to product 
development is necessary that enables probing and learning, e.g. see Tabrizi and 
Eisenhardt (1995), Iansiti and Clark (1994), Iansiti and MacCormack (1997) or von 
Hippel and Tyre (1995). 
Concept Design
Design






















Figure 19 – Iterative Approach to Product Development 
In this context, new knowledge about market needs and technical opportunities often 
arises during product development. Referring to Figure 19, a more iterative approach 
allows firms to exploit this information and adjust the concept design to environmental 
changes until the later stages of the project. This ability to adapt appears to be generated 
by a different model of product development, one in which development activities 
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proceed in parallel rather than as a sequence of different stages separated by milestones 
(Iansiti and MacCormack, 1997). 
Such an approach correlates with resource-based pattern of product development 
capability where planning (concept development) and execution (product 
implementation) is highly overlapped. Learning and reconfiguration happens by several 
design-build-test iterations. These kinds of projects are characterized by design-build-test 
iterations between the activities of intended concept design and implemented product 
design, the feedback obtained in one iteration being used to evolve design decisions in 
the next (Tabrizi and Eisenhardt, 1995). These iterations build the basis for learning and 
reconfiguration of product and competences. 
The Design-Build-Test Cycle 
Learning and reconfiguration within product development is enabled through iterative 
design-build-test cycles. The design-build-test cycle is a problem-solving cycle (Clark 
and Fujimoto, 1991, Wheelwright and Clark, 1994). A ‘problem’ occurs when developers 
encounter a gap between intended and realized product attributes. To close such a gap, 
organizations apply a problem-solving or design-build-test cycle. 
Solving problems in product development is both a learning and reconfiguration process. 
No matter how much an individual may know about a given problem, there are always 
aspects of a new product that must be understood and adapted before an effective design 
can be developed. Except for trivial problems, developers are unlikely to come up with a 
complete design in a single iteration. Instead, developers go through several iterations, 
learning a little more about the problem and alternative solutions each time before 
committing to a final design and detailed specifications. Each iteration or ‘learning cycle’ 
consists of the three phases illustrated in Figure 20. 
In the design phase, a developer frames the problem and establishes goals for the 
problem-solving process and generates alternative solutions. Based on the developer’s 
understanding of the interdependencies between design parameters and customer 
requirements, several designs for the prototype may be appropriate. The purpose of 
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alternative designs may be to explore the relationship between design parameters and 






Figure 20 – The Design-Build-Test Cycle (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) 
In the second, or build phase of the problem-solving cycle, working system models or 
prototypes are built that allow for testing. Depending on what the developer is trying to 
learn, the working models may take several forms. At an early stage, for example, a 
developer may implement alternatives electronically in a computer-aided design (CAD) 
workstation. At later stages, physical prototypes are built using materials and production 
processes close to those used in a commercial process. 
In the third or test phase, working models or prototypes are tested. Depending on the 
purposes of the cycle, the tests may focus on a particular component or may involve the 
whole product system. 
A single design-build-test cycle generates insight and information about the 
interdependencies between specific design attributes and customer requirements. That 
information becomes the basis for a new design-build-test cycle and the process 
continues until developers arrive at a solution: a design whose attributes meet custo mer 
requirements.  
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As an answer to our question of how organizations learn in the course of product 
development we can note that they learn through design-build-test cycles. But learning in 
such a sense depends not only on the speed and productivity of each individual step in the 
cycle, but also on the number and quality of cycles required to achieve a solution. The 
number of cycles depends directly on the extent to which activities at each phase are 
linked and integrated. The challenge in product development, therefore, is both to execute 
individual phases of the cycle rapidly and well, and link individual cycles so that 
products are coherent. 
Customers as ‘Test’ Institution 
Such a dynamic focus drives customer involvement during product development. Many 
products fail to produce an economic return because they fail to meet customer 
requirements (Schilling and Hill, 1998). Integrating customers and other stakeholders into 
the design-build-test cycles can help to avoid such mismatches. But such customer 
involvement only makes sense if it serves as a vehicle for learning about the product, and 
whether and how it can be scaled up, about the market, and which applications and 
market segments are most receptive to the various product features, and about the 
influence of exogenous factors, such as changes in customer perceptions. 
Customers become an integrated part of the design-build-test cycle. Firms show early 
versions of the product to customers, learn from the reaction, modify the product based  
on what they have learned and then try again. Product development becomes a process of 
successive approximation, each time striving to take a step closer in the product’s match 
with market requirements. 
2.6 New Content for Product Development 
In this chapter, I described three basic perspectives (market-based, resource-based, 
evolutionary) in the light of their potential to explore the pattern of product development 
capability. Each perspective evolved from different sources and focused on different 
aspects of product development capability. The market-based perspective emphasized 
that product development capability is a function of superior planning and design, the 
resource-based perspective showed that it is also a function of product development 
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organization, and the evolutionary perspective requires technological opportunities as 
critical variables for product development success. 
Then, I changed to a dynamic capability perspective as a kind of hybrid of perspectives. 
With the concept of dynamic capabilities, our attention moved from static considerations 
to dynamic aspects of product development. The former explains product development as 
perfectly adjustable systems focused to successfully follow the rules dictated by 
competitors, and the latter claims to change the rule of competition. This shift started 
with evidence that new product success is often driven by dynamic aspects like learning 
and reconfiguration and not by the intended market position or project organization.  
The ambiguous role of routines – static and dynamic - within product development 
operation was among some recent research efforts. Iansiti and Clark (1994) studied 
dynamic capabilities in product development and introduced the measure of ‘dynamic 
performance’. Leonard-Barton (1992a) called it a paradox, the role of learning and 
unlearning through product development. Henderson and Clark (1990) observed that 
firms have their problems in developing new products when they cope with architectural 
innovation. Such innovation requires reconfiguration of existing structures and processes. 
Unfortunately, the application of these theoretical concepts in product development 
operation may have been insufficient. It is still challenging today to implement and 
balance static and dynamic routines in product development operation. One reason is the 
difficulty to ‘operationalize’ the content of dynamic theories. Such an attempt requires 
fundamental changes in managing product development: product development is not a 
fixed sequence of activities anymore, it is an employment of routines to ascertain where 
to learn, how to learn and how much to learn.  
The difficulties with the new content of product development may be caused by the fact 
that it is frozen within a static market-based instead of a dynamic view of product 
development. The contradictions created by this can be seen in the various process 
models of product development in product development literature (see, for example, 
Cooper (1996)). Most of them clearly separate the ‘planning’ from the ‘doing’ and 
emphasize pre-development planning as the key success factor (Bacon et al., 1994). But 
implementing learning and reconfiguration into product development operation requires a 
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fundamentally different perspective of that for the role of product development, from 
mere “follower” of strategic planning to active “leader” of strategy. But within a market-
based context, the idea of using learning and reconfiguration as a competitive weapon is 
difficult to implement due to the dominance of product planning and design (Mintzberg, 
1994). 
This is why a dynamic view may be necessary, one where the primary goal of product 
development is to learn and build fruitful paths in concurrence with an evolving 
environmental context to create long-term new product success. The innovative content 
for product development would be supported directly by existent market position and 
competence base. 
As we shall see, the current view of product development will have to be updated in order 
to take account of a dynamic view of product development. At the heart of this paradigm 
change, this view on product development may include dynamic issues such as learning 
and path dependencies, which had been considered up to now as cultural aspects 
(O'Reilly III and Tushman, 1997). We will see how these issues do not simply have to be 
aligned with product development operation, but must be managed integrally, in order to 
be both supportive and generative of sustained product development success. This may 
change completely the theoretical focus of product development, creating new links with 
more “qualitative” theories of organizational dynamics and strategic renewal.  
The key to develop this conceptualization are two observations. First, that existing 
product development literature is largely caught in a market-based perspective to product 
development. And second, that effective product trajectories rather than sole projects are 
important drivers of sustained new product success. 
In contrast to the traditional view of product development, a dynamic view has more 
breadth in theories and more depth in scope. The conceptualization is based on an 
evolutionary perspective where resources and market position evolve from project to 
project and focuses not on static market analyses but on the ability to learn on project-
level with firm- level impact. 
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Also a key to develop this paradigm change of product development is the observation 
that the concept of dynamic capabilities and traditional product development research 
have complementary approaches. Product development research is largely non-
theoretical, consisting of collections of observations. In contrast, dynamic capabilities 
research has a cognitive theoretical orientation, which links ideas about organization to 
effective management practice.  
These overlapping and complementary scopes of research as well as the theoretical 
complementarities suggest that the streams can be synthesized to a dynamic capability 
perspective to product development. Table 5 compares key dimensions of traditional 
product development research and a dynamic view of product development. 
 Traditional Conceptualization 
of Product Development 
Product Development 
as Dynamic Capability 
Aim The aim of product development is to 
take an idea from concept to reality by 
converging to a specific product that 
can meet a market need in an 
economical, manufacturable form. 
The aim of product development is to 
build successful product trajectories by 
building and leveraging product 
development capability.  
Scope Process and Structure Positions 
Paths  
Processes  
Pattern Plan and Execute Probe and Learn 
Level of 
Analysis 
Individual Project Individual Projects 
Sequence of Inter-related Projects 




Concept of Dynamic Capabilities  
Outcome New Product Success Sustained New Product Success 
Table 5 – Contrasting Traditional and Dynamic View to Product Development 
The diverse perspectives to approach the pattern of product development capability have 
much in common. Each views product development as an instrument to create and sustain 
new product success and each takes a holistic approach, grouping activities and decisions 
in coherent, logical ways. The latter quality is especially important because it suggests 
that the dynamic view to product development provides managers with a powerful 
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integrating device,  a way of meshing specialized, segmented activities with larger 
organizational needs. 
Despite these similarities, the diverse perspectives capture different organizational 
phenomena and are best viewed as complementary pieces of a larger puzzle. They can, in 
fact, be combined into a single model of product development capability that includes 
both cross-sectional and dynamic elements.  
In accordance with Teece et al. (1997), the following three key dimensions of a dynamic 
capability perspective to product development can be recapped.  
• Positions. Product development capability is shaped by the firm’s current product 
market position Mi and the available positional options. And it is shaped by its current 
function-specific and architectural competences Ci that are relevant for the feasibility 
of the intended product concept. 
• Paths. Product development capability is path dependant. It embraces the 
identification of technological opportunities for product development that can be new 
breakthroughs but also opportunities for incremental improvements. The firms’ 
product trajectories restrict potential product development options. They are limited 
by the current competence base C i and market position Mi . 
• Processes. Product development capability is correlated with superior static routines 
that build the capacity to replicate certain previously performed product development 
tasks. But it also embraces dynamic routines, i.e. the collective learning and 
reconfiguration through product development, or in other words, the level of 
knowledge the firm has to acquire within projects and across projects through 
successive product generations. Both are highly interrelated. 
The dynamic capability perspective to product development offers several advantages.  
First, it provides a convenient, intermediate level of analysis. We know that firms exhibit 
dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) but still we lack confidence in how we can build 
and improve them. The dynamic capability perspective to product development opens up 
the black box of the firm without exposing analysts to the ‘part-whole’ problems that 
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have plagued earlier dynamic capability research. Past studies have tended to focus on 
either the forest (the firm as a whole) or the trees (the practices); they have not combined 
the two. The dynamic capability perspective to product development gives the needed 
integration, ensuring that the realities of product development are explicitly linked to the 
firm’s overall functioning. 
Second, such a focus provides new insights for product development operation. Most 
studies of product development have been straightforward descriptions of best practices, 
roles, and activity streams, with few attempts to dynamic routines like learning and path 
dependencies. In fact, most past research has highlighted the restrictive role of culture 
when firms couldn’t translate best practices into successful product development efforts 
(Barney, 1986a). A dynamic approach, by contrast, emphasizes the links among learning 
and routinization, showing that seemingly unrelated tasks – a technological decision, a 
prototype modification, or a system test – are often part of a single, unfolding sequence 
that form the overall capability to develop new products. From this vantage point, 
managing product development becomes far more rational and effective. 
However, we are still far from describing an effective pattern of product development 
capability. How do organizations learn within and across product development projects? 
How do they reconfigure themselves within projects and on a project-by-project basis? 
How are they restricted by their competence base and historical path? To answer these 
questions, we have to continue our analysis on an empirical level in order to see how 
organizations learn and reconfigure within and across product development efforts. The 
following case studies of Audi and Siemens might help to answer this task. 
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3 Empirical Evidence from Audi and Siemens 
Empirical and explicit understanding is essential for understanding product development 
as dynamic capability. This chapter represents the empirical part of this work by 
exploring ‘positions’, ‘paths’, and ‘processes’ on an empirical level in the broader context 
of business strategy and the firm’s overall functioning. It comprises four sections, one 
introductory in nature, two on the cases and characteristics by which Audi and Siemens 
exhibit dynamic capabilities and one section for the demarcation and interrelation of 
static and dynamic routines. 
3.1 Empirical Design 
Exploring a dynamic capability perspective to product development entails difficult 
challenges. How can one ensure that the observations provide accurate and robust 
implications for management research? How can one ensure that the sample of 
organizations includes enough variation in approach to be interesting and representative? 
How can one define a methodology that is structured enough to provide reliable 
qualitative and quantitative analysis while being rich and flexible enough to capture the 
details of the phenomenon one is trying to study? The telecommunications environment 
especially, where technology evolves unpredictably and where the environmental context 
is uncertain, makes these questions difficult to tackle. 
I approached these challenges by founding the research on a cross-sectional comparison 
of product development projects in automobiles and telecommunications, each limited to 
a very narrowly defined environmental context. Each project was chosen to make sure 
that it had well-defined, stable, and reliable performance measures and that it included 
breakthrough or incremental innovations. I also used multiple approaches to observe 
performance dimensions and organizational characteristics, combining extensive 
qualitative case studies (Yin, 1994) with structured empirical comparisons (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967) creating qualitative and quantitative evidence (Jick, 1979, Eisenhardt, 
1991, Wacker, 1998). This structure created a robust and  rich analysis, examining two 
distinctive empirical environments through multiple empirical methodologies. The goal 
was to achieve consistency across levels of analysis and contexts. 
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3.1.1 Empirical Work Design 
The structure of empirical work follows the framework of Figure 21. I start by 
conducting two single case settings at Audi in automobiles and at Siemens in 

















Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Figure 21 – Empirical Work Design  
The aim of identifying a specific pattern of product development capability challenged 
this methodology in several ways. First, given the different dynamics of technology of 
the environments studied and  comparing ‘better’ or ‘worse’ learning in different projects 
in a precise way was a subtle undertaking. Comparing the development of cars to the 
development of enterprise networks, could not be done by simply adjusting for the 
number of parts or price, since each product is different in nature and comes from a 
fundamentally different technological base. While the development of an enterprise 
network hinges upon new information technologies, the development of cars makes 
predominant use of existing technologies. Since the goal was to study the relationship 
between dynamic aspects of product development capability and product development 
operation, it was necessary that basic differences in the environment of a given project do 
not drive any observed difference in product development. 
To solve this problem, I decided to perform the fieldwork in very narrowly defined 
product segments. This ensures that each project comparison was truly made at a 
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comparative level. For example, the study of product development in automobiles 
focused only on aluminum-bodied cars: the Audi A8 and Audi A2. I compared the 
development of different product generations: the most recent Audi A8 model (internal 
code: D3) and predecessor (internal code: D2). All project studies faced different 
technology dynamics and market uncertainty. What’s more, because of the similarity of 
the projects, each project’s characteristics could be compared precisely along well-
defined criteria. A similar approach was used in the studies of product development in 
telecommunications - it focused only on Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) technology 
- so that each time a comparison was made, observed project differences could 
confidently be linked to differences in the pattern of product development capability – 
not to basic differences in the environmental context surrounding each project. 
Next, I needed to find ways to assess differences in the product development projects of 
Audi and Siemens ICN. In a two-year European project, I investigated the enterprise 
network division of Siemens ICN in detail. During my PhD studies, I followed a major 
restructuring program at Siemens ICN where I could follow and analyze the Siemens 
ICN structure and major product development efforts in enterprise networks. These 
investigations were used to develop the basic empirical conceptualization for this study, 
including the definition of dynamic aspects of product development capability.  
During my PhD studies, I also collected observations on the major projects recently 
performed by Audi. There were two projects analyzed in detail. More than 50 structured 
and unstructured interviews were held with scientists, developers, and managers at 
different levels in the organization involved with the most critical aspects of each project. 
A questionnaire was used to guide the interviews and to gather additional data to add to 
and check the information drawn from interviews. Histories were recorded for each 
development effort, tracking the completion of each major prototype iteration as well as 
the resources used, and observations were gathered on the basic characteristics of the 
organization, the processes employed, and the behavioral patterns of managers and 
engineers. These observations were used to create overall project evaluations and a 
project-specific pattern of product development capability.  
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In total, detailed field observations were gathered for more than six projects in two 
different environmental settings. As anticipated, the results show a clear relation between 
the dynamic aspects of product development capability and new product success. 
3.1.2 Empirical Settings 
Identifying the pattern of product development capability is conducted in two different 
empirical settings. The empirical work focuses primarily on the automobile and 
telecommunication environments. Each is characterized by simultaneous challenges of 
technology dynamics and market uncertainty. Both firms, Audi and Siemens, faced 
rapidly changing and ambiguous innovative opportunities as well as a diverse and 
complicated context in which new products needed to be developed. 
The nature of technology and market dynamics in each of the environments varied 
considerably. At the time of the study, the automobile industry’s technology base was 
moderately dynamic. Dynamics and uncertainty in electronic components such as, for 
example, navigation systems or brake systems, could be observed, but the overall product 
architecture remained relatively stable. Its automobile market environment exhibited 
uncertain and rapidly changing customer preferences, a fact that confirms Clark and 
Fujimoto’s observation (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Instead, a more predictable customer 
base characterized the enterprise network industry; preferences were held stable by 
technology compatibility standards. The technical base, on the other hand, evolved in 
rapid and discontinuous fashion, and companies in the industry were constantly prompted 
to acquire new technological competences, for example in wireless technologies like 
UMTS or Bluetooth.  
In the automobile industry, product development includes thousands of components and 
sub-systems and development costing billions of dollars including manufacturing 
equipment. In enterprise networks, because of the decreasing margins of 
telecommunication equipment, a trend has established from mere hardware orientation 
towards integrated hard- and software applications and services. 
It must be emphasized, therefore, that the differences among empirical settings are very 
substantial. As such, comparisons between the development of automobiles and 
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telecommunication equipment and services are useful tests of the generalisability of the 
results obtained. 
In sum, this study presents a base of empirical evidence and discusses observations made 
by a variety of independent methodologies assessing firm- level and project-level aspects 
of product development. The evidence covers settings as different as a multi-billion-
dollar car project and a call center software application project carried out by a few 
software specialists and managers over a few months. The findings present a consistent 
outlook across industrial environments, methodologies and levels of analysis. The 
outlook suggests that product development should not be approached in a scattered and 
single-project fashio n. Rather, creating streams of new product success is a central 
challenge in a dynamic and uncertain environment, and the ability to develop new 
products successfully is associated with dramatic differences in competitiveness in the 
short and long term. 
3.2 The Audi Case Study 
The first evidence comes from the automobile industry. The research, conducted between 
1999 and 2003, focused on the development of the last major generations of Audi 
automobiles. This section investigates how Audi in the automobile industry exhibits a 
pattern of product development capability. For Audi, product development is a strategic 
process based on reacting to the needs of its technological and market environment. After 
looking at the current market position and competence base, I turn to path dependencies 
and look how Audi has built fruitful product trajectories for sustained new product 
success. Finally, I turn to product development processes in order to analyze the role of 
static and dynamic routines in product development operation. 
3.2.1 Positions 
At the time of the study, the automobile market in Germany represented 3.24 million 
vehicle sales in 2003; -0.5% compared to 2002. Figure 22 shows the vehicle sales in 
Germany during the last 13 years. The German automobile market has been decreasing 
for four years and is intensely competitive. 
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Figure 22 – Vehicle Sales Germany in Millions per Year  
In 2003, Audi was particularly successful in Germany, conquering its position as No. 4 
on the league table of manufacturers from Ford behind VW, Mercedes, and Opel. 
Not only did Audi set yet another record for vehicle sales in 2003, it also succeeded in 
increasing its vehicle sales for the tenth year in succession. Despite the fact that the 
overall economic situation remained difficult, Audi vehicle sales worldwide increased by 
3.7 percent to 769,893 cars. Audi's export quota was around 69 percent (2002: 67 
percent).  
The company's market share in Western Europe stayed at the previous year's level of 3.8 
percent. A total of 547,666 Audi models were handed over to their new owners in this 
market (down 0.4 percent). 237,786 Audi models were sold in Germany (down 2.4 
percent). The company consequently succeeded in maintaining its market share at the 
same high level of 2002, at 7.4 percent (see Figure 23). 37,467 vehicles were sold in 
France (down 8.2 percent). Audi increased its sales volume in Great Britain by 6.9 
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percent to 70,107 units, in Italy by 2.5 percent to 51,341 units and in Spain by 0.2 percent 






















Figure 23 – German Car Market 2003 – 4th Position in Sales for Audi (Source: VDA)  
A total of 86,421 Audi models were handed over to customers in the USA, Audi's biggest 
export market. This is equivalent to an increase of 0.8 percent, making it the fourth record 
sales year in succession. Moreover, Audi was particularly successful in China (including 
Hong Kong) where it sold a total of 63,531 cars (up 71.5 percent). Sales figures in Japan 
rose by 12.8 percent to 13,137 vehicles. 
Audi set new records for vehicle sales in 20 markets including the USA, Great Britain, 
China, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Greece and Australia. These 
records had their source in the historical path of Audi that is to be described in the 
following. 
Historical Path 
With the beginning of the 1980s, Audi’s corporate strategy changed from a mid-range 
towards a premium car manufacturer with the claim of technology leadership. The Audi 
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quattro coupe was launched to a stunned reception at the 1980 Geneva Motor Show. 
Until then, the all-wheel-drive principle had been restricted to relatively clumsy off-road 
vehicles, but the Audi quattro was a genuine high performance car designed to have 
superior handling on wet or dry roads, and it immediately began to show its potential on 
the international rallying scene. Permanent all-wheel drive was offered on the Audi 80 in 
1982, and by 1984 every Audi model in the range was available with all-wheel drive. 
'Vorsprung durch Technik' was the credo for Audi. 
With the amazing success of the Audi quattro in international rallying in the early 1990s, 
the reputation of Audi changed completely. The brand that had been evolved from the 
Auto Union and DKW was no longer a brand looking for identity – the position now 
claimed and occupied by Audi was one of technology leadership, power, and excitement. 
In 1982 the Audi quattro swept all before it to take the manufacturers’ world title, with 
Michele Mouton runner-up in the drivers’ championship. The following year, Hannu 
Mikkola won the driver’s championship in his quattro, and Audi were runners-up in the 
manufacturers’ category. The crowning year was 1984, with new Audi driver Stig 
Blomqvist winning the driver’s title and Audi taking  the manufacturers’ championship. 
This was the year in which Walter Röhrl led an Audi in the Monte Carlo Rally and 
Audi’s pioneering work on the quattro driveline was acknowledged with the ‘Motor Sport 
Car of the Year’ trophy. Quattro was associated with Audi, Audi was associated with 
quattro, and a new era had begun that has endured until today. 
The final integration of brand and company into a single concept came in 1985, when 
AUDI NSU AUTO UNION AG was transformed into AUDI AG, and the head office 
moved from Neckarsulm to Ingolstadt. With competition on world markets intensifying, 
an additional 943 million DM were allocated to new investment, earmarked mainly for 
production technology and the all-new fully-galvanized Audi 80, launched in the fall of 
1986. 
During the second half of the eighties, major investments were made in a new quality 
assurance department as well as extra staff- training facilities. Public evidence of the 
company’s commitment to customer service came in October 1988 when the introduction 
of the first Audi V8 brought with it the service for customers to personally collect their 
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new car from the delivery center at the Neckarsulm factory. This service was later 
extended to the Ingolstadt factory, and the majority of customers now combine the 
delivery of their car with a tour of the production plant or a visit to the historical vehicle 
collections at each location. 
In 1991, a process started which would give Audi independence from Volkswagen in 
marketing, sales and dealer relations, and in 1994 the oval Audi logo gave way to the 
‘four rings’. 
At the same time, closer business links within Europe and with the rest of the world 
meant that Audi was increasingly becoming a global company. Worldwide sourcing of 
components and services, design centers in Spain and California and the opening of an 
engine plant in Hungary were just a few of the projects undertaken to ensure Audi’s long-
term competitiveness. Another major step was the manufacture of the Audi 100 in China. 
New markets were opened up in Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe and South America. 
1991 was a watershed year for Audi. Not only was it a record year for both production 
(with 451,265 cars built) and turnover (14.8 billion DM) but almost the entire product 
range had been replaced with new models during the year. The following year saw an 
even greater output – 492,085 cars, but a slump in sales in 1993 on the back of an 
international recession led to major structural and procedural changes in the company, 
including more flexible working hours and a new understanding with the workforce. This 
would take Audi into the future with the continuing evolvement of a product program that 
had started in the mid-eighties. 
From this time ecological matters  had been a major driving force in Audi design, and a 
fully galvanized bodywork became another Audi trademark. The third-generation Audi 
80, and its five-cylinder sister the Audi 90, impressed with their aerodynamic bodies and 
low-pollution engines, but Audi’s entry into the premium segment came with the 1988 
V8, with a four-valve alloy 3.6 liter engine and permanent quattro four-wheel drive. 
However, Audi’s engineers were not totally preoccupied with high power outputs. 
Simultaneously, huge developments we re being made in perfecting direct- injection diesel 
technology (TDI technology), and records were soon being set for frugal fuel 
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consumption with an engine design that only Audi had succeeded in refining sufficiently 
for passenger car use. 
Increasing recognition of the needs of the environment inspired the major task of 
developing a construction method that would enable a mass-produced car to be fabricated 
entirely from aluminum. That car, the A8, celebrated its world premiere at the 1994 
Geneva Motor Show, replacing the Audi V8. Apart from being the world’s first 
mainstream aluminum car, the A8 started the renaming process for Audi’s products, 
whereby the letter ‘A’ would stand for Audi, and the numeral would designate the body- 
size category.  
The second car to receive the new nomenclature was the November 1994 A4, replacing 
the Audi 80. Introducing five valves per cylinder technology, the A4 became Audi’s most 
successful model ever. 
With an expansive model lineup featuring four- and six-cylinder engines, together with 
turbo charging and quattro all-wheel drive, the A4 was the first Audi to challenge the 
sales volumes of the established premium competitors. 
Audi re-entered the compact premium class in 1996 with the A3, but a new direction was 
still emerging. With increasingly severe market competition, Audi’s existing brand 
values, whilst strong and compelling, would no longer be enough. The new dimension 
would be emotion – the building of an image outside the normal rational influences, an 
image based on a unique combination of style integrity, design progression, technological 
innovation, and superb quality. The result was the stunningly styled 1997 A6 and the 
opinion-leading 1998 TT, both of which took the perception of Audi into a new and 
broader direction. 
In 2001, the new Audi A4 product line with sedan, estate, and cabriolet featuring the new 
multitronic transmission received a lot of attention and continues the success of the 
previous A4 generation.  
Today Audi’s success of the latest evolution is reflected in its “figures” as shown in 
Table 6. In the six years between 1998 and 2003, sales increased by ~70%, net income by 
~80%, and employment by ~30%. 
 Empirical Evidence from Audi and Siemens  85 
  2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
Sales (€ Mill) 23,406 22,603 22,032 19,952 15,146 13,918 
Net Income (€ Mill) 816 774 769 859 634 463 
Employees  52,689 51,432 50,942 49,396 46,558 41,011 
Table 6 – Six-Year Figures Audi AG (Annual Report 2003) 
Technology Dynamics 
New technology still drives competition. To a significant degree, automobiles are still 
bought based on performance criteria and comfort features, and both are primarily based 
on new technologies. Premium cars are premium because they possess attributes that beat 
those of standard cars. Developing such cars requires high levels of refinement and 
product integration (Clark and Fujimoto, 1990). Such refinement takes time; it takes 
relationships with partners from other industries, long-term commitments, and substantial 
expenditure. How can one achieve such refinements when customer preferences and 
technologies are continually evolving? New ideas like lane -departure-warning (LDW) or 
adaptive light (AL) arise almost monthly, resulting from the recognition of new 
possibilities arising from a still immature technology base. The complexity of the existing 
car architecture and customer user profile is already considerable, with cars already 
having more than sixty electronic control units linked to three central bus systems (Audi 
A8). 
At the end of the 90s, most automobile industry competitors were betting that the world 
of electronics would revolutionize automobile architecture. The former CEO of Audi Dr. 
Ferdinand Piech, for example, expected in 1997 that 80% of all future innovation in 
automobiles would be created in electronics and electromechanical engineering. At that 
time, Audi had significant know-how in mechanical engineering but was hardly 
competent in the electronic and electro-mechanical business. In a strategic shift, Audi 
radically changed its functional strategic scope towards electronic and electro-mechanical 
engineering. Between 1998 and 2003, the number of electronics engineers at Audi rose 
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from 220 to 600. To get some understanding of the speed of change, consider that it takes 
nearly 5 years to develop an automobile from idea to market. 
Market Dynamics 
Figure 24 depicts current market trends in automobiles: the product lifecycles are 
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Figure 24 – Challenges for the Automotive Industry in the Coming Years 
Both challenges significantly affect product development organization. The increasing 
number of models per brand and per platform requires a project organization not on a 
project-by-project basis but for several product development projects to proceed 
simultaneously. Project teams gain responsibility not only for one model (e.g. sedan) but 
for a model line (sedan, estate, convertible, coupe etc.). For employees, their work 
becomes much more complex: they have to participate in several projects at the same 
time in different phases. 
In 2003, Audi restructured its product development process towards the so called 
“Modellreihenstruktur”, where teams were built with life-cycle responsibility. Life-cycle 
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responsibility means that these teams are responsible not only for a whole model line that 
is in development but also for the previous and successive generations, which are in 
production  or sometimes still in the product planning phase. This new structure allows 
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Figure 25 – Fuel Consumption and Engine Power (Spark-Ignition Engines) 
Figure 25 shows one possibility for classifying the nature of projects in automobiles. Data 
is taken from Audi market research and draws on data on most smaller cars on the 
German market in 2002. Fuel consumption is used as the performance indicator. A close 
distance to the average line indicates an incremental technology. A large distance to the 
average line (to the top) indicates old technology and a large distance to the bottom 
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indicates a breakthrough technology. Figure 25 shows that different firms in the same 
environment tend to achieve different product performance of their products.  
Audi scores high with its A2 1.6 FSI, indicating that the product is a breakthrough 
compared to the industry norm. An internal look at Audi’s competences is consistent with 
this analysis. The revolutionary technical approach is linked to Audi’s research activities. 
The product superiority of the A2 1.6 FSI is caused by a lightweight aluminum body, 
termed Audi Space Frame (ASF). 
ASF is a high-strength aluminum frame structure into which the panels are integrated so 
that they also perform a load-bearing function. In conjunction with high-strength 
aluminum sheet, the aluminum body is characterized by exceptional stiffness and above -
average crash protection, yet at the same time by substantially lower weight. Comparison: 
an Audi A2 weighs ~950 kilograms (in average across the model range), about 150 kg 
less than a comparable car with a conventional steel body. Advantages for the driver are 
greater safety, increased performance, improved handling, lower fuel consumption, ease 
of repair and lower insurance premiums. 
This section takes a look at how Audi builds fruitful product trajectories that start with 
breakthrough projects to implement new technologies and result in incremental projects 
to profit from the competences built by the previous projects. In literature, product 
development in breakthrough projects is associated with high levels of learning while 
product development of incremental projects is associated more with high levels of 
planning leveraging existing competences. 
My observations at Audi are largely consistent with these propositions. In breakthrough 
projects, many design-build-test iterations in all areas of the firm indicate high levels of 
learning. In incremental projects, managers rely more on people’s experience. 
Experimentation is targeted when extension of existing experience is necessary. My 
observations indicate that most projects are something in between, the optimal balance 
between planning and learning is critical for product development. But how is this 
optimal balance carried out? 
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The following reveals these differences in some detail. It illustrates how Audi first built a 
technological foundation in aluminum technology through a breakthrough project, then 
expanded its innovation to larger markets, and finally consolidated it through following 
incremental projects.  
Audi’s history of automobile development is an interesting example of building 
successful product trajectories. In 1993, Audi replaced its Audi V8 in the premium car 
segment by introducing the full-aluminum-bodied A8, whose design and performance 
gained a lot of attention in the motor press. The A8 (internal code: D2) was a 
breakthrough project, introducing a number of new technologies. While not the leader in 
its field, the A8 established an outstanding technological foundation for the future. In 
2000, Audi expanded the aluminum technology of the first A8 project (D2) by delivering 
the first cars of the A2, the first four-door car that achieved a fuel consumption below 3 
liters per 100 kilometers because of its light weight. The real pay-off came with the next 
product generation of the Audi A8 .In 2002, Audi revealed the Audi A8 (D3) that 
substituted its predecessor Audi A8 (D2). The Audi A8 (D3) overtook the BMW 7 Series 
for sales in Germany 2003 and was recognized for the sportiest premium sedan in the 
luxury car segment. Audi thus went fr om no market participation in aluminum 
technology to technological leadership in one of the world’s most sophisticated industries 
in less than 10 years. 
The A8 (D3) is an example of a typical incremental project. It built on the functional 
competences created by the A8 (D2) project and the manufacturing competence of the 
A2. The Audi A8 (D3) increased the product performance in its class by a substantial 
margin only by improving and refining the technology base of its predecessors A2 and 
A8 (D2). The A8 (D3) was in all ways a technological extension of the A2 and A8 (D2). 
Its superior performance was not due to any fundamental breakthroughs, but rather to 
attention to detail in optimizing the match between technology and the application 
context (see Figure 26 for a time line). 






































Figure 26 – Aluminum Projects at Audi (internal development codes in brackets) 
Breakthrough Project - The Audi A8 (D2) 
The Audi A8 (D2) is the first car with an aluminum body built according to the Audi 
Space Frame (ASF) principle. Advances in aluminum material technology can be traced 
to research efforts in the mid 1980s. In the late 1980s, conscious of the pressure on 
conventional steel materials that future performance requirements would bring, Audi 
researchers, in joint ventures with the aluminum supplier Alcoa, began exploring the 
technical possibilities of aluminum materials for automobile body design and 
manufacturing. The new materials had very attractive intrinsic properties that allowed for 
substantially lower weight and higher stiffness of the car. 
Two groups within Audi were particularly critical to the A8 project: the central R&D 
aluminum group and the manufacturing implementation group, both situated in 
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Neckarsulm. Members of the R&D group had been active in materials research for many 
years. The group comprised researchers with expertise in material science and several 
years R&D experience at Audi. Most of their work was aimed at developing fundamental 
new techniques and approaches for aluminum utilization with application in new 
automobiles. For its part, the implementation group focused on creating a working, 
manufacturable product. While the role of the R&D group was to offer a large breadth of 
technical options, the implementation group would drive the investigations, select the 
most promising alternatives, and integrate them into a manufacturable subsystem. 
A8 (D2) concept discussions started in 1989. The targeted shipping was 1993, leaving 
approx. 4 years for the entire effort. During 1988, managers and engineers of the R&D 
and implementation group met repeatedly to discuss technical options for the car 
architecture and production process. Members of the implementation group took the lead 
in setting the direction of the project and began to perform feasibility studies for new 
production concepts. They initiated discussions with members of the R&D group and 
with material suppliers, test engineers, and car body designers. Many possibilities were 
discussed and modeled; the most promising were tested in partial prototypes. 
Implementation group and research specialists thus decided that three different concepts 
should be pursued in parallel. The first two were quite new for Audi (these concepts 
included aluminum material), while the third approach was an extension of the existing 
steel concept of the predecessor Audi V8 (D1). 
Members of the implementation group quickly began to perform feasibility studies for the 
different approaches. They initiated discussions with members of the central research 
laboratory in Ingolstadt, material suppliers, test engineers, and car body designers. They 
also investigated possibilities through experiments, quickly making physical models of 
the module assemblies to investigate the characteristics of the new materials.  
At the end of 1990, the new concept design was complete, and the other two approaches 
were finally dropped. It employed aluminum materials, whose incompatibilities with the 
rest of the car architecture had been resolved. This involved the development of a number 
of specific technical refinements, including new and improved connection techniques and 
many modifications of the production process. 
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During 1992, many prototypes of the new architecture were built to assess 
manufacturability; the emphasis was on completing partial prototypes and a number of 
models for each of several fundamentally different concepts. The connectivity 
techniques, for example, were investigated at each stage of the fabrication process. In this 
way, before the pilot production process began, there was already sufficient data (on 
connectivity, types of defects, causes of defects, and so forth) to provide confidence in 
the manufacturing process. Reliability testing began in 1992 leading to some changes in 
design and production process. The first complete, fully representative pre-production 
automobiles were built in 1993.  
A batch of pre-production cars would be fabricated and tested until a major defect was 
encountered. Knowledge gained from analyzing the causes of the defect would then be 
used in construction of the second batch of pre-production cars, while the first batch 
would be used to conduct additional tests. The implementation group went through many 
of such iterations. The pre-produc tion cars were tested investigating a wide variety of 
functionalities and the design was gradually refined. 
By 1993, the Audi A8 (D2) concept was complete: The production process had been 
designed in detail, production workers had been trained, and the product was presented in 
motor shows and press releases. 
As one manager stated 
The Audi Space Frame (ASF) is no mere duplication in aluminum of what 
some craft in steel. More than 15 years in the making with Alcoa, the ASF 
demanded new space-age alloys, more than 40 patents, even new 
construction techniques in order to see the job through. Was it worth it? 
Emphatically yes. Not only did we improve performance and safety, we've 
learned ways to improve our other cars. 
From Breakthrough to Expansion to Penetration – The Audi A2 and Next 
Generation A8 
In 1995, while the A8 project was completed, engineers began working on adapting the 
new technical approach to mass production of smaller cars, the Audi A2, to be launched 
in 2000. Soon thereafter, the next generation of the A8 project (D3) was also begun on an 
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informal basis, with discussions about how the A2 production concept could be extended 
to provide lower production costs for the next generation Audi A8. Project engineers 
were often allocated to two projects (A2 and A8), facilitating the transfer of knowledge 
from project to project. 
The Audi A2 was introduced on time in 2000, exhibiting the most fuel-economic 
automobile in its market segment. Its design was based on the Audi A8 (D2), although 
the number of body parts was reduced by ~40% to reduce production costs. The focus of 
the engineering team was primarily on cost reduction. The Audi A2 was fully driven by 
engineers from the implementation group responsible for the A8 (D2). This was still 
going at full speed at the time, with yield refinement and process improvement activities. 
Implementation engineers working on the Audi A2 project retained some responsibilities 
for the Audi A8 (D2). 
The official project start of the Audi A8 (D3) was marked in 1997. It was characterized 
by an approach similar to the A8 (D2) and A2 project and was staffed by many engineers 
with A8 and A2 project experience. By this time, several members of R&D and 
implementation group had participated in two project generations (see timeline of Figure 
26), with responsibilities ranging from concept development to product introduction. The 
group’s small size and project managers’ attention together provided members the chance 
to obtain broad expertise in a wide range of tasks. Their approach involved project 
members’ continuous participation in the development project from project start to 
product launch. As a result, members of the implementation group had built up an 
intimate knowledge of the aluminum’s manufacturing context, represented by existing 
production processes and system- level design considerations. This put them in an ideal 
position to analyze the interaction between the new approaches and the organization’s 
existing competence base and infrastructure. 
Such level of expertise in the implementation group was reflected in many of its 
decisions. These ranged from relatively major changes such as redesign of the cooling 
system to account for higher performance specifications to more subtle choices such as 
the decision to define the production steps. 
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For both the A8 (D3) and the A2 projects, experimental iterations were much more 
limited in comparison to the A8 (D2) project. The idea was to validate the designs based 
on the experience of the R&D and implementation group members, not to explore 
fundamentally new possibilities. Experimentation efforts were more aligned to confirm 
expectations, however, since they were carried out in the same facilities and by the same 
technicians responsible for building the A8 (D2). 
The results were impressive: While the A8 (D3) retained essentially the same basic 
technologies developed in the A8 (D2), the new architecture saved production costs of 
about 30% compared to the predecessor. The Audi A8 (D3) was introduced in 2002, 
surpassing existing cars of its class by performance parameters like handling, fuel 
consumption, acceleration speed, etc. The experience of members of the implementation 
group, their intimate knowledge of the production system, and the high skills of the 
technicians all contributed to a design that met aggressive performance specifications. 
The A8 (D2) project set up a strong technological platform for Audi. For the A2 and A8 
(D3) projects, this technology was extended through incremental refinements that 
enhanced the performance of the systems and established Audi as a leader in aluminum 
technology in the automobile industry.  
Audi’s new product success around aluminum technology is based on a specific pattern 
of product development capability. This pattern should be studied in more detail. In the 
following section, therefore, we look at how Audi develops new products and how they 
learn and reconfigure themselves within and across product development projects. 
3.2.3 Processes 
In 1984, Ferdinand Piech, convinced that without an Audi in the premium car segment a 
key opportunity was being squandered, urged the development of a new revolutionary 
sedan that exhibits innovative features that would make Audi the technological leader in 
the premium car market. He made some experienced people responsible for the project, 
code-named D1. Piech directed the team to “develop the best premium sedan ever” and 
finish the project as soon as possible. The end of 1987 was the scheduled completion day. 
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The D1 team quickly created a rough product concept. Way ahead of its time, the idea 
was to integrate a V8-engine, automatic transmission and all-wheel drive, a combination 
rarely found in the market. Some American off-road cars of that time had automatic 
transmission with non-permanent all-wheel drive and no central differential. No 
comparison to Audi's high-tech solution with multi-disc center differential and Torsen 
rear differential. 
These objectives overstretched the team’s capabilities, and a year passed; several 
developers were brought in to build a concept car but their work stalled. By the beginning 
of 1985, the scheduled ship date was still more than two years away, and Piech began to 
pressure the team to produce results. After a concept review, Piech decided to change the 
concept and introduced a product manager to guide and lead the project. Several Audi 
veterans were bought in: along with the addition of a product manager, the Audi V8 
development lead took over the same role for the D1, while a well- regarded developer 
assumed the technical role. A team member described the scene: 
We all thought that the project was much farther along. We ended up throwing 
everything that had been done out and started from the product architecture used in 
the Audi 100 (C3). We were a year behind schedule from the first day we started. 
The project organization was restructured, and a new team of developers was formed. In 
the second half of 1985, it was dedicated to develop a new specification for the product 
while pressure mounted, once again, for results. The schedule continued to slip into 1987, 
and the pressure increased. 
Over the next several months all the required components were designed, and in the 
middle of 1987, the team declared that the ‘Design Freeze’ milestone had been reached. 
‘Design Freeze’ meant that all that remained to be done was to build prototypes and 
optimize the car for performance. At Audi, this phase is called confirmation phase, and 
once the product had stabilized (all known failures were solved and performance was 
adequate), the product could be built in pre-production series. For scheduling, Audi used 
a rule of thumb that the confirmation phase typically lasted 12 months. 
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It soon became clear that the D1 project was not likely to follow the twelve-month rule. 
Although developers solved problems quickly, the testers seemed to find new ones just as 
fast. By the end of 1987, the number of problems remained relatively constant, but, 
during spring 1988, an initiative emphasizing the effects of changes rather than the 
number of changes was instituted. For the first time, testing people were invited to 
product reviews, and ownership of the components was stressed. By summer, the project 
had stabilized and the Audi V8 was released in October 1988. Naturally, the product 
when it shipped was nothing like the original specification put together by the original 
D1-team. Its architecture, functionality, and performance had been scaled down 
considerably to make the project feasible. Still, the Audi V8 was viewed quite favorably 
by both critics and customers and built into a satisfying business. 
Product Development Problems 
As is evident from the preceding description, the development of the Audi V8 was 
fraught with problems. The product shipped one year after its original target date, causing 
Audi’s 100 series (shipped in 1982) to be on the market for 6 years without an adequate 
premium version (in previous model series: the Audi 200). Moreover the development 
process was unpredictable; the launch date was in serious question even 6 months before 
market introduction. Finally, the D1 project completely drained its members, forcing 
several  to take leaves of absence. 
Many of these problems can be traced to the product development process. When the first 
team put together its original, impossible specification, it set incredibly high expectations 
for all subsequent efforts. Full of new elements, these objectives were defined without 
any substantial effort at experimentation and prototyping; clearly the team members’ 
guess about the product’s feasibility was very wrong. As the description shows, these 
efforts often failed and even in later project phases, developers felt under pressure to 
improve functionality at a high rate at the expense of testing and reliability. 
The Audi V8 thus failed to incorporate many of the criteria of successful product 
development. Although it had revolutionary goals, the project resources and competences 
did not match the requirements to develop a robust and coherent product concept. The 
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project suffered from the inexperience of critical decision makers and responsibility for 
important tasks like technology and package was uncertain. The role of the product 
manager was confused with that of many other leads in the project. As such, the Audi V8 
suffered problems because of a mismatch of resources and competences with the project 
requirements. 
New Approach to Product Development 
Partly in response to the problems with the Audi V8, in 1990 several discussions had 
been initiated to improve Audi’s development organization. These were aimed at 
improving the reliability and quality of product development while retaining its flexibility 
and responsiveness. Two different possibilities were discussed. 
The first possibility was trying to do what the D1 failed to accomplish – hold 
development to the original product concept. Some people argued that if enough time 
were spent in product planning, and enough discipline existed in the team to respect that 
concept throughout the project, the process could be made to work quite efficiently. The 
second possibility was to let the concept change during the course of the project – the 
uncertainties in technologies and market were just too great to be able to predict 
everything up front. This was the approach with which Audi usually developed products 
but the difference was to do so in a controlled fashion, driven by regular reviews and 
milestones. This was the big change in the Audi product development organization. The 
new process worked as follows: After conducting considerable market analysis and 
several focus groups, marketing managers described the unfilled needs that the new 
product should address. A product planning team then translated these general market 
needs into broad project objectives contained in a product strategy statement and outlined 
the product concept. Developers worked from the outline specification to bring objectives 
to life. As developers strove to develop the desired functionality and to optimize product 
performance, they typically discovered problems and possible improvements. A new 
process called “ÄKO process” was installed to manage product changes in a controlled 
manner even in later project phases. The process was under the responsibility of the 
product management function. As part of the process, problems and improvements were 
discussed with the project team and, if necessary, the product concept was changed. This 
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cycle was repeated frequently until the project was finished. Another process called 
“clinic process” was installed. This process allowed for a more institutionalized cus tomer 
feedback. Each major prototype release would be tested with customers (or quality 
assurance as customer function), thereby obtaining market feedback as the project 
evolved. The installation of these two processes therefore allowed the project to remain 
responsive to market changes by adding or removing functionality in a controlled fashion 
even in later project stages. 
To reduce product complexity, the features of the outline product concept were divided 
into bundles, each to be developed, tested, and  launched sequentially. The product would 
thus progress from a simple architecture to a complete configuration in a controlled and 
testable fashion that project management could closely follow. The ideal was to add 
desired features and product improvements in order of their priority. Developers worked 
on the highest prioritized features first and gradually expanded the product’s feature set 
until the shipment of the product. 
Organizational changes complemented the new development process. A concurrent 
engineering organization was implemented where product managers became the primary 
drivers in a typical development project and strongly influenced the company’s future. 
One product manager described the role: 
The ideal product manager probably would have a dev elopment background. The 
key component, however, is to have the knowledge and ability to talk to developers 
in their own language. They need to be respected by R&D. A product manager 
needs good people management skills. 
Another product manager elaborated: 
A good product manager must be comfortable with the technical aspects of the 
specification and know how to change it. The product concept gradually evolves 
until the development is complete. It is important that trade-offs are clearly 
presented to all functions and levels of management during evolution. 
Product managers at Audi had thus become the integrators in the project; they had 
responsibility over the entire specification and were charged with making critical 
decisions. They had to keep a holistic perspective and make sure that the components 
 Empirical Evidence from Audi and Siemens  99 
developed by the developers fulfilled the customer requirements and were in line with the 
financial targets. 
With the new product management function, Audi institutionalized a changing product 
concept even during product implementation. By working intensively on methodologies 
for experimentation and testing (e.g. Virtual Prototypes, Rapid Prototyping) and on the 
role and experience of its product managers, the new development process allowed a 
good degree of control and predictability while retaining the flexibility to respond to 
market and technology changes. 
With the development process, Audi began to tackle a problem fundamental to all 
competitors. The current automotive industry environment is characterized by dynamics 
in peripherical technologies especially in electronics and electro mechanics (approx. 3-
year lifecycle), creating a virtually unprecedented need for flexibility and responsiveness. 
The challenge is to allow the appropriate level of flexibility while keeping the 
development process and costs under control. 
Dynamic Routines at Audi 
Audi was late to enter the premium class in automobiles; it was not until the end of the 
1980s that Audi really began to focus on developing premium cars, such as a luxury 
sedan that would rival the Mercedes-Benz S-class and BMW 7 Series. When Audi 
entered the premium car market, Mercedes and BMW already had a dominant position 
and were way ahead in technology and design. 
Thus, in 1988, Audi with the Audi V8, started its strategic shift towards the premium car 
segment with remarkable speed. In 1994, Audi shipped the Audi A8, offering a product 
that several experts claimed was comparable to or better than the Mercedes-Benz S-class 
or BMW 7 Series. By 2003, Audi was No. 2 in the German luxury car market behind 
Daimler-Benz and in front of BMW, and the product line A3 in the premium segment 
was gaining momentum. A senior manager of the Audi Product Management Group 
characterized Audi’s strategic shift to premium cars in this way: 
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Think of how far we were ten years ago. Within 5 years we put out the RS 22 and the 
A8 that established ourselves in a sustained way in the premium car segment.  
Audi’s development process in the early 1980s was informal with little emphasis on 
schedule or process. Projects were driven by a few brilliant engineers as technical leads, 
who had almost total control of a product’s design. Not surprisingly, given such 
approaches and attitudes, what the product would look like and when it would be released 
frequently remained mysterious. Ferdinand Piech, director of R&D at Audi at that time, 
was one of the few controls in the process, influencing developers primarily during the 
intense prototype review meetings he attended. Meanwhile, the company’s image was 
that of a firm producing technically excellent but relatively boring and not inspiring 
products. At the same time, automobiles became significantly more complex, challenging 
the project teams even further. One of the company’s first product managers recalled this 
pattern: 
Development of outstanding automobiles was starting to require much greater 
attention to detail than to sheer functionality. What mattered most was attention to 
how the individual parts fit together into a well-designed, coherent car that was 
attractive, reliable, and fun to use. 
Increases in the automobile’s complexity led to corresponding modifications in product 
development. No longer could one technical lead manage the entire undertaking, and the 
product management function was created to share the responsibility for financial and 
time targets. The first product manager was assigned to work on the design of the Audi 
A4 in the early 1990s. As he noted, 
I became a sort of service organization for the R&D department. I helped document 
the specifications, do the product reviews, and decide what failures were important 
and what could be postponed to a later release. 
By the early 1990s, several people shared the leadership for the development of a new 
automobile. The product manager was responsible for overseeing the product 
                                                
2 The Audi RS2 was a sporty estate car based on the Audi 80 Avant, powered by a 315 hp, 5-cylinder 
turbocharged engine, developed in collaboration with Porsche. 
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development effort, including task assignment, scheduling, and coordinating all 
organizational functions (manufacturing, purchasing etc.). The technical lead had final 
say in all technical decisions, product reviews, and design standards. The production lead 
oversaw implementing the product for mass production. The marketing manager handled 
all the marketing issues such as competitive analysis, positioning, packaging, and 
advertising. The product manager’s job was to integrate and coordinate the efforts of 
everyone involved in the project. Product managers were also directly responsible for 
product concept and specification.  
Design-Build-Test Cycles 
Product development at Audi aims to integrate latest technology and customer 
preferences. This requires a high degree of customer involvement from concept 
development to product implementation. Customer involvement is achieved with the 
following approach: concept development is initially outlined in a rough manner, and 
then progressively detailed as the project continues. Rather than concept development 
and product implementation being independent, sequential stages become tightly linked 
overlapping stages. Implementation begins before there is a precise definition of the 
product’s design. As the project proceeds, it iterates between the activities of concept 
development and product implementation, each iteration involving a sequence of design, 
build and test activities, followed by integration into the evolving car design. This model 
is driven by rapid learning, a significant proportion of which is focused on the feedback 
of customers on the evolving product design. It differs substantially from the ‘traditional’ 
product development process, where product integration (and hence customer feedback) 
tends to occur late in the project. 
The success of such an ‘iterative’ model has two foundations: First, feedback on the 
performance of the evolving product design begins early in the process. This feedback is 
driven by early prototype experiments with customers. Early prototypes, for example, are 
used to gain an understanding of the trade-offs involved in a car’s attributes (e.g. weight 
or costs). In addition, early integration of the product’s components into a working 
prototype allows testing of problematic interactions between components and then 
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releasing of early prototypes to the user function (parts of quality assurance department) 
to generate feedback on how the initial design meets customers’ expectations.  
Second, these experiments proceed intensively during a project’s subsequent stages. 
Frequent iterations are geared to providing new knowledge about car and car 
components. These iterations are punctuated by regularly updated prototypes, which 
provide continual feedback on how the additional functions and features being added to 
the product concept perform in the end-user environment. 
While continual iterations provide a way to learn to match customer requirements, this 
new knowledge must still be consolidated within the organization and applied to car and 
car components. The goal is to keep the possibility to realize car concept and component 
adjustments for as long as possible in order to consider the latest shifts in technology and 
market. 
The Audi case shows that product development can be successful when it is approached 
in a more evolutionary fashion than simply focusing on sole projects. At Audi, the A8 
(D2) was a breakthrough for Audi to develop full-aluminum automobiles with reduced 
weight and increased performance. The Audi A2 project transferred the aluminum 
technology to higher volume markets that require a more automated production process. 
Both projects together allowed the development of the Audi A8 (D3) that overtook the 
BMW 7 Series in sales in the German market in 2003. 
The Audi case also shows that dynamic routines play an important role in product 
development capability. Within projects, design-build-test cycles are the central activities 
where competences are built, reconfigured, and refined. Across projects, resulting from 
product development problems, Audi installed specific processes like the ‘ÄKO’ process 
or the ‘clinic’ process in their product development activities that helped to cope with 
shifting product specifications required by new market dynamics. 
These developed capabilities have entrenched Audi as a technology leader in the 
automobile industry. 
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3.3 The Siemens Case Study 
Siemens is an international electrical engineering and multinational electronics company 
with $77.8 billion sales, 426,000 employees, and presence in 193 countries (2002). Their 
product range includes 50,000 product families and approximately one million products. 
Siemens invests more than 1.2 billion euros in research and development each year and 
holds more than 17,000 patents and has over 49,000 employees engaged in research and 
development worldwide. The revenues stem from 6 business segments: energy, industry, 
healthcare, transportation, lightning and information & communications.  
Innovation has always been a part of Siemens' tradition. But new social pressures and 
rapidly changing technologies throughout the world brought new challenges to Siemens 
as it faced the 21st century. To deal with this new business market, Siemens used its 
tradition of intelligence, competences, and systematic application to remain a strong 
international force. As von Pierer stated in Siemens' 1994 annual report:  
"Helping set the course of change has been a vital part of our business for nearly 
150 years… Fifteen years ago, barely half of our worldwide sales came from 
products that were less than five years old. This figure has now risen to more than 
two-thirds--solid proof that we are not just meeting increased demands for 
change, but are setting the pace for innovation.”  
In this case study, I focus on Siemens Enterprise Networks, USA, a division of Siemens 
Information and Communication Networks (ICN), and study Siemens’ product 
development capability in this market segment. I start with an analysis of the market and 
resource position and continue with a closer look at product trajectories around VoIP 
technology. I close the Siemens case study looking at dynamic routines at Siemens.  
3.3.1 Positions 
In 2003, Siemens Enterprise Networks (ICN-EN) had its headquarters in San José, 
California, and employed 700 people. In 2000, Siemens was third in the U.S. enterprise 
networks market and their market share was about 15%. 
The presence of Siemens in the U.S. started in 1973, when Siemens opened its first 
factory producing telephone equipment in New Jersey. In 1988, Siemens acquired 
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Stromberg Carlson, a manufacturer of switching technology equipment. In 1990, Siemens 
entered into a joint-venture with ROLM, a manufacturer of communications systems. In 
1992, ROLM was fully acquired by Siemens.  
The market in which Siemens operates is the enterprise network market. The customers 
are enterprises for which tailor made information and communication solutions are 
provided in 5 major areas: Voice Networks, Data Networks, Application (Hardware and 
Software) Services, and recently Converged Networks (Voice-over Data Networks). 










Enterprise Network Market 
Voice Networks 
•  PBX/Key-Systems 
•  Phones 
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• Next Generation Phones (IP) , ...) 
Data Networks 
• LAN Equipment 
• WAN Equipment 
 
Figure 27 – Enterprise Network Market (Source: Siemens 1999)  
Based on the 1995 figures, a product was vivid on the market for 3 years, with 
investments of approx. 10 million euro per product. At the beginning of the 21st century, 
Siemens experienced profound changes in its product life cycles. In the 
telecommunications industry, a range of factors were reported as causing drastic changes 
in the life cycle of new products. Compared with the traditional 3-year lifecycle, the new 
product lifecycle was shortened to 9 months, and the required pre- investments more than 
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doubled. An example of the new life cycle is depicted in Figure 28 and shows a study of 






Source : Department of Marketing and Finance of Siemens Switzerland, Swisscom  
Figure 28 – The Present Product Life Cycle on the Telecommunications Ma rket 
One initial conclusion can be drawn from this insight: not sole products but successful 
product trajectories become a requirement, because pre- investments and new 
technologies have to be continuously turned into viable returns (see Figure 29).  
Sales




Figure 29 – Product Trajectories to Achieve Viable Returns  
Product trajectories have to be established that involve the development of more 
breakthrough innovations based on entirely new technology platforms (such as change 
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from GPRS to UMTS) that are followed by more incremental ones (such as modifying an 
existing user interface to yield product characteristics).  
3.3.2 Paths 
The product trajectory of Siemens around VoIP technology provides an interesting 
example for how companies can build fruitful paths of long-term new product success. 
Voice over IP had its foundation in Israel. At the beginning of 1995, the company 
‘Vocaltec’ was the first to use the Internet medium to transfer voice over data networks 
via internet protocol (VoIP). Figure 30 shows the technological trajectory of how the 
VoIP technology evolved. It started with software applications in 1995 and resulted in 
call-center applications that supported operators with call-related data and telephony 
features in 1999. The first VoIP-PBX came in 2000 and represents the 1st generation 
VoIP.  




















Figure 30 – Development of Voice-over IP Technology and Applications  
Major pay-offs of the 1st generation VoIP included cost and design flexibility. The 
scalability of the Voice-over-IP architecture for enterprise networks removed one of the 
highest cost items from design – the PBX itself. If one uses the computers that exist 
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nearly at each working place, the modules of the new architecture are relatively 
inexpensive and it might be possible to create an architecture for a system that would 
serve a wide variety of customer segments, from small-sized network customers to large-
sized server application customers. Moreover, the 1st generation VoIP provided a 
potential for lower service costs because errors could be located in modules. Lower 
service costs would be extremely attractive to commercial customers. 
Siemens participated in the technological trajectory of VoIP with several projects in order 





























Figure 31 – VoIP Product Trajectory at Siemens  
It started with HiPath 5000 which is a native VoIP-PBX that works in packet-switched 
and circuit-switched environments, and continued with MobileOffice, a comprehensive 
set of applications to connect mobile devices with enterprise networks. With the 
competences gained by these two projects, Siemens was able to initiate OpenScape, an 
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“open, presence-aware, real-time communications software suite designed to quickly and 
easily synchronize people and information to facilitate action or decision-making” and 
“allows the full potential of IP communications to be realized for the first time” (Siemens 
Press Texts). 
While the search for increased performance was natural for Siemens projects, the focus 
on VoIP technology enabled a significant strategic shift. Traditionally, Siemens 
emphasized sales of telecommunication equipment (hardware). VoIP might enable 
Siemens to expand considerably its presence into other commercial segments, such as 
software applications and communication services. Several senior managers got involved 
in the early stages of VoIP development to influence the direction. Other senior managers 
were more skeptical of the viability of the new technology, but encouraged the 
investigations as long as a clear focus on low cost and reliability was kept. After 
introducing HiPath 5000 into the market, Siemens realized that the replacement strategy 
of traditional PBX through VoIP-PBX was wrong because savings of 5-15% didn’t 
justify the necessary investments in a new VoIP enterprise network.  
By the end of 1999, the insight grew that only a more service and application oriented 
strategy could build new customer value. By the beginning of 2000, new IP-centric 
applications like ProCenter for electronic Customer Relationship Management (eCRM) 
or MobileOffice were initiated that finally led to the real-time communication platform 
OpenScape. 
We follow this trajectory and outline the characteristics of each project. 
The HiPath 5000 Project (1998 – 2000) 
When Siemens introduced the Private Branch Exchange (PBX) product family “HiCom” 
in 1993, the product was an incredible success; its revolutionary bus design architecture 
enabled it to set the benchmark for business voice networks. With the HiPath product 
line, Siemens implemented the VoIP technology in enterprise network environments. For 
Siemens, the HiPath project was a breakthrough because it changed the traditional 
switchboard technology to data communication standards (IP protocol). The HiPath 
project built the foundation of VoIP competence at Siemens. 
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The essence of why VoIP was so important for Siemens is relatively simple. The 
architecture of a traditional voice network centers on the PBX, the central conduit of 
information linking all components and subsystems: the telephones, faxes, cordless 
phones, data adapters etc. and is connected to the public network. This type of 
architecture (the right part of Figure 32) has essentially characterized all enterprise 
networks sold in the last thirty years, from large to small companies. Its advantage is that 
it is simple and flexible. Its main disadvantage is that if performance of components 







Figure 32 – Separated Voice and Data Networks  
The idea behind the VoIP architecture is to resolve the bottleneck problem by eliminating 
the switchboard character of the PBX and change it to a more open and distributed 
architecture using the dominant and standardized IP protocol. The new architecture 
groups bundles voice and data into integrated modules. They are connected to each other 
in a star configuration that comes together in a router, which controls the information 
traffic in the computer. This architecture has several advantages.  
First, VoIP makes it possible for companies to network Siemens' HiPath communications 
nodes across IP networks and create a uniform communication platform with distributed 
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components and work points with a single-system image. Second, VoIP allows 
applications to reside on a standard platform (a PC server) for sharing applications with 
users across a distributed IP network. By using IP networks for communication and 
application sharing from a central serve r, businesses can significantly improve workforce 
productivity while reducing application, system management and circuit switch-related 
costs. Third, the architecture is very reliable, since errors can be located in individual 
modules and hardly in interfa ces. 
As one manager pointed out 
"HiPath is a perfect progress in the evolution of our circuit-switched Hicom 
platform to the world of convergence: With HiPath, our customers will 
experience the best of both worlds. They get all the reliability and feature 
benefits of their Hicom systems, and at the same time can leverage their 
corporate WAN for handling interoffice voice traffic. There is no sacrifice in 
performance and the transition is made simple.”  
Siemens was interested in the VoIP technology for several reasons. First was the 
relentless drive for innovation and increased performance. In the PBX products, 
aggressive targets had been achieved by working intensively on the product structure, 
increasing the capacity to transmit information by more than the factor of twenty at the 
end of the 90s. This had been very difficult to do, and the possibility of bypassing the 
PBX altogether was very attractive. 
At Siemens, with a VoIP-PBX a new business opportunity was to converge voice and 
data networks in enterprise network markets. Siemens developed a working system 
model as a first prototype of the VoIP-PBX. The first trial with customers led to a 
complete redesign of the product concept. But by then, Siemens was applying what it had 
learned in the first trial and optimized its product concept. 
Experimentation with immature versions of products or services only makes sense if it 
serves as a vehicle for learning about technology or markets, which applications and 
market segments are most receptive to the various product and process features, and 
about the influence of exogenous factors such as changes in customer preferences and the 
need for regulatory approvals. 
 Empirical Evidence from Audi and Siemens  111 
Even though the first version of the VoIP-PBX was not a success, it did demonstrate that 
the market was indeed interested in such a product. Product development at Siemens 
became an iterative process. The firm enters an initial market with an early version of the 
PBX, learns from the experience, modifies the PBX based on what they have learned, and 
then tries again. Development of innovative products becomes a process of successive 
approximation, learning again and again, each time striving to take a step closer to a 
winning combination of product and market. 
High levels of experimental iterations, which took several forms, drove the VoIP-PBX 
project. The team built some critical hardware models to test the feasibility of 
transmitting voice with high quality. In late 1999, a critical test vehicle finally confirmed 
that high quality voice transmission was feasible. This experimental iteration led to 
several architectural changes of the product. By December, Siemens finally locked into 
the design, and the first HiPath products were delivered in early 2000 to start the bring-up 
stage. Three weeks after the system was turned on it was capable of running reliably, 
despite the innovativeness of its design. 
Concurrent with development of VoIP technology, problems occurred because of the 
uncertainty and complexity around VoIP technology. Because until the nineties, Siemens 
operated in an extremely stable, government-regulated market, they still developed their 
products in a sequential manner (concept development and product implementation). 
After deregulation of the telecommunication market, such in-depth planning of projects 
and products was hardly possible in such an uncertain environment and Siemens replaced 
its linear ‘planning-driven’ process with an iterative ‘learning-driven’ process. Siemens 
developed the HiPath product family by probing potential use cases with early versions 
of the product, learning from the experiments, and experimenting again. In effect, they 
ran a series of market tests – implementing prototypes into a variety of tests. The initial 
VoIP-PBX was not the culmination of the development process but rather the first step, 
and the first step of design-build-test was in and of itself less important than the learning 
and the subsequent steps that followed. 
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The MobileOffice Project (1999-2001) 
The telecommunications application and services market is increasingly outperforming 
the equipment market by volume. This tendency is driven by the market trend to 
customized solutions and new software functionality. In order to transform a new 
technology platform like VoIP into profitable returns, it is necessary to build applications 
and services around this core technology. 
This fact requires a more application- and service-oriented strategy by Siemens. The 
share of enhanced business services revenues generated by integrating converged systems 
and applications is  strongly outperforming the share of revenues made with traditional 
voice-based systems. This leads to new business opportunities for hardware suppliers in 
the application and services business. 
This market trend and cost pressures lead to a strategic shift of Siemens. Siemens 
Enterprise Networks in San José, the former ROLM, changed completely from a 
hardware manufacturer to a software development company in less than 10 years. Since 
the late 90s, Siemens in San José has been a pure software development center. The 
manufacturing of PBX hardware moved to other countries. 
Siemens Enterprise Networks developed several IP-based services around VoIP 
technology with the focus on applications, work points and multi-site connectivity. For 
Siemens, the MobileOffice project was not a breakthrough because Siemens could build 
on the VoIP competences of the HiPath 5000 project. The MobileOffice project expanded 
the network competence through tying enterprise infrastructure to mobile devices like 
cellular phones, laptop computers, and PDAs. MobileOffice provides “any-device access 
to information and people anywhere and anytime” (Siemens Press Texts). 
The OpenScape Project (2001 – 2003) 
While the focus of the first-generation VoIP rollouts is on deploying a cost-effective 
integrated voice-data infrastructure, the objectives of the second-generation VoIP 
initiatives is to develop a variety of compelling standards-based integrated 
communications applications. The goal of the 2nd generation VoIP is to look beyond 
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infrastructure cost-savings and create business value through applications that yield 
sustained improvements in user-productivity and business process productivity.  
The Siemens’ OpenScape suite of real-time communications software enables real-time 
synchronization of people and information and represents the 2nd generation VoIP and is 
a significant departure from the traditional Siemens HiPath PBX and MobileOffice 
Application product line. “OpenScape is a modular set of applications that streamline 
business communication processes for enterprise workgroups” (Siemens Press Texts). It 
is not a PBX replacement but it seeks to create a platform of ‘presence-based 
communication’. Presence-based communication has been primarily associated with 
instant messaging (e.g. Microsoft ’s Windows Messenger), but it actually has broad 
applications in real- time communication in general. The same presence information 
behind instant messaging contact list icons that show whether your contact is “out to 
lunch”, “busy”, “away”, etc., can enable compelling use cases for all media types – use 
cases such as ‘polite calling’ (calling others only when their presence shows they are 
available) and virtual team rooms. Presence information plays an important role in 
determining the best approach for handling incoming contacts. 
There are various facets to real- time communication, but they all reflect the fact that 
communication becomes an integral part of IT infrastructures. E-mail is an obvious, early 
example, but real-time communication solutions and applications can also interoperate 
with data applications and be integrated with corporate directories. Building on the new 
Greenwich RTC platform from Microsoft, OpenScape works in conjunction with several 
mainstream IT platforms and provides a platform for enterprise-grade presence and 
availability management, and extends the new presence-based communication paradigm 
consistently to multiple media types across a rich set of applications and devices. 
Through cooperation with IBM, Microsoft, and SAP, OpenScape creates an industry 
standard that has the potential to establish a dominant design in real-time communication 
architectures and interfaces. 
Companies currently have three principal domains: real-time communications 
(telephony), information (databases), and IT (network and other services). In today’s 
economy there is a clear need to merge these domains into a common event framework 
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and this development is well advanced on the information front. Enterprise Application 
Integration (EAI) is taking place and enabling transactions to flow from one system to 
another. The Gartner Group has coined the term ‘Integration Broker’ to describe the new 
generation of software that can help bridge the current disparate flows of data and real-
time communications. This requires a new generation of VoIP initiatives. 
Both previous projects (HiPath 5000 and MobileOffice) became the seed for Siemens’ 
OpenScape real-time communication, gradually developed under the broader umbrella of 
Siemens Enterprise Networks USA. The Siemens R&D group collaborated with IT 
experts of Microsoft and research institutions. All application choices would be 
optimized for the target business, the network installation at the customer side. The 
application context of real-time applications had therefore become much more narrowly 
and precisely defined. 
3.3.3 Processes 
Along the VoIP trajectory, Siemens was changing the core foundations of its product 
development efforts. In the words of a senior executive of sales: 
“Siemens witnessed a massive transition from telecommunication hardware to 
telecommunication applications and services. We don’t sell sole products anymore; 
our aim is to offer solutions for real-time communication.” 
The following Siemens presentation slides show the current dominance of applications 
and services over traditional hardware products and outlines the new focus on “solution 
development” instead of product development. 
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Figure 33 – Siemens’ Transition from Hardware Supplier to Solution Provider 
Moreover, the opportunities of such ‘convergence products’ changed product 
development at Siemens completely. Development efforts were clearly aimed at 
generating various options for applications and services. The evaluation and selection of 
all application ideas (provided by internal employees or external customers) was made in 
a unified, focused way by a single, experienced group of individuals within Siemens 
ICN-EN. The evaluation and selection was made based on precise targets derived from 
cost and performance objectives. As noted by the senior executive of sales: 
“The issue is to determine the relevant customer needs, and then consider what 
application or service can do this.” 
Once the service architecture was finalized, any change in service or application 
characteristic would need approval from a centralized committee. Figure 34 shows the 
current application portfolio around HiPath.  
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Figure 34 – HiPath as Comprehensive Portfolio of Software, Services, and Hardware 
The Siemens case shows that product and service development has to be seen in a 
broader context than sole projects. Technology and market dynamics require an 
evolutionary focus where new competences are built and developed through a sequence 
of projects. At Siemens, the HiPath 5000 project was a breakthrough for Siemens to 
transfer the traditional voice networks to IP standards. The MobileOffice project 
developed applications (hardware and software) that empower mobile users with anytime 
access to enterprise resources. Both together opened the door to communication 
platforms like OpenScape that provide real time communications solutions for medium to 
large enterprises - resulting in greater connectivity between people and information.  
Dynamic Routines at Siemens 
In telecommunication markets, projects must be responsive to rapidly evolving customer 
requirements, changing product specifications multiple times to make sure that the final 
product architecture really meets the current needs of its customers. This is necessary 
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because new features sometimes evolve even during the course of a product development 
effort. 
Development of applications and services at Siemens is driven largely by requirements 
and discussions with the help of a visualized application model. Experimentation with 
new approaches and the combined expertise and experience of all experts involved help 
to uncover problems before committing to a final solution. Experimenting with an 
iterative approach, linking individual design choices to the requirements of the entire 
application and facilitating the joint optimization before routinization is built are all 
important factors. 
Siemens also relies on external sources to test its applications and search for relevant new 
information during the course of effort. First, among these, are other ICN subsidiaries. 
With the development of VoIP applications, some ICN subsidiaries as lead users were 
invited to evaluate and discuss the product and the implementation was finally done 
there. 
At Siemens, during the OpenScape project, critical decisions were made rapidly and 
jointly by a dedicated global core business team, usually a group of professionals who 
met regularly. The core of the global team comprised five managers, three from the US, 
one from the headquarters in Munich and one from Switzerland. This core business team 
had the final say in architectural decisions linking product architecture and customer 
requirements. During the project, this group had to coordinate both software experts and 
enterprise network veterans. In all cases, managers had both extensive experience with 
multiple aspects of data processing and network design and a good understanding of 
changes and their impact on product performance. 
These organizational challenges were aided by visualization efforts. In OpenScape the 
application model changed several times as the effort progressed. The application 
architecture was designed on wallpaper. This wallpaper performed the function of a 
living specification; it was a complete representation of the applications, which all 
members of the project team shared. The wallpaper enabled the overall impact of 
individual application choices to be rapidly verified. It also facilitated communication 
among team members, and it integrated individual efforts. All team members could work 
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on the same application model. At Siemens, this model hangs on the wall of the main 
floor in the R&D department, and when a significant change took place, each key 
member had to confirm the change. As such, everyone was apprised of the latest version 
of the overall application and the direction of its evolution.  
The use of existing competences is essential for specifying the right product architecture. 
Many sources of knowledge need to be integrated by team members, who make use of 
their individual experience to interpret the impact of changes. Product managers should 
have great depth and breadth of experience and are particularly crucial. In OpenScape, 
each project team member had worked in the development of application software or 
enterprise networks before. The group comprised primarily R&D and sales people, 
although it also included individuals with extensive distribution experience.  
One area where experience appeared to have the greatest impact was the early 
partitioning of a project plan. When OpenScape started, the project manager first focused 
on a comprehensive activity diagram of the whole project, which serves as a project 
timetable. The project timetable is not used as a rigid specification, and almost all of the 
detailed objectives changed repeatedly. Its main role is to identify the basic activities and 
functional responsibilities and to highlight the most critical interactions among them. 
This is essential, since the project plan identifies what is likely to change and what is 
likely to remain the same. It is therefore used as an early roadmap, identifying the most 
appropriate ways to partition tasks to minimize uncertainty of who is doing what and 
when. 
Moreover, Siemens  relies on ties with a research institution for bringing in the outside 
research experience. PhD students with relevant theses are frequently hired into the 
company and former PhD students gained consulting contracts in order to support 
product development activities. The author was one of those PhD students. 
Design-Build-Test Cycles 
Developing products and services in a deregulated and uncertain environment required a 
different approach to product development than Siemens had used to date. A senior 
project member described it like this: 
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What matters is first choosing the right test measures. These are a set of variables 
that give us solid, quantitative indication of product and service performance. 
Especially important is real-time responsiveness of software applications. We then 
have a focus on measuring a large number of product tests, changing the product 
until the measures indicate that the right objectives are met. It is essential to run 
enough trials, both to test with different approaches, and to obtain statistically 
significant results. 
Figure 35 shows a Siemens-specific Design-Build-Test cycle. There are 6 steps that 
should be carried out in each iteration. Product development is complete only when all 
product options under consideration had been fully explored, when all product 
specifications had been fully characterized, specified, and documented and when product 
performance had been reached and sustained on the development line.  

























































Iterative Product and Service Development
 
Figure 35 – Siemens Methodology - Iterative Product and Service Development 
In successive product generations, Siemens has continued to pursue a focused 
organizational approach to making product choices, coupled with iterative ‘trial and 
error’ for the development of new products and services. Product choices are coherently 
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made by a core business team. With reference to service development, Siemens had by 
2001 significantly increased its performance in developing applications and services 
around the HiPath product family. They also utterly eliminated the learning curves, 
achieving seamless transfer from development to sales. These factors have entrenched 
Siemens as a leader in the enterprise network industry worldwide. 
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4 Analyzing Case Study Evidence 
We have just analyzed two very different firms. The first, Audi, develops automobiles 
that are very complex product systems with a wide variety of technologies ranging from 
aluminum to wireless communication, from mechanics to electronics. The second, 
Siemens, develops applications and services around VoIP technology aimed at B2B 
customers. 
Despite the differences, the characteristics of both companies resemble specific patterns 
of product development capability that allow for sustained product development success 
in diverse contexts. The case studies of Audi and Siemens show that dynamic routines 
(learning and reconfiguration) and path dependency are crucial parts of product 
development capability. 
4.1 Pattern of Product Development Capability 
Both companies create unique product paths that develop their competence bases and 
market positions – and this inter-product relationship creates trajectories of long-term 
product development success. Each product development effort should contribute to build 
or continue such a path and affects the firm’s market position as well as the competence 
base which are themselves objects for evolution.  
With such an observation, one can derive propositions based on the dynamic capability 
perspective to product development. I argue that pattern of product development 
capability shows product trajectories that follow or even create evolutions in technology 
and markets and derive the following propositions: 
PROPOSITION 1A. The closer product trajectories follow evolutions in technologies and 
markets, the more sustained new product success is likely. 
…and even more desirable: 
PROPOSITION 1B. The more product trajectories create evolutions in technologies and 
markets, the more sustained new product success is likely. 
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At the beginning of such a product trajectory, Audi and Siemens possessed a market 
position M0 and competence base C0. Their trajectories started with a breakthrough 
project P1 that realized a product/service innovation and initiated a market position M1 
and competence base C1. The expansion project P2 expanded the innovation to other 
market segments and succeeded the path towards market position M2 and competence 
base C2, and the following project P3 penetrated the innovation to market position M3 and 
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Figure 36 – Product Trajectories and Evolution of Market Positions and Competences  
In the following tables, we follow the product trajectories observed at Audi and Siemens 
and have a closer look at the influence of each project on the market position, the 
competence base and the project characteristics that reflect the individual product 
development effort. The analysis is structured along the path of Figure 36. It starts with 
the initial position M0C0 and continues with the breakthrough project P1, etc. 
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Position M0C0 





Project Audi A8 (D2) 
Before Breakthrough 




Audi’s entry into the luxury 
segment came with the 
1988 V8, with a four-valve 
alloy 3.6 liter engine and 
permanent quattro four 
wheel drive. The Audi V8 
was viewed quite favorably 
by both critics and 
customers and built into a 
satisfying business but it 
failed to beat its 
competitors in most 
performance criteria like 
riding, handling, comfort 
etc. 




complained about the poor 
service quality. 
Both companies occupied 
specific market segments 
but deficiencies for 
entering new market 
segments were evident. 
Competence 
Base 
Audi had strong 
competence in four-wheel 
drives but less competence 
in the luxury market 
segment. Smoothness of 
drive and most refining 
requirements were less 
marked than competitors’ 
products. 
Siemens had strong 
technological competences 
in voice networks. But they 
were hardly aware of data 
communication and 
Internet technology.  
Siemens had a mere focus 
on product and ‘hardware’. 
Customer service was 
limited to technological 








Both companies had 
strong competences in 
their core business but 
lacked competences in 
future-relevant 
technologies. 
Table 7 – Product Trajectory Position M0C0 
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Project P1 





Audi A8 (D2) 
Breakthrough Project: 
Siemens HiPath 5000 
 
Project Mission Develop an innovative 
product that achieves 
performance advantages by 
implementing aluminum as 
body material for 
automobiles. 
Improve Audi’s position in 
the luxury segment of 
automobiles. 
Develop an innovative 
product that achieves cost 
and reliability advantages 
through implementing VoIP  
technology in the enterprise 
network market. 
Potential for Siemens to 
lead VoIP technology. 
Both companies strived for 
a leadership position with 
an innovative product. 
Dynamic 
Routines 
Audi co-operated with 
Alcoa to use their aluminum 
competence for the project. 
Prototypes were presented 
in various motor shows to 
gain feedback of customers 
on technology acceptance. 
During product 
development, the A8 (D2) 
prototypes were presented 
in two ‘product clinics’ to 
validate the product 
concept by key users. 
A product manager function 
took over responsibility to 
keep costs within the 
product concept. It had to 
report frequently to senior 
management and Board.  
The plan shifted from time 
to time because of 
experimental results that 
did not match plans. Many 
changes in concept design 
were necessary to meet 
aggressive targets. 
. 
Siemens acquired a data 
communication company to 
build competences in data 
communication. 
The reference for product 
performance was the 
original PBX HiCom voice 
network system that set the 
targets for cost, voice 
quality and reliability for 
HiPath 5000. 
The cost reduction of VoIP 
compared to traditional 
PBX was one central 
argument to develop it and 
was, therefore, reported 
frequently. 
A project plan was the 
reference for time planning 
and a prototype was the 




Both companies acquired 
and integrated a 
necessary external 
competence so that it 
became internal. 
Both companies frequently 
validated the product 





with which they wanted to 
be ahead of competition. 
 
Table 8 – Breakthrough Project P1 
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Position M1C1 




After Breakthrough Project: 
Audi A8 (D2) 
Before Expansion Project. 
Audi A2 
After Breakthrough Project: 
HiPath 5000 





The aluminum technology 
was Audi’s key to beat 
competitors’ performance 
attributes in the segment of 
luxury cars. 
The aluminum technology 
was more expensive than 
steel technology but 
allowed a significant 
reduction in car weight. 
Audi decided to realize the 
technology in the premium 
segment where one can 
achieve significant 
performance progresses 
and cost pressures are not 
as high as in smaller cars. 
Therefore the Audi A8 (D2) 
was decided on to develop 
the most light-weighted and 
sporty car in the luxury 
segment. 
With the A8 (D2) aluminum 
technology, Audi matched 
the market trend to reduce 
the weight of automobiles, 
to reduce fuel consumption 







The HiPath 5000 project 
was Siemens’ key to 
expand its market from 
telecommunication 
equipment to software 
applications and services 
based on VoIP technology. 
VoIP makes existing voice 
networks obsolete and 
improves reliability and 
comfort of voice 
communication. It 
represents the next 
generation of voice 
communication.  
Both companies became 
technology leaders in their 
market segments and built 




Table 9 – Product Trajectory Position M1C1 
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Position M1C1 (continued) 
M1C1 Audi Siemens Remark 
Competence 
Base 
Audi experimented with 
aluminum as the body 
material to replace steel in 
order to reduce weight and 
to increase performance 
and the safety of 
automobiles. 
But the organization had 
only sporadic experience 
with aluminum material. 
Most engineers hadn’t ever 
built a car body out of 
aluminum. Therefore 
external aluminum 
competence at the 
aluminum specialist Alcoa 
was acquired.  
To develop the A8 (D2) a 
strategic alliance was built 
with Alcoa, a popular 
aluminum specialist that 
was chosen as an external 
development partner. With 
the A8 (D2), Audi 
developed the product and 
process competence 
internally. 
Audi demonstrated with the 
A8 (D2) that it has the 
competence to reduce the 











Siemens has strong 
competences in telephony 
and acquired a data 
network company. 
Therefore, all necessary 
competences were 
available within Siemens.  
The problem was more to 
combine and integrate the 
traditional voice site with 
the upcoming data site. 
 
 
Both companies have built 
new technological 
competences in the 
course of their 
breakthrough projects. 
Audi gained aluminum 
competence; Siemens 
gained VoIP competence.  
 
Table 11 (Continued) - Product Trajectory Position M1C1 
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Project P2 









Project Mission Develop an innovative car 
that achieves fuel 
consumption advantages 
through implementing 
aluminum technology in a 
higher volume car segment. 
Simplify and optimize 
production technology of 
the Audi A8 (D2) for a cost-
sensitive market segment. 
Establish software 
applications and services 
as strategic goal for 
Siemens. 
Extend VoIP technology to 
mobile devices. 
Pioneer VoIP technology 
as future investment. 
Create a new market 
position for Siemens as 
software and application 
producer. 
 
Both companies expanded 
their technological 
competence from a niche 
to a higher volume market. 
Both companies wanted to 
leverage their 
technological competence 
through the focus on cost 




Many efforts were 
undertaken to simplify the 
production process and 
reduce production time. 
In contrast to the A8 (D2), 
the A2 production process 
was characterized by a high 
level of automated steps.  
During product 
development, the A2 
prototypes were presented 
in two ‘product clinics’ to 
validate the product 
concept by key users. 
Most people assigned in 
the A8 (D2) project were 
also assigned to the A2. 
Siemens integrated a 
company with 




prototypes to validate 
acceptance and product 
performance. 
The most important 
performance attributes for 
Siemens were reliability 
and cost reduction. This 
required large amounts of 
product testing by lead 





Audi’s main focus was on 
deploying a cost-effective 
high-tech car. 
Similarly, Siemens’ main 
focus was to deliver a 
cost-effective VoIP 
application in enterprise 
networks. 
Table 10 – Expansion Project P2 
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Position M2C2 




After Expansion Project: 
Audi A2 
Before Penetration Project: 
Audi A8 (D3) 
After Expansion Project: 
Siemens MobileOffice 





The A2 uses the strength of 
aluminum to increase fuel 
efficiency. The A2 became 
the first four-door car with a 
fuel consumption below 3 
liters per 100 km.  
The A2 wanted to establish 
a trend to sophisticated and 
exclusive cars in smaller 
car segments. It realized 
low fuel consumption 
without other 
disadvantages like less 
safety or less driving 
pleasure.  
The MobileOffice project 
implemented data 
communication technology 
in voice communications. 
Strategically, with 
MobileOffice, Siemens 
became the technological 
leader in VoIP applications 
and offered supporting 
applications and services 
that were not possible 
without VoIP technology. 
 
Both companies expanded 
their technological 
competence from niches 
to higher volume market 
segments. 
Both companies became 
the technological leader in 




With the A2, Audi became 
the leader in fuel 
economical cars. They 
used the product 
technology of the A8 (D2) 
and leveraged this 
competence by developing 
automated mass production 
processes around it. 
The A2 project increased 
the profitability of aluminum 
technology and built the 
basis for expanding the 






Siemens experimented with 
VoIP to reduce costs and 
increase the reliability of 
traditional voice networks. 
With the MobileOffice 
project, Siemens knew that 
they had a competitively 
leading PBX. They used 
their VoIP competence of 
VoIP enterprise networks 
and leveraged this 
competence by expanding 
to application and service 
markets.  
Both companies leveraged 
their competences by 
optimizing aluminum 
technology for cost-
sensitive smaller cars 
(Audi) or by using VoIP 
technology for application 
and services (Siemens). 
Table 11 – Product Trajectory Position M2C2 
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Project P3 









Project Mission Converge A8 product 
technology with cost-





Both companies profit 
from competences built 





With the functional 
competence of the A8 (D2) 
project together with the 
manufacturing competence 
of the A2 project, Audi had 
all the necessary 
competences available to 
develop an A8 (D3) that 
would beat the performance 
attributes of competitors 
and simultaneously provide 
the profitability of an 
efficient production 
process. 
Most people assigned in 
the A2 project were also 












With a state-of-the-art 
product (HiPath) and the 
VoIP application 
competence of the 
MobileOffice program, with 
OpenScape Siemens was 
able to enter the market 
segment of real-time 
communication and 
simultaneously become the 
leader in enterprise 
networks. 
 
Both companies built 
valuable leadership 
positions through their 
product trajectory.  
Table 12 – Penetration Project P3 
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Position M3C3 




After Penetration Project: 
Audi A8 (D3) 





The A8 (D3) had to 
penetrate the A8 (D2)’s 
market position and 
simultaneously increase 
profitability. 
With the help of the cost-
orientated production 
technology of the A2, the 
A8 (D3) now established a 
leadership position in 
product and process 
technology of aluminum. 
The Audi A8 (D3) matched 
the trend to lower car 
weight in order to achieve 
better handling and lower 
fuel consumption. 
 
The OpenScape project is 
a logical progress from the 




builds a new market 
segment of real-time 
communication and has 
years of advantage 
compared to competitors. 
The project matched latest 
evolutions in technologies 
and markets. The customer 
can choose which 
technology he wants to 
have and the ‘real-time 
communication’ business 
shows tremendous 
opportunities for future 
innovations.  
In both companies, the 
product trajectory 
developed valuable 
market positions. Audi 
became technology leader 
in the luxury car segment 
and Siemens became 
technology and service 




Audi demonstrated with the 
A2 and A8 (D2/D3) that 
they have the competence 
to develop and produce an 
aluminum car that is a 
profitable business. 
This competence can now 
be further replicated to 
enter new market segments 
like sports cars where a 
light -weight car body is 
important. 
Siemens had strong 
competences in enterprise 
networks hardware but 
hardly any experience in 
the application and service 
business. With the 
MobileOffice and HiPath, 
Siemens became the 
technology leader in 
enterprise network 
markets. 
This competence can now 
form the basis to develop 
further paths and new 
innovations. 
 
In both companies, the 
previous projects 
established competences 
that formed the basis to 
continue the trajectory or 
to establish new ones. 
Table 13 – Product Trajectory Position M3C3 
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Concluding Tables 9 to 15, if we follow the product trajectories of Audi and Siemens, 
breakthrough projects had to explore something new, bringing a technological 
opportunity from a research status towards a usable product in a small and seizable 
market. Breakthrough projects build new technological competences. Expansion projects 
expand the technology to higher volume markets that are more competitive and cost 
sensitive. The purpose of this project is to leverage the developed competence to the 
requirements of volume markets. Penetration projects utilize and refine the competences 






















Figure 37 – Product Trajectory and Nature of Projects  
With the above, we can argue that the pattern of product development capability shows 
product trajectories with the following elements: a breakthrough project that builds new 
competences in small market segments, expansion projects that leverage competences to 
volume markets and penetration projects that refine competences, penetrate market 
position, and stretch advantages. 
PROPOSITION 2A. The more breakthrough projects build new competences and are 
targeted to niche markets, the more likely sustained new product success is. 
PROPOSITION 2B. The more expansion projects leverage competences and are targeted to 
volume markets, the more likely sustained new product success is. 
PROPOSITION 2C. The more penetration projects refine competences and are targeted to 
penetrate existing markets, the more likely sustained new product success is. 
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As the cases of Audi A8–D2 and Siemens HiPath 5000 show, breakthrough projects are 
associated with high levels of learning indicated by high levels of experiment-based 
iterations and diverse adaptations in product or service architecture. Breakthrough 
projects are linked to an approach that creates new product or service architecture. This 
creation happens through iterative experimental trials, which generate new information 
about technology-context application and component-system interactions. Product 
development tasks are strongly affected by such upgrades because each time the 
product/service architecture has to be upgraded.  
With the above, I argue that breakthrough projects show high degrees of design-build-test 
iterations that create new product/service architecture. 
PROPOSITION 3A. The more breakthrough projects are founded on experimental 
iterations, the more likely sustained new product success is. 
Expansion projects (Audi A2 or Siemens MobileOffice) are linked to an approach that 
reconfigures product and process architecture in order to utilize the new technology for 
volume markets. Iterative experimental trials happen as well but not in the same number 
as in breakthrough projects because the competence built by the breakthrough project can 
be utilized. Expansion projects show medium levels of design-build-test iterations that 
reconfigure product/service architecture. I derive the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 3B. The better expansion projects find the optimal balance between 
experiential planning and experimental iterations, the more likely sustained new product 
success is. 
Penetration projects (Audi A8-D3 or Siemens OpenScape) are linked to incremental 
refinement of product or service architecture. The architecture remains nearly the same. 
Design-build-test trials happen to confirm expectations. Product and service development 
is based on the competences built by the former projects. Penetration projects show low 
levels of design-build-test iterations that refine product/service architecture. I derive the 
following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 3C. The more penetration projects are founded on experiential planning 
based on previous projects, the more likely sustained new product success is. 
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The similarities between both firms are striking. Breakthrough projects (Audi A8–D2 or 
Siemens HiPath 5000) implement a new product/service architecture, expansion projects 
(Audi A2 or Siemens MobileOffice) reconfigure existent product/service architecture, 
and penetration projects (Audi A8-D3 or Siemens OpenScape) profit from their 
predecessors and continue to refine product/service architecture incrementally. Product 
trajectories proceed via building of new competences at the beginning, then these 
competences are leveraged and refined at the end. Both Audi and Siemens strive for 
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Figure 38 – Pattern of Effective Product Trajectories at Audi and Siemens  
4.2 Elements of a Dynamic Capability Perspective to 
Product Development 
We have just seen how Audi and Siemens have built effective product trajectories and we 
analyzed the nature of such trajectories according to the amount of design-build-test 
iterations. The next step is to modify theory and develop policy implications. 
4.2.1 The Limitations of Existing Theories 
Traditional literature on product development has little to say about product trajectories 
and their path dependency and does not readily explain long-term product development 
success. It neither explains inter-product relatedness nor its absence. While there is some 
development of evolutionary explanations for sustained new product success in strategic 
management literature, these theories are without strong operational implications. Thus, 
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one can ‘explain’ sustained new product success from an outside- in perspective through 
notions of product differentiation and market segmentation, but such theories rarely 
explain why product development success remains over time. The same can be noted for 
an inside-out perspective where product development structure and process are supposed 
to be the drivers of long-term product development success. Long-term product 
development success cannot be built on such static perspectives. 
Other approaches are almost equally poor. For instance, the evolutionary perspective 
focuses on industrial environments and their interaction with organizations over time. 
Therefore it provides little gain, though it may provide a starting point. Such an approach 
is quite explicit about the importance of learning and organizational renewal. The concept 
of dynamic capabilities was first to combine the ‘static’ inside-out perspective with 
evolutionary reasoning and provided an argumentation path to explain sustained new 
product success. Thus, it is from a dynamic capability perspective that we draw our 
implications for product development. 
I argue that if we want to explore a dynamic capability perspective to product 
development, I find it necessary to put to the side theories of the firm which define firms 
along their resource position or competence base as well as those which define firms 
according to their industrial position. The former puts zero weight on the product in its 
market context; the latter neglects internal aspects of firms. In my view both need to be 
considered.  
Each of the key variables of a dynamic capability perspective to product development 
will now be analyzed. 
4.2.2 Processes 
The amount of learning decreases from breakthrough projects to expansion and 
penetration projects as depicted qualitatively in Figure 39. Breakthrough projects can run 
many design-build-test iterations during the course of the project, investigating a broad 
set of product and process alternatives. These are compared against each other, with a 
relatively well-defined output target in mind. In the Audi A8 (D2) study, these iterations 
came in an intense, parallel, but relatively short burst. As such, there was ample time to 
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experiment with prototypes and transfer the new technology to the manufacturing setting. 
The telecommunications environment, in contrast, did not require such long lead times 
for the bring-up stage. In a relative sense, the more revolutionary a project emerges, the 














Figure 39 – Product Trajectories and Learning (Dynamic Routines) 
While the study found no projects without significant routinization, routinization was not 
the primary factor in differentiating between more or less effectiveness in breakthrough 
projects. This can be understood in part by the obsolescence of knowledge in situations of 
uncertainty. Breakthrough projects overturn the established context. It is thus 
unsurprising that routinization is not critical to bringing new technologies to market (see 
Figure 40).  














Figure 40 – Product Trajectories and Routinization (Static Routines) 
We derive the following propositions 
PROPOSITION 4A. More effective product trajectories show a high amount of learning in 
the early stages whereas they depend on routinization in the later stages. 
PROPOSITION 4B. The more learning is facilitated in the early stages and the more 
routinization is built in the later stages, the more likely sustained new product success is. 
As Audi’s A8 (D3) makes clear, large performance increases are possible through 
breakthrough projects as well as through expansion or penetration projects. Managing 
penetration projects are associated with a deeply contrasting approach however. The most 
important factors are the emphasis on product and process refinement and operational 
excellence. Rather than doing various iterative experiments to learn, effective penetration 
projects relied on a sequence of analytically driven experiments, gradually confirming 
expectations. Transferring new technologies to the manufacturing setting does not require 
as much time, since the projects are making extensive use of existing, mature equipment. 
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Incremental improvement and refinement is essential for effective product trajectories. 
Experienced project members drove the A8 (D3) project, obtaining a dramatic 
improvement in performance by stretching the existing approach of the A8 (D2) and A2 
by innumerable refinements of product architecture and manufacturing process. 
Similarly, at Siemens, some people started with the HiPath 5000 project, went over to the 
MobileOffice project, and now use their experience in the refinement of OpenScape. 
Managing penetration projects is linked to the pattern of product development capability 
different from those driving breakthrough projects. Rather than an exhaustive focus on 
learning resulting in product iterations and adaptations, evolution appears to be driven by 
refining integration of existing competences. The focus is on refinement and 
optimization. Gaining some new ideas and having a good setup for representative 
experimentation, however, are important to extend old concepts in effective ways. 
In summary, in breakthrough projects, iterative trials and high levels of learning ensure 
that new competences are built. They are leveraged through expansion projects and 
refined by penetration projects. Audi discovered early on the necessity of mastering 
aluminum technology in a high volume production to leverage its aluminum competence. 
Siemens adopted a similar philosophy for its development of VoIP applications and 
VoIP-PBXs but focused on B2B customers. 
4.2.3 Path Dependencies  
The two key aspects of path dependencies in our dynamic capability perspective to 
product development are the competences being employed and the market into which the 
new product is to be launched. If firms attempt to enter new market segments wit h new 
technologies, failure is likely to be the norm because the effort is likely to be outside the 
firm’s learning range (Teece et al., 1994). Product trajectories show path dependencies 
between the products and the firm’s competence base and market position at the time the 
product has been developed. I derive the following proposition 
PROPOSITION 5. The better products are aligned with the existent market position and 
competence base of the firm, the more likely sustained new product success is. 
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At Audi and Siemens, we observed that both firms keep a close distance to market and 
technologies not only at the beginning but also during the course of a new trajectory.  
Market Distance 
Market position matters, but in turbulent environments a firm’s market position is often 
fragile. In automobiles, the evolving customer perceptions make specific models obsolete 
after 6 years at the latest and in enterprise networks it is more the technology dynamics 
that overtake existing product lines. 
A more lasting asset is reputation factors that enable the firm to achieve various goals in 
the market. For product development, reputation is a kind of summary about the firm’s 
current resources and competences and its likely future behavior (Teece et al., 1997).  
Keeping a close market distance was considered to be important during as well as before 
and after each project. This approach is strongly used by Siemens ICN-EN with the 
project OpenScape, where a lead user helped significantly to evolve the application 
concept, providing feedback on features and functionality that have been integrated into 
software prototypes, and suggesting new features and improved functionality that 
improve the match with customer requirements. Siemens is therefore very capable in 
keeping a close market distance. 
Similarly, Audi obtains a close market distance in motor shows and through ‘product 
clinics’ that often give feedback on product design and usability. Quality assurance 
engineers are expected to validate the product and production process from a user 
perspective. They continually compare their product with the functionality and features of 
their main competitors. The extensive internal feedback is then combined with more 
carefully staged external ‘show cars’. This is done to organize market feedback and to 
limit the risk that imperfections in early product releases would damage the company’s 
reputation. 
Technological Distance 
New technologies and features must be translated into product and process architecture. 
Organizations must respond to technology shifts before and even during the course of 
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development projects (Iansiti and MacCormack, 1997). Waiting until all major design 
issues are resolved before product launch wouldn’t be successful because they will never 
be resolved completely. Product development should therefore expect a significant 
amount of design work to be thrown away especially in breakthrough and expansion 
projects. 
The Audi A2 project illustrates these dynamics well. After a partially complete prototype 
had been developed, a main competitor, the Mercedes-Benz A-class, had been struggling 
in specific driving maneuvers because of chassis problems. These problems occurred 
because this space-friendly body concept of the A-class had the disadvantage of a high 
center of gravity compared to other cars. Because the A2 had a similar body concept, 
Audi conducted a comprehensive review of the product and decided that major revisions 
were necessary. The chassis was to be redesigned so that even in extreme driving 
maneuvers the car would be more robust in stability. A new set of features and 
functionality like the open-sky roof was also developed to better differentiate Audi’s A2 
from the Mercedes-Benz A-class. As the effort continued, and the new chassis was 
integrated, the team found that parts of the car’s body also had to be redesigned to work 
with it. As noted, major car components changed during development – meaning that by 
launch date the development team had rebuilt the car almost twice during the 
development cycle. 
Responsiveness merits further elaboration. It varies significantly with project context. A 
product will be successful only if it is introduced to the market rapidly, since the 
customers compare its applied technologies to those of other products on the market at 
the same time. If an organization is not responsive enough, the product will be introduced 
with substantial delays, making its potential at the time of introduction low. As such, 
other factors, such as management behavior and making critical decisions can even there 
make a difference. 
Therefore, product development capability includes responsiveness. Though it is not only 
market distance, it is also not simply technology distance. Product development 
capability was cons istently linked to responsiveness during and between the development 
cycles, going well beyond traditional product development tasks found in traditional 
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product development literature. Once the product specification is defined, opportunities 
for product and process architectures that promise new product success can rapidly 
appear but also disappear. The achievement of product development success frequently 
involved fundamental changes in product and process architecture equipment often 
during development.  
I exemplify this statement with the following scenario: Let’s imagine being at Audi 
halfway through the development of the next generation Audi A8 and realizing that one 
of the key competitors has just presented during a motor show a technology that offers a 
hands- free voice solution to operate the magnificent features and functionalities. To 
respond effectively, we need to know where to find the necessary technology, say 
software algorithms for creating voice processing. We also need to know where to find  
the necessary programming skill, the necessary usability experts, and the necessary 
designers who will translate the technology into a usable and reliable application. We 
need to know how to test the new interface with internal and external users, and we need 
to know how to interpret the results. We need to know how hands- free voice solutions 
influence the vast variety of electronic standards. Then we have to make a critical 
decision: Do we respond by changing the current product specification, which is expected 
to be launched next year, or do we respond in the next generation, which we expect won’t 
be out for at least another three years? And what about the intention of the competitor? 
Does he really want to customize the technology or does he only want to throw us off our 
stride? Responsiveness is an important part of product development capability. I derive 
the following proposition 
PROPOSITION 6. The more responsive organizations are to environmental disturbances, 
the more likely sustained new product success is. 
Overall, my observations confirm the extensive literature on product development that 
outlines the importance of keeping a close distance to markets and technologies (see, for 
example, Clark and Fujimoto (1991)). But we highlighted the necessity to respond 
quickly in the case of disturbances.  
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4.2.4 The Role of Managers 
In the above discussion, I did not distinguish the organization’s ability to develop 
products successfully from the managerial influence to do so. In essence, we were 
focused on organizational routines not on managerial processes.  
If firms have the product development capability to develop new products successfully 
but their managers fail to accomplish that, it would suggest that systematic management 
rigidities limit firms’ product development capability (Barney and Tyler, 1991, Mahoney, 
1995). Indeed, based on their observations of managerial decisions and processes, several 
academics make precisely this argument. Utterback and Kim (1986) argue that managers’ 
familiarity with existing products and markets prevented effective understanding of new 
markets. Christensen (1997) reported that producers of high fidelity stereo equipment 
missed the portable market because they discounted the size of the market. We can derive 
that managers can have a substantial impact on new product success. 
In contrast to traditional research on product development, a dynamic capability 
perspective to product development enables managers to understand their organization’s 
product trajectories and the pattern of product development capability required at each 
stage. With this background, managers can identify weaknesses and deficiencies in 
managing product development of their organization. This analysis was the simple part of 
improving the organization. The more challenging part is to improve the overall product 
development capability. 
Sustained improvement of the ability to develop new products and processes in a path-
dependant context can provide significant advantage in long-term competitiveness. 
Although there are many different starting points and means of improving product 
development capability, successful efforts share some characteristics. Managers should 
recognize in the first instance that enhancing product development capability is an 
evolutionary process and not a destination. Because effective product trajectories require 
attention to many different elements that cut across functions, disciplines and 
organizations, sustained improvement requires fundamental change of product and 
service development activities.  
 Analyzing Case Study Evidence 142 
Since product and service development touch much of what a company does, and since 
sustained and fundamental change must be pervasive to be effective, managerial 
processes are a critical determinant of product development capability. The importance of 
managerial processes and leadership has long been recognized in academic studies of 
product development. Some major issues are 
• Improve Market Position 
With an emphasis on products in their competitive context, managers look to products 
to solve problems in their markets. Change in this sense focuses on the product itself, 
not the development process. Managerial processes appear bold and decisive: senior 
managers may direct an overhaul of a product’s market position through redesign, or 
through the addition of new technology and features, or may develop an entirely new 
product portfolio.  
• Improve Competence Base 
Comparisons with competitors or ‘benchmarking’ can provide managers with 
important information about how to focus attention and energy. Managers often 
recognize the importance of external development partners as the key for new product 
success. Managers may focus on the introduction of strategic alliances, the building 
of core competences, or launching an educational program to develop own 
competences further.  
Still, these considerations are static. In our dynamic view, managers recognize the 
importance of building new product trajectories that will begin to change the 
organization’s competitive position. They also recognize the importance of developing 
those products in a way that is determined by its trajectory position (breakthrough, 
expansion or penetration).  
While managers who have this ‘broader’ view may do many things that those caught in a 
static view (redesign products, fill gaps with training, or modify organizational structure), 
they do so with a broad comprehensive focus. The leadership they exercise focuses on the 
expansive vision of what the organization ought to become in the future as well as on the 
substantive details of everyday product development. In this context, effective leaders 
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pay careful attention to both the whole (firm/trajectory) and the part (project). The 
successful building of new product trajectories over a long period of time is a matter of 
consistency between the sole project dimension and the overall new product trajectories 
the firm aims to achieve. I derive the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 7. The clearer the path the organization seeks, the better the alignment of 
individual projects to the overall direction and the more likely sustained new product 
success is. 
With a clear understanding of the path the organization seeks, managers can move to help 
the organization translate that path into product trajectories designed to build specific 
types of competences and market positions. Moreover, their support of that effort must 
include actions to help solve particular problems. In this sense, effective management is 
much more than encouragement. Senior managers must supply critical energy and focus 
for the organization’s path to renew and enhance existing competences. They not only 
coach and counsel with key individuals, but also help define targets and then move to 
educate the organization in their project application. 
Leadership that offers a compelling vision of the evolutionary path – that provides energy 
and momentum to the organization; leads, encourages, coaches, and supports the 
organization is the kind of leadership necessary for managing product development 
capability.  
4.2.5 Project Structures 
Reconfiguration of organizational structure influences product development capability 
either by buildup of organizational inertia or by creating routines that support 
organizational change. At the project–level, Katz and Allen (1982) have found that 
periodic reconfiguration of product development teams prevents them from developing a 
‘not- invented-here’ syndrome. At firm- level, Tushman and Romanelli (1985) argue that 
reconfiguration reduces inertia thereby keeping the organization adaptable. 
Because a dynamic perspective to product development puts emphasis on the market 
context (breakthrough, expansion, penetration), product development projects cannot rely 
on formalized organizational structure. In other words, firms cannot predetermine precise 
 Analyzing Case Study Evidence 144 
patterns in their activities and then impose them on their work through some kind of 
deliberated structures. Rather, many of their actions must be decided upon individually, 
according to the project context. Structure proceeds along the new product trajectory and 
has to be managed. At Audi, a ‘process management’ unit was responsible for 
coordinating and managing all process changes in the standard product development 
process, whereas at Siemens a process management group was responsible for all 
adaptations of the process model. 
At Siemens, a process management team has never been quite sure what it will do next, 
the structure never really stabilizes totally but is responsive to new evolutions in 
technologies and markets. Similar things can be said about Audi, although the 
restructuring process is slightly more formalized here. That is because the organization 
tends to concentrate its attention on projects, which involve more people. I derive the 
following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 8.  The better project structures are aligned with project contexts, the more 
likely sustained new product success is. 
4.2.6 The Nature of Effective Product Trajectories 
Is sustained new product success really possible? How does a new product trajectory 
create momentum to create long-term new product success? Many firms focus on short-
term results because they are required to do so by international accounting standards. But 
short-term results are not enough; longer-term survival must be sought. A start must be 
made to develop new products that increase the chances of durable innovation.  
We regard product development capability or creating trajectories of successful products 
as the essential ingredient for lasting new product success. The task is difficult and often 
subtle. To ensure that all the attributes of product development capability appear, product 
development must avoid the “best practices” so beloved by many. Quality function 
deployment (QFD), venture capital programs or customer and market analyses are 
usually ineffective if undertaken with insufficient attention to the ‘overall’ product 
development capability issues we raised.  
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Establishing product development capability takes time; it cannot be done with a leap. It 
is, for example, seldom clear at the outset, because of uncertainty, just where the 
trajectory should be headed. Even when the direction has become clear, the details of the 
business remain fogbound. Experimentation is necessary to test the feasibility of ideas. 
Too early commitment to a new direction can be risky. A way has to be found to build 
consistently and to link newfound strengths before real and lasting investments are taken.  
While there are many ways such new product trajectories can take, the elements can be 
distilled to identify one path that we feel is more sure than many others. At least, it is a 
three-stage trajectory creation process that is gradual, requiring many steps over many 
years. The process has to be managed and momentum for new product success 
established to allow products to reach for ever more challenging targets.  
I address the question of how a new product trajectory can get started. To place that start 
in context and show where we headed, I begin with a brief summary of the overall model. 
P1 P2 P3
time
A. B. C. D.
 
Figure 41 – A Model of Product Trajectories 
A. Identify ‘productive’ opportunities 
B. Build new competences in small market segments 
C. Leverage competences in volume market segments 
D. Refine competences and stretch advantages 
A. Identify ‘Productive’ Opportunities 
Although it seems obvious to begin by identifying productive opportunities, this vital 
stage is often overlooked. What are these opportunities? Simply stated, opportunities 
occur in response to or, better yet, in anticipation of major changes in technologies or 
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markets – changes that require more than mutual adjustments. An opportunity arises from 
one or a combination of the following: 
• Industry discontinuities – sharp changes in legal, political, or technological conditions 
shift the basis of competition within industries. Deregulation has dramatically 
transformed the telecommunications industry. Substitute product technologies may 
transform the basis of competition within industries. Similarly, the emergence of 
industry standards or dominant designs signal a shift in competition away from 
product innovation and towards increased refinement. Finally, major economic 
changes (e.g. oil crisis) and legal shifts (e.g. patent protection) also directly affect 
bases of competition 
• Product life-cycle shifts – over the course of a product life-cycle, different strategies 
are appropriate. In the emergence phase of a product class, competition is based on 
product innovation and performance, whereas at the maturity stage, competition 
centers on cost, volume, and efficiency. Shifts in patterns of demand alter key factors 
for success. For example, the demand and nature of competition for cellular phones 
was transformed as cellular phones gained acceptance and their product classes 
evolved.  
B. Build New Competences in Small Market Segments 
In the second stage, the organization must set about building new advantages for later 
deployment. It is at this stage that new competences must be developed. Beginning with 
raised aspirations to do better and resolve old problems, in the course of time new 
challenges have to be articulated, which will help all to work to a common purpose. 
Making progress along the chosen trajectory requires managers to experiment and to 
discover what can work and what fails. 
The targeted market segment ought to be small at the start: resources are limited, 
knowledge about possibilities uncertain, and the risks seem immense. At some 
experiments pay off, confidence should increase to the point where major investments in 
new technologies may be required. Learning should be in the scope, though ordinarily 
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some parts of the organization progress more quickly than others. Over time, the 
organization must invest in deepening existing competences and acquiring new ones. 
C. Leverage Competences in Volume Market Segments 
As the breakthrough project proved the feasibility of the new technology, the 
organization can expand the sphere of its innovation into new market segments and new 
products. Pressures of expansion must be balanced against the danger of too much 
complexity,  slowing down the pace of innovation and forcing the organization to a 
standstill. 
Leveraging competences means to apply the already built competence in volume market 
segments whe re requirements are slightly different. If the admired functionality is 
achieved, the next step is on the product side to improve manufacturability, simplify 
technology, reduce complexity, replace over-engineered components, etc. Such a 
leveraging requires market inputs such as customer perceptions of the product and its 
functionality or tests by the popular press. On the cost side, components have to be 
evaluated for high quality and cost efficiency. Such an attempt requires the experience of 
the previous project and in-depth product analysis. 
D. Refine Competences and Stretch Advantages 
With the refinement phase, the firm profits from its former investments in building and 
leveraging competences. It’s the harvest phase in the trajectory. The developed 
competences base provides advantages compared to competitors and can now be utilized 
through better and other products. This happens until new opportunities arise with the 
potential to make the trajectory and the developed competences obsolete. 
Creating successful product trajectories is a process where the stages are not discrete 
steps but rather activities which merge into each other. Organizations create such 
trajectories not only once: they may need to do so repetitively and can possess various 
examples of them. The challenges of one period of time may be resolved, but those of the 
next may again require a new trajectory. 
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At the beginning of creating such trajectories, progress is best achieved in small market 
segments, because resources are limited. Small market segments spread the risks and 
prevent the organization from betting everything on one project. As the trajectory 
proceeds, the risks become better understood and progress more secure, allowing the 
markets to be served to get bigger.  
I stress that or ganizations need time for creating successful product trajectories. It takes 
years to build a truly innovative company. Organizations that aim to become innovative 
have to sink deep foundations, rushing for the immediate success is unlikely to result in 
long-term rewards. 
4.2.7 New Content for Product Development Research 
Increasing dynamics of technologies and markets has deeply influenced the nature of 
product development projects. A dynamic capability perspective to product development 
leads to path dependent considerations emphasizing the building of new competences 
through breakthrough projects, leverage competences through expansion projects and 
refining competences through penetration projects. 
The ‘Broader View’ 
The aim of traditional product development literature to focus on sole projects with clear 
objectives, frozen specifications, and proven technologies leads to a narrow ‘static’ 
perspective. If management acts in such a scattered fashion many opportunities will be 
lost. Audi and Siemens have developed product development capability that enables 
sustained new product success. They invest in new product innovations and regain 
investments through following successive expansion and incremental refinement. 
Developing products in such a generic fashion is more like managing the interaction 
between two streams, characterizing the evolution of technological and market 
possibilities as depicted in Figure 42. The challenge for managers is to direct their new 
product trajectories in interaction with both streams through deciding how and when the 
current product concept is outdated and new opportunities arise. A breakthrough project 
offers to users a new technology of the first stream. The resulting product is not a final 
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outcome but simply the  next step in the interaction between the two evolving streams. 










Figure 42 – Managing the Interaction of Streams  
This model also implies an emphasis towards externally available resources and 
competences. It is impossible to develop the needed breadth of competences internally. 
Even Audi, with its extensive internal expertise in car design, went to Alcoa, an outside 
aluminum specialist to adopt aluminum competence, which accelerated the introduction 
of the first Audi A8. The external focus necessary for such dynamic environments is thus 
not restricted to input from customers, but includes access to a variety of technical and 
market resources, ranging from companies of other industries to the vast variety of start-
up firms possessing interesting technologies. Product development capability thus implies 
access to external resources coupled with integration of them. In other words, both, 
technology and market streams are largely external to the firm, and a core competence of 
a firm acting in such an environment is the interaction between the two, which is part of 
product development capability. 
Neglected Dynamic Routines 
While I remain partial to ‘static routines’ (routinization of activities) in product 
development that is primarily proposed by traditional product development research3, 
                                                
3 see, for example, Cooper (1994) 
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there is a necessary and useful tension between them and ‘dynamic routines’ (learning 
and reconfiguration). ‘Learning’ benefits from ‘routinization’ to pinpoint the necessary 
iterations that have been stumbled upon. The other way round, routinization benefits from 
learning to stay in touch with ‘how it really happens’. In this respect, we can neither 
avoid routinization or learning; they are in some kind of symbiotic relation to each other. 
4.3 Implications for Research 
Several results of this work are worth highlighting. First, my results support a dynamic 
capability perspective to product development. I argued that long-term product 
development success is rooted in path dependant product trajectories that are part of the 
overall product development capability. Based on a literature review, I argued that 
dynamic routines are at least as important as static routines for sustained new product 
success. 
We then turned to empirical considerations and studied positions, paths, and processes at 
Audi and Siemens. Such a dynamic focus, I argued, could provide a better understanding 
of the pattern of product development capability for managers and researchers of 
different management streams where product development plays an integral part. This 
resulted in a dynamic perspective to product development that helps managers to think in 
product trajectories and terms of learning and path dependencies rather than in isolated 
‘best practices’. 
Clearly, a dynamic perspective to product development has much to offer. It sheds light 
on many pressing questions of organization and management while provid ing practical 
guidelines. Here I present a starting point, a taxonomy and frameworks for defining, 
distinguishing, and classifying the major elements of a dynamic capability perspective to 
product development.  
4.3.1 Implications for Product Development Research 
A dynamic capability perspective to product development has some deeper implications 
than ‘traditional’ product development literature. In contrast to existing product 
development literature, where empirically observed ‘best practices’ build the foundatio n 
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of performance and competitiveness, this work puts such isolated and static views into 
question. According to this perspective,  the dynamic aspects of product development like 
learning and path dependencies within and across projects particularly need to get more 
attention in product development research. 
Contrary to my and others’ arguments, a ‘high quality’ process (Cooper, 1996), was not 
found to be the determining source of sustained product development success between 
projects within one company. One explanation is that all projects within one company 
have already adopted similar project organization; therefore they can not be the reason 
for performance differences. Another explanation is that a determined ‘high quality’ 
process doesn’t suit simultaneously for diverse project contexts (breakthrough, 
expansion, penetration). This explanation is consistent with earlier work in product 
development literature that describes how managers in turbulent markets avoid planning 
because it is a futile exercise when the environment is changing rapidly and 
unpredictably (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, perhaps that ‘high quality’ process reduces 
product development success when information is incomplete and uncertain. Consistent 
with othe r authors, it may be better sometimes not to ‘freeze’ the product concept even 
with negative effects on development cost or project lead time (Iansiti, 1995). 
 Traditional Product Development 
Research 





Sole new product success New product trajectories with 
sustained new product success  
Level of 
Analysis 
Mostly sole product development 
projects 
Product development projects as part 
of an unfolding sequence of products 
Focus Static routines: 
product development process and 
structure 
Interaction between static and dynamic 
routines. 
Path dependency of products 
Assumption ‘Best Practices’ are the sources of 
sustained new product success 
Creating valuable product trajectories 
is the source of sustained new product 
success 
Table 14 – Contrasting Traditional PD Research with PD from a Dynamic Capability Perspective 
These findings relate to existing product development literature in several ways. If this 
analysis is correct, it has rather strong implications for theory building and for 
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management. With respect to theory building, it suggests the inadequacy of standard best 
practices that have organizational structure and process as the key if not the only 
determinant of product development success. Clearly, such ‘best practices’ are poor 
guides to management. At a minimum, the ability to establish product trajectories where 
successive projects utilize the competences of their predecessor projects must be 
recognized as major determinants. This work especially indicates that such evolutionary 
considerations are an important determinant of product development success, a point 
made by Leonard-Barton (1992) that has largely gone unheeded by product development 
researchers. 
The dynamic capability perspective to product development developed here is designed 
to shift the structure-conduct-performance debate beyond the domain where Clark and 
Fujimoto (1991), Wheelwright and Clark (1992) and others have put it, and into a new 
domain where path dependencies and learning attain new significance.  
4.3.2 Implication for Dynamic Capabilities Research 
A dynamic capability perspective to product development has some deeper implications 
than the traditional concepts of dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997, Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). Like the concept of dynamic capabilities, the dynamic elements of product 
development capability put emphasis on the firm but extend this emphasis by the real 
operative activities of product development projects both within and across projects (see 
Table 15 for the conceptual contrast between the concept of dynamic capabilities and a 
dynamic view to product development). 
These findings relate to the existing literature of dynamic capabilities in several ways. 
The integration of diverse strategic management perspectives in one cohesive theory 
extends current thinking. It challenges the self-containment of strategic management 
theories because one theory alone cannot adequately explain the pattern of product 
development capability. In most project contexts, product development capability was 
associated with a mix of market-based, resource-based and evolutionary contributions out 
of product development.  
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 The Conce pt of  
Dynamic Capabilities 
A Dynamic View to Product 
Development 
Aim Explaining how and why firms create 
and sustain competitive advantage. 
Explaining how and why firms create 
and sustain new product success. 
Pattern Resource-based perspective with 
evolutionary considerations. 
One cohesive theory that integrates 
several strategic management 




Firm, Industry Firm, Project, Activities 
Operationalization Analyzing Processes, Resources, 
Path, Processes  
Analyzing the interaction of static 
and dynamic routines and path 
dependant new product trajectories 
and their inter-product relatedness. 
Table 15 – Contrasting Dynamic Capabilities with a Dynamic View to Product Developm ent 
The insight that competitive advantage is not only based on markets or resources but also 
on dynamic aspects strengthens the thinking and empirical results of many authors 
(Grant, 1996, Pisano, 1994, Henderson and Cockburn, 1994, Teece et al., 1997, 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Thus, this work joins a small but growing number of 
studies that challenge the self-contained market-based or resource-based studies of 
competitive advantage and relates closely to emergent research on dynamic aspects of 
organizations to overcome the narrow static perspectives. 
Second, the link between product development and market dynamics is mixed. Like 
others, e.g. Teece et al. (1997a), Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), I argued that high levels 
of learning are needed especially in dynamic markets. Yet, for our analysis here, this 
relationship was non-significantly exhibited. Why? 
It was not the market dynamics itself that influenced the rate of learning. It was the 
project context that determined the necessary levels of learning. For example, in 
breakthrough projects (Audi A8-D2; Siemens HiPath 5000), high levels of iterative 
learning was necessary whereas in penetration projects this was not the fact (Audi A8-
D3; Siemens OpenScape). The rate of learning was independent from the market 
dynamics surrounding the projects. 
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These mixed results also relate to previous strategic management literature. Static 
routines have been associated with stable markets while dynamic routines have been 
associated with turbulent environments, e.g. (Tabrizi and Eisenhardt, 1995, Eisenhardt 
and Brown, 1999, Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). What the results here suggest is that 
these past results may hold true in extreme stable or extreme turbulent environments. In 
the environments I studied, the relation between static and dynamic routines depended 
not directly on market turbulence but on the project context. This suggests a contingent 
view of product development in which static routinization is particularly relevant in 
penetration phases, while dynamic learning and reconfiguration is more germane to 
breakthrough phases. In expansion projects with a mix of breakthrough and penetration 
aspects, a combination of routines is likely to be relevant. Table 16 highlights the 









Projects center around 
radical improvement of 
product or service 
architecture.  
Projects center around a 
product or service 
architecture that has to 
be adapted for a volume 
market. 
Projects center around 
incremental refinement 











Outcome Project outcome is 
more or less 
unpredictable 
Project outcome is more 
or less predictable 
Project outcome is 
predictable 
Mentality More dynamic Mixed dynamic and static More static 
Execution Many iterations Some iterations Linear 
Table 16 – Contrasting Breakthrough, Expansion and Penetration Projects  
My work also relates to research on the emergence of competitive advantage. There is 
surprisingly little understanding in strategic management literature of how and why 
competitive advantage emerges. At best, there are some traditional assumptions that 
competitive advantage evolves when specific attributes of markets/resources are 
evaluated: If market positions/resources fulfill the VRIN attributes: Valuable, Rare, 
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Inimitable, Not substitutable (Porter, 1980, Barney, 1991), then competitive advantage 
evolves. Yet, each of these attributes also impairs the quality and effectiveness of 
organizations and fails to deal with how and when specific activities or management 
tasks contribute to this goal. Emphasis on markets and resources is problematic, 
especially in uncertain contexts, because such dictatorial scope might create rigidity. 
Emphasis on markets is likely to impair quality and to sap the confidence of managers. 
So, overall, these sole views are likely to be too simplistic. In contrast, the results here 
provide new insights about the emergence of competitive advantage. One is that the 
emergence of competitive advantage is an evolutionary process and not defined by 
positional attributes of markets or resources. 
Finally, my results relate to the literature of strategic renewal and change. Strategic 
renewal has emerged as an important mechanism when faced with infrequent 
environmental changes, e.g. (Tushman and Anderson, 1997). Yet strategic renewal can 
also occur through small, frequent shifts in how firms compete in the marketplace. For 
example, Henderson and Clark focused on different levels of technological change in the 
photolithographic industry (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Galunic and Eisenhardt 
examined domain changes among the strategic business units within a major electronic 
firm (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). Here, I described product development projects that 
may provide the same type of change in the automotive and telecommunications 
industries. The image is responding to evolving markets and technologies through a 
consistent flow of new products that reposition and ultimately reshape firms. As 
described in Chapter 3, Siemens evolved from a telephone hardware company to a ‘real-
time’ communications company through successive new products and services, while 
Audi evolved from a mid-range car manufacturer to a premium car manufacturer through 
technology leadership in aluminum technologies. This view contrasts with learning by 
wrenching infrequent changes that break long periods of inertia. In this work, I attempt to 
shed light on the sources of sustained new product success, or in strategy parlance, the 
capability that create this type of change. 
Overall, the argument is that only a dynamic perspective can help to explain how and 
why firms enjoy successive and therefore sustained new product success. However, 
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although these links have some substantiation in management literature, they have 
received little empirical testing and rely on limited theoretical logic. 
4.4 Opportunities for Future Research 
Many theoretical links of ‘product development as a dynamic capability’ have been well 
studied. However, some links are less sharply defined and not well tested. These 
shortcomings present research opportunities. 
One research opportunity is to examine the primary links of the developed 
conceptualization – that is, for example, the links between static and dynamic routines in 
product development operation. As was noted, these links have been examined rarely. 
However, because the methodology in this research often involves subjective, 
retrospective studies of single cases, the validity of these links is tenuous. Thus, a test of 
these fundamental theoretical links would be useful. A related research opportunity is 
determining the relative difference in managing breakthrough and expansion or 
penetration projects. For example, Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) found that the different 
nature of projects should be managed ambidextrously. It would be useful to examine the 
robustness of this claim in the light that in expansion projects the competences built by 
breakthrough projects are needed. 
A second area of research is a broader understanding of product development research. 
As was noted, product development research has a fairly well-studied understanding that 
includes practices and their impact on new product success that was developed in the 
context of empirical observations, e.g. Clark and Fujimoto (1991). A dynamic context, 
instead, enables a broader understanding and emphasizes learning and path dependencies 
between development projects; yet this second understanding has received only limited 
empirical examination. The point is that exploring a contingent understanding of dynamic 
routines in project- level practices and their impact at the firm- level is an important path 
for future research.  
Third, our understanding of how management affects product development capability is 
incomplete. Managers are consistently found to be important contributors to product 
development success, e.g. Clark and Fujimoto (1991), Cooper (1996), Leonard-Barton 
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(1992). However, the practice-related concepts in management literature are vague. There 
is also little understanding of the links between management tasks through which 
managers manage product development projects and dynamic routines. These 
management tasks have been virtually unexplored. In addition, previous research on 
product development is vague regarding when and how senior management, project 
leaders and project teams should act. For example, should senior management respond to 
competitive moves by changing the product concept even during implementation? Thus, 
the concepts surrounding managerial processes and their link to product development 
capability offer opportunities for future research.  
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5 Conclusions 
Dynamic capabilities have often been criticized as tautological, vague and non-
operational (Priem and Butler, 2001). To reduce tautology and vagueness from the 
concept, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) proposed to see dynamic capabilities as specific 
processes like product development. I followed their proposition and developed a 
dynamic capability perspective to product development. With this view, my claim is to 
explore dynamic capabilities in a way that is neither tautological nor vague and my 
approach is proved true if the concept of dynamic capabilities provides valuable 
contributions for product development operation.  
In this view, product development is an important organizational capability, yet it is 
challenging to identify patterns of related product development operatio n. Therefore, I 
reviewed a wide range of management literature to identify patterns of product 
development capability that allows us to explain sustained new product success. 
In the course of my literature review, I found that sustained new product success can only 
be explained by dynamic aspects of product development capability. These dynamic 
aspects, such as processes of learning, reconfiguration and path dependencies, have 
hardly been studied within traditional product development literature. I strived,  therefore, 
for empirical evidence looking at how static and dynamic aspects of product development 
interact in two industrial settings at Audi and Siemens. 
Recommendations for Sustained New Product Success 
A number of recommendations were generated based on the case studies at Audi and 
Siemens. Even though these conclusions are context-dependant I think that they can be 
applied in other industries. My recommendations are in three areas: product trajectories, 
product development organization, and the manage ment of learning and reconfiguration 
processes. 
a. Product Trajectories 
The development of new product success involves sequences of steps that often cannot be 
achieved all at once. A single product development project may not be an appropriate 
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framework to obtain sustained new product success. Therefore it seems desirable to 
structure product development projects and technology development into product 
trajectories and to cluster the nature of the project into breakthrough, expansion, and 
penetration projects.  
Breakthrough projects explore something new, bringing a technological opportunity from 
a research status towards a usable product in a small and seizable market and build new 
technological competences. Expansion projects expand the technology to higher volume 
markets that are more competitive and cost sensitive and leverage the developed 
competences to requirements of volume markets. Penetration projects utilize and refine 
the competences built by the previous projects and stretch advantages. 
The main benefit of clustering projects along trajectories is the ability to manage projects 
according to their context. Siemens, for example, performed more iterations in their 
breakthrough project for VoIP technology ‘HiPath 5000’ than in their later expansion and 
penetration projects. So did Audi, where The Audi A8 (D2) had to develop the aluminum 
competence through extensive iterative learning and the follower projects could reduce 
their iterations because the necessary competences were available. 
b. Product Development Organization 
A dynamic capability perspective raises new questions concerning product development 
organization. Current literature on product development emphasizes a plan-and-execute 
process where the product should be planned thoroughly before it is to be executed. I 
think that this view is caught in a static market-based perspective and is only appropriate 
when necessary competences and targeted markets are available and well-known at the 
outset. Such an approach can be associated with a follower role in competition because in 
such a context firms avoid coping with uncertainty. 
But if firms strive to take the leader role in competition they sometimes have to explore 
something new where the required competences and markets need to be built. In such a 
‘breakthrough’ context, a probe-and-learn process seems to be more appropriate that 
iterates between planning and execution. Audi keeps ‘its window of opportunity’ open as 
long as possible before the concept is frozen in order to improve the product concept 
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when new information or insights arise. So does Siemens with the aim to integrate latest 
evolutions of technologies and markets. Both firms showed that they can do both: using a 
probe-and- learn process in ‘breakthrough’ contexts and later utilize these competences 
through plan-and-execute approaches. 
c. Managing Learning and Reconfiguration 
Processes of learning and reconfiguration are often neglected in popular literature on 
product development. I found that such dynamic routines are at least as important as an 
effective sequence of product development activities. 
Learning within product development projects happens primarily through design-build-
test cycles. Audi and Siemens applied many iterations in their breakthrough projects but 
less iterations in the following projects. Both vary design-build-test iterations according 
to the nature of project and balance learning and routinization.  
Reconfiguration within product development projects needs an existing product 
configuration. Such product configurations can be reference prototypes or working 
system models. Audi installed a so called “ÄKO-process” to manage product changes in 
a controlled manner even in later project phases. Siemens adapts continuously a working 
system model as a reference model. Bo th institutionalized reconfiguration in their product 
development operations. 
New Content for Product Development Research 
With our dynamic focus, we have seen how Audi and Siemens build new competences 
through breakthrough projects and how they leverage and refine these competences in 
path-dependant trajectories of product development projects. We explored dynamic 
routines such as learning and reconfiguration as a crucial element of product development 
capability. This work has identified some key issues t hat may become the basis for a new 
content of product development research. First, the dynamic focus may help firms to 
develop from mere ‘follower’ to active ‘leader’ of strategy, ensuring that learning and 
product trajectories are properly used as competitive weapons.  
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Second, a dynamic view offers a number of lessons for the management of product 
development in diverse contexts, providing clear rules to develop, leverage, and refine 
competences through effective product trajectories. Moreover, in order to overcome 
major failures in the implementation of “best practices”, a dynamic capability perspective 
may help managers to better understand the coherence of such practices as part of an 
unfolding sequence of activities that altogether form the overall product development 
capability. 
Essentially, the new rules emerging from a dynamic view of product development may 
change the fundamental beliefs of product development. These beliefs may eventually 
evolve from mere taking charge of the functioning of processes, toward processes that 
enable learning and manage reconfigurations required for bringing a new technology 
from a breakthrough status to a penetration status. 
While the integration of product development operation and dynamic considerations is 
only starting, there are reasons to believe it may be a major research issue within the next 
few years. Going beyond the market-based paradigm of product development where pre-
development planning and design is emphasized, we may be able to infer that a new 
paradigm will emerge focusing on probing and learning at the heart of effective product 
development. This new paradigm could be geared toward ensuring that organizational 
structures are both supportive and generative of effective product development capability.  
Consequently, several new research issues may be addressed within the dynamic view to 
product development. For example, researchers could explore through what kind of 
processes and structures firms institutionalize learning and reconfiguration. In the same 
way, product development may become concerned with the creation of new product 
trajectories, where key sources of new product success may be better rooted. Finally, in 
order to build a strong momentum for new product success, product development may 
provide a new outlook on the design of product development activities that balance 
learning and routinization. 
To conclude, as a new paradigm of product development may be emerging, going back to 
the operational roots of product development, a new integrated research agenda could 
emerge between the research on product development and research on strategic renewal 
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and change. This may overcome some of the unresolved issues of sustained new product 
success. But more importantly, the dynamic view to product development may help 
refocus product development as a truly creative and future oriented activity, geared 
toward integrating and building new strategic advantages through learning and fruitful 
product trajectories.  
I end this work by looping back to the research question. I asked if the concept of 
dynamic capabilities can provide valuable contributions for product development 
operation. From my point of view, the answer is ‘yes’ and I can outline the following 
contributions. 
The important characteristic of a dynamic capability perspective to product development 
is that it involves a pattern of variables that is different from those of traditional 
approaches. From a dynamic capability perspective, product development is seen as 
routines of learning, reconfiguration, and integration, shaped by path dependencies and 
positions of resources and markets (Teece et al., 1997). 
Such a perspective provides a fundamentally different account to explain how and why 
product development success occurs: as we have seen, it puts into question the traditional 
‘plan and execute’ paradigm and suggests a ‘probe and learn’ strategy in order to take an 
active leader role instead of a follower role in competition. Moreover, this perspective is 
not merely focused on the creation of a single new product success; rather it is concerned 
with how companies create trajectories of new product success. 
The work has several conclusions. One is that a dynamic capability perspective to 
product development may be one singular and narrow perspective but can reduce the 
tautology and vagueness from the concept of dynamic capabilities. As noted at the outset, 
there is much research work done from a firm- level perspective (Teece et al., 1994, 
Grant, 1996, Kogut and Zander, 1997, Teece et al., 1997, Pisano, 2000, Zollo and Winter, 
2002) where highly aggregated concepts like ‘routines-to- learn-routines’ are supposed to 
be the source of sustained new product success. There is also much research work done 
from an operation- level perspective (Myers and Marquis, 1969, Cooper, 1979, van de 
Veen, 1986, Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987, Little, 1991, Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 
1995), where e.g. effective project organization has been observed as the source of truth. 
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Both views reveal important aspects. The problem for researchers and managers is to 
balance and combine these views. One way is see ‘product development as dynamic 
capability’. 
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